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

TASHKENT

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

SURPLUS DUPLICATE

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.

BUKHARA

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
K	Kommunist
KOM. P	Komsomolskaya Pravda
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. IX, NO.2

EDITORIAL

During the past three months, CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW has had under consideration two pronouncements on the subject of Central Asian History. The first is by Mr. Inoyatov, a member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, to whose misrepresentation of the Review's object we drew attention two years ago.* In a new article, of which we print a translation in this issue, he accuses CAR of falsifying history and tries to support his charge by three quotations, all shorn from their context and one mistranslated. This is a common practice of Soviet writers in dealing with objectively written material of the kind which appears in the Review: they focus the attention of their readers on critical passages leaving them to suppose that the item under attack contains nothing but hostile criticism. It is in order to give our readers an opportunity of evaluating the objectivity of the Soviet critical approach and of comparing it with our own, that we have translated Mr. Inoyatov's article in full. We hope that the editors of the Academy of Sciences' Journal will see fit to give their readers a similar opportunity by printing a full translation of at least one of CAR's articles from which Mr. Inoyatov has misquoted.

The second pronouncement comes from Sir Gerard Clauson, President of the Royal Asiatic Society. In his review of TURKESTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY by Mary Holdsworth (CARC, 1959), published in the Journal of that Society, he complained that "her account of the cultural background gives the strong impression that she is merely reproducing what she has read in Russian sources and not drawing on her own first-hand knowledge". He goes on to speak of "another exemplification of the ancient truth that people ought not to write histories of countries without being intimately familiar with their languages and atmospheres". This can only mean that no one should attempt to

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* CAR, 1959, No.2, p.106.

write the history of Turkestan except those who have a thorough knowledge of its languages, and have actually lived a long time in Turkestan itself. In other words, the history of Turkestan may only be written by natives of Turkestan, or perhaps by Russians. Lord Curzon, Schuyler and (dare we say it?) Sir Gerard Clauson himself would be quite unacceptable. Indeed, if Russian historians, including perhaps the greatest of all oriental historians, Bartol'd, are objected to, the only person who has ever had the qualifications stipulated by Sir Gerard seems to be Arminius Vambèry. The plain fact is that for reasons which should be obvious, very nearly all the available historical source material on 19th century Turkestan - we are not speaking of earlier periods - is in the Russian language. Very little of this material has been translated into English and Mrs. Holdworth's object was to make some of it accessible to English readers. It is to be feared that if Sir Gerard Clauson's restrictions were carried to their logical conclusion, the history of the greater part of Asia would have to remain a closed book for the West. Where, for instance, would it be possible to find the historian of 19th century India who was not only familiar with her atmosphere but with her twelve written languages? Perhaps the mildest judgment that can be passed on Sir Gerard Clauson's dictum is, "Indignor quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus".

. . .

In this issue we publish two articles on the Dungan Chinese Muslims of whom about 21,000 now live in the USSR, mainly in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Recently this small and industrious Muslim community has received unusual prominence in Soviet writing: in addition to a book by a Soviet Dungan, M. Sushanlo, published in 1959, in 1960 an entire issue (131 pages) of the Journal of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences was devoted to Dungan history, culture, language, agricultural methods and handicrafts.

In the present indeterminate state of Sino-Soviet relations it is natural that the Soviet authorities should wish to lay emphasis on the conditions enjoyed by these Chinese expatriates. It is also to be expected that Soviet official writing on the Dungans should seek to minimize the strength of their adherence to Islam. It is, however, significant that the Osh oblast, where many Dungans are settled, was, at any rate in 1958, regarded by the authorities as a hotbed of Muslim religious survivals. Finally, it should be remembered that both Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, where almost all the Dungan immigrants now live, border on Sinkiang whose five million Muslim population, including one of the largest concentrations of Dungans in the whole of China,

are said to be in a state of great disaffection towards the present Chinese Government.

. . .

One of the many problems which confronts the Editors of CAR is that of the transcription of Central Asian proper names. The matter was dealt with in some detail in an article entitled "Geographical and Personal Names in Central Asia" in No.2 of 1954. The principles enunciated in that article have been adhered to in the Review, except that since 1955, the system advocated by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, that is, exact transliteration from the Russian spelling, has been rigidly followed. The most cogent reason for adopting this system is that it is now followed by the leading British and American cartographers in all authoritative maps published during the past 15 years. The principle underlying the system is that the correct name and spelling of any geographical locality is taken to be that given to it by the supreme administering authority of the territory in which it lies, irrespective of its history or of the language from which it is derived. Thus, the originally Persian name of Shahr-i-Sabz is now shown on British and American maps as Shakhrisyabz. A writer who recently objected to this spelling gave as another example of wrong Russian transliteration the spelling of the name 'Hissar' as 'Gissar'. But if the original Arabic is to be considered, 'Hissar' is no better, for the use of 'ss' suggests that the original 'ṣ' (ṣad) in Arabic is doubled (mushaddad), whereas it is not. The whole question of the transliteration or transcription of geographical names written in a character other than the Latin is a highly complicated one. Those feeling impelled to pontificate on the subject would do well to take advice from a professional body such as the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names.

It must be admitted that there are some aspects of the problem of transcription which seem to elude satisfactory solution. For instance, CAR frequently has occasion to refer both to Soviet Azerbaydzhan and to Persian Azarbaijan, these being the spellings used in the maps of each area. The Tadzhiks of Tadzhikistan and the Tajiks of Afghanistan are one more instance of the same difficulty. Another and probably the most intractable problem of all is that of the transcription of Muslim personal names. For Muslim as well as for Western readers direct transliteration from Russian spelling produces bizarre and often obscure results. This is partly because of the different phonetic values of the Cyrillic alphabet, and partly because of the habit dating from Tsarist times, of adding the suffix '-ov' or '-ev' to make family names out of patronymics. Thus, the common Arabic name usually

written in English historical works as 'Muhiyaddin', or sometimes as 'Muhieddin', becomes in Russian writing 'Mukhitdinov'. The practice generally followed in CAR is to transliterate personal Muslim names relating to the Soviet period from the Russian spelling according to the PCGN system. This is in order to facilitate reference to Soviet source material on which the Review is almost entirely based. Personal names relating to the pre-Russian and to some extent the Tsarist, periods are transliterated according to the usage traditionally followed in English historical works. A new problem will be encountered in the next issue of CAR, which contains an account of Muslim clerical organizations in the USSR. In this it will be necessary to give the names of Muslim dignitaries in their un-Russianized form; but the Russianized forms will be given in an appendix.

Irrigation in Uzbekistan

In the Uzbek pavilion at the Exhibition of National Economy, to be held in Moscow next June, there will be a special section "Irrigation in Uzbekistan" showing past achievements and future plans.
PV. 1.3.61

Uzbekistan's new gas pipeline

The construction of the gas pipeline Dzharkak-Bukhara-Samarkand-Tashkent has been completed. The pipeline is 767 km. long, one of the longest in the Soviet Union. The natural gas comes from wells in Tashkent and the pipeline runs through desert, mountainous regions, rivers and innumerable irrigation canals. P. 5.1.61

THE DUNGANS OF SEMIRECH'YE

PART I

THE DUNGANS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

The settlement of the Dungans - Dungan economy in Semirech'ye - Social structure - Culture.

In 1959 a book on the DUNGANS OF SEMIRECH'YE was published in Frunze by the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences' Institute of Language and Literature. Its author is M. Sushanlo (himself a Dungan, see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1954, No.3, p.249), who in 1957 published an article on the Dungan migration from north-west China to Semirech'ye (see CAR, 1958, No.3). His new book is, in a sense, a continuation of the article since it deals with the life of the people in the Russian territory before 1917. The conclusion briefly outlines the changes it has undergone in the Soviet period. (It has also two chapters on the Dungans in Sinkiang, which are handled in the Borderlands Section of this issue.)

Sushanlo's estimate of the benefits derived by the Dungans from their settlement in Semirech'ye does not differ from other estimates of the importance of the "union" of various peoples with Russia: the Dungans thereby came into contact with the Russian people whose greatness, he claims, cannot be undermined by the fact that men like Stolypin and the Romanovs were Russian (p.26) and, secondly, that the immigrants arrived just in time to join the struggle of the peoples of the Russian Empire against Tsarism, which culminated in the October Revolution (p.3); thanks to this they have by-passed the capitalist stage and been able to move fast towards Communism (p.98).

The settlement of the Dungans

Dzhetysu or Semirech'ye ("land of seven rivers") derives its name from the rivers flowing north-west into Lake Balkhash. In 1846 it was

annexed by Russia and later constituted the Semirech'ye oblast with its centre at Vernyy (now Alma-Ata). Now it is divided between the Alma-Ata and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts of Kazakhstan and in the Chu valley area of Kirgizia.

Arriving in two waves, in 1877-8 and 1882, the bulk of the Dungans settled in the Semirech'ye oblast while some established themselves in the Fergana and Syr-Dar'ya oblasts. The Chu valley was their main area of settlement and the immigrants numbered over 15,000. (P.29) They found the country inhabited by the nomadic Kirgiz and Kazakhs and oppressed by the colonizing policy of Tsarism. At the turn of the 19th century agriculture began to develop owing to the colonization of the country by Russian peasants under whose influence the Kirgiz and Kazakh nomads began to settle.

The Shensi Dungans led by Bai-Yan'-Khu arrived in the winter of 1877 and were allowed to settle at Tokmak and the surrounding region, the district of Karakunuz on the right bank of the Chu. Some settled in the Przheval'sk and Osh cantons (sic) where they received the same amount of land as Russian immigrants. The Dungans from the Ili territory (the second wave of immigrants) received land in the Aleksandrovka volost of the Pishpek (now Frunze) uyezd while some of them established themselves in the Dzharkent (Panfilov) and Vernyy uyezds. In 1884 there were 8,809 Dungans in Semirech'ye, the majority inhabiting the Vernyy and Pishpek uyezds, both towns and the countryside; some Dungan villages were founded. In that oblast lived almost 80 per cent of the immigrants while some 3,000 settled in the Fergana and Syr-Dar'ya oblasts. The proportion of town-dwellers was high - in 1884, 3,307 of them lived in the towns of Semirech'ye and their number grew every year owing to the poor Dungan peasants migrating from the countryside. (P.31)

In order to strengthen its hold on the country, the Government organized a Cossack force in Semirech'ye. Recruitment was open to other nationalities also and as early as 1883 some Dungans of Vernyy and Pishpek were included in the Cossack class. This was of considerable practical value since the Cossacks enjoyed various privileges and received much more land than other settlers. This was at the expense of the nomads whose lands were appropriated by the authorities on behalf of the so-called land fund out of which allocations were made to the Cossacks and other immigrants.

In 1885 distribution of land among the Semirech'ye Dungans started and went on until 1889. Instead of the usual 10 desyatins (one desyatin = 2.7 acres) per person, they received 4-5 desyatins of land which was often unsuitable for raising grain crops. The Ili Dungans


THE DUNGANS
IN SEMIRECH'YE
50
0
50
Miles
PANFILOV
(Dzharkent)
ALMA-ATA
(Vernyy)
Chu R.
Milyanfan
Karakunuz
(Nikolayevskoye)
Aleksandrovka
Volost
FRUNZE
(Pishpek)
Kant
TOKMAK
Sokuluk
Moskva R.
Lake Issyk-Kul'
PRZHEVAL'SK
Yrdyk
(Mariinskoye)
Naryn R.
Karasu
OSH
S I N K I A N G
J. P. - 1961.

were even poorer since they were given only 2-3 desyatins. Altogether the 10,000 or more Dungans of Semirech'ye received 27,168 desyatins of which 2,567 were uncultivable. Thus there was an acute land shortage: the Dungan village of Nikolayevskoye (now Karakunuz), for instance, had in 1912 over 983 households with 4,835 people; they had, on average, 3 desyatins per person while at Aleksandrovka and Mariinskoye (now Yrdyk) there were only two desyatins per person. (P.38) Many households produced no crops at all - about 1915, 29.4 per cent of Dungan farms in the oblast belonged to this category - a larger proportion than among the other nationalities. On the other hand, prosperous Dungan farms with 10-20 or more desyatins under crops constituted 41.3 per cent. (P.39) The poor peasants earned their living as agricultural labourers or moved to the towns; some engaged in trade and crafts.

Dungan economy in Semirech'ye

The main occupations of the Dungans were agriculture, horticulture, small trade and various crafts connected with country life. They adapted their economy to local conditions - thus the main crop of those of Pishpek was rice; those of Przheval'sk cultivated medicinal poppy, colza and pulses, while the Dungans of Vernyy and Dzharkent engaged in horticulture.

The Ili Dungans started the cultivation of rice in the Chu Valley. In 1882 those of the Aleksandrovka volost sowed some 5 desyatins on the banks of the Sokuluk and Ak-Su; but the harvest was disappointing. In the late 1890s they found good rice lands on the banks of the Chu which they leased from the Kirgiz. Even the Dungan town-dwellers of Pishpek did the same, and those of the Vernyy and Dzharkent uyezds started rice growing in 1883. As it expanded, they began to construct irrigation canals to put more land under the crop. By 1885 local rice was replacing in Semirech'ye that imported from Central Asia and soon the former began to export its rice to Tashkent and the Ili region. In 1895 the oblast Dungans sowed some 800 desyatins with rice, while in 1908 in the Pishpek uyezd alone 3,000 desyatins were under rice, and the oblast total was over 5,000 desyatins. (P.42)

The Dungans of the Przheval'sk region specialized in industrial crops and introduced the medicinal poppy into the Issyk-Kul' uyezd. Apart from this, in 1902 they sowed 550 desyatins with flax and over 50 desyatins with pulses. By 1912, 1,535 desyatins were under flax. (Pp.43-44) They became the main suppliers of flax-seed oil in the oblast and many Dungan merchants of Przheval'sk made their fortune supplying vegetable oil to the oblast towns and exporting it to Tashkent and Sinkiang.

The Dungans of the Vernyy and Dzharkent uyezds became the main producers of vegetables in the oblast. By 1889 their horticulture had developed so far that local vegetable prices decreased two or even three times compared with the pre-immigration period when the local Russians were the only ones to grow vegetables. (P.44) The vegetable trade came to be limited almost exclusively to the Dungans who learned from the Russians to grow tomatoes and potatoes.

Although the Dungan farmers had been allotted less and worse land than that held by the others, they used it in such a way that it yielded more income than that cultivated by the other local nationalities. Even the income of the Russian farms was four times lower, and the Kirgiz 28 times lower, the latter being due to the fact that the Kirgiz were mainly cattle breeders. In the case of the Dungans cattle breeding was subsidiary to agriculture from which 94.8 per cent of their income was derived. (Pp.46-47)

As the Dungans had little good land of their own, they leased it from the local population. Those of Przheval'sk held in this way 2,750 desyatins and the Pishpek Dungans leased 5.51 desyatins per farm on average. (P.47) Dungan town-dwellers cultivated such land and agriculture was their main occupation.

Dungan merchants and richer town-dwellers allied with richer farmers to control agricultural production. By making loans of goods and money to the peasants, who subsequently could not repay them, they appropriated better Dungan lands and the poor peasants were left only inferior plots which led them to become the hired labourers of their rich compatriots. This process was so quick that by 1914 almost 90 per cent of the allotments in the Aleksandrovka, Mariinskoye and Nikolayevskoye volosts passed to the rich (p.49), and poor peasants leased land from them.

Social structure

The development of agriculture in Semirech'ye, whose products were exported, caused the growth of the merchant class. The Dungan settlements lay on the trade routes from Semirech'ye to Tashkent and to Sinkiang. Many Dungan "merchant usurers" played an important part in trade with Sinkiang and much of Chinese imports into Turkestan passed through their hands. In 1905 there were 167 Dungans engaged in trade at Dzharkent and 17 at Przheval'sk. At the same time, out of the total 18,021 Semirech'ye Dungans 5,773 lived in the towns. (Pp.57-58) Rich Dungan merchant families had a large share in trade with Russia from where manufactured goods were imported and local raw materials and foodstuffs sold.

The merchants and rich town-dwellers controlled also the small local industries connected with agriculture. Thus in 1913 at Pishpek they had hundreds of oil presses and rice mills (risorushki) and at Przheval'sk they owned almost 80 per cent of the oil presses. (Pp.58-59) They leased land from the Kirgiz bays and manaps and sub-leased it to landless Dungan peasants.

"Class differentiation" in the villages progressed rapidly. It resulted in an increasing number of poor peasants and landless labourers. Taxation completed their depression and by 1 January 1898 the Dungan and Uygur immigrants owed the State 6,048 rubles 89 kopecks, which sum increased subsequently to 15,000 rubles. Their inability to pay it made the peasants flee to China. At the beginning of 1914 in the Kuldja region of Sinkiang there were 1,462 Dungans who were Russian subjects. (Pp.67,69)

The Muslim clergy played a very important part in Dungan society. The believers paid various taxes for clerical purposes and the large number of mosques and "houses of prayer" (sic) in the Dungan settlements of Semirech'ye testifies to the wealth of the clergy. Before the Revolution almost every Dungan village had 10 mosques. There was one mosque for every 50 Dungan householders and in the Dungan settlements of the Pishpek and Przheval'sk uyezds there were some 50 mosques and houses of prayer. (P.35)

As in their Chinese homeland, the clergy was numerous among the Dungan settlers. In 1888 there were 841 people in the Dungan quarter of Pishpek, served by seven imams and mullas; the population of Nikolayevskoye was 2,639 with 36 imams and mullas; at Mariinskoye there were 1,158 inhabitants with 19 clergy. The average number of mullas and imams was 77 per 8,031 population, but this figure does not include lower "clerical activists". (P.36)

Many of the Dungan clergy were at the same time rich landowners and merchants on whom the population of whole uyezds depended economically.

Culture

Education of the Dungans was very largely in the hands of the clergy. In 1890 the mullas taught 295 children in the Dungan settlements and 460 in 1914. (P.77) Some girls attended the religious schools. The language of instruction was Arabic which the children did not understand. In the Mariinskoye Dungan uyezd there were five religious schools and over 50 at Karakunuz. (P.78)

In order to give their children better education, the inhabitants of Nikolayevskoye in 1884 at their own expense completed the building of a Russian school and subsequently similar schools appeared in the other Dungan settlements of the oblast. Teaching in them was in Russian and secular subjects were studied. Teachers were Russians who had completed the course at the teachers' training college of Tashkent.

To encourage the learning of Russian, the authorities provided facilities for Dungan children to study together with Russians, but the Dungan clergy preached that sending children to Russian schools was a grave sin and this agitation resulted in the number of Dungans attending these schools decreasing from 60 in 1897 to 40 in 1914. (Pp.78-79) It was mainly the children of the rich who went to those Russo-Dungan schools whose teachers were both Russians and Dungans. These schools were very few in number and only two or three per cent of Semirech'ye Dungans were literate. (P.81)

Printing in Dungan was almost non-existent and if anything was published in the language, it was modelled upon Tatar and Chagatay writing (pis'mennost'). Several books on religious subjects in Dungan were published in Tashkent and St.Petersburg.

Oral folk literature was an important part of Dungan culture. It consisted of heroic poems, fables, proverbs and songs, whose range of subjects expanded owing to the new environment which the immigrants found in Semirech'ye.

Dungan and Chinese oral literature was mainly poetry. This consisted mostly of songs divided into "great" and "small". Almost all Dungan "great" songs are translations from Chinese originals. Dungan epic songs are closely related to them and nearly all deal with the "struggle of the popular masses against social inequality in Chinese feudal society". (P.84) One such song of the Semirech'ye Dungans is the "Thirteen Months" where each month covers a period of Chinese history. After singing it, Dungan bards may spend several days relating the events mentioned in each "month". Many songs praise heroes who "opposed Dungan-Chinese feudalism". (Pp.85-86) Dungan poetry is closely related to the Chinese, but the "realistic" tales like KHUNLOUMEN', FIBI and SANGUY are regarded by the Dungans as their own. They are still told by the Dungan fofudi (story-tellers).

The main subject of Dungan songs before 1917 was "the hard life of the people. These songs express a wrathful protest of the people against the arbitrariness of the Tsarist administration and feudal-kulak exploitation." (P.87) Vu San and Magazy Zhubishi were the celebrated authors of such songs, but there were also other poets who propagated "reactionary feudal ideology".

Dungan songs are sung with music; the singers use the khuchinzy (Chinese fiddle) and sanshchyanzy (Chinese three-string mandolin). There were celebrated performers of Chinese musical instruments. Before 1917 their contact with Chinese music was close, for wandering Chinese actors and musicians used to give concerts in the Dungan settlements of Semirech'ye and some even settled there.

Dungan art was mainly practical: jewellery, wood-carving, architecture, embroidery and decorative cut out paper (vyrezki). The last two were particularly important. Embroidery was used to decorate clothes, shoes, various domestic objects and decorative panels. The designs were the same as the Chinese - animals, birds and plants with symbolic significance. Thus "ducks admiring the lotus" represented marriage and loyalty, "the Phoenix admiring dahlias" happiness and long life, etc. Such symbols "expressed the century-old hopes of the Dungan people and their dreams of a happy life". (P.90)

Paper decorations served as embroidery designs and so they also represented symbolic subjects. This craft, like embroidery, was peculiar to women and was carried on in every family.

The traditional symbols of long life, happiness and wealth were also applied in making jewellery, which was mainly worn by women. There were jewellers in almost all Dungan settlements but, compared with embroidery and paper decorations, the jewellers' craft was much less widespread and jewellery was imported from China.

Dungan master-builders were skilled in the architecture of north-west China and in Semirech'ye they learned to use new building materials: baked bricks, roofing iron and plywood. Although they continued to build the traditional Chinese houses, in some of them new features began to appear: iron roofs, large glazed windows and Russian decorative ornaments on the wooden fittings. At the beginning of the 20th century the Dungan communities at Przheval'sk and Dzharkent had mosques in the Chinese style built by Chzhou Sy, an architect from Peking. In spite of the limitations imposed by Islam, dragons are included in the façade.

Dress changed considerably after the arrival of the Dungan in Semirech'ye. Men began to wear some parts of local costume, both Central Asian and Russian. Dungan merchants wore Russian dress. The native population, on the other hand, learned from the settlers to cultivate the land and taught them how to breed cattle.

"In this way, through mutual cultural influence, friendship between the peoples grew." (P.94) The immigrants in the Przheval'sk and Pishpek uyezds began to learn the Kirgiz language while those of

the Vernyy and Dzharkent uyezds spoke Uygur and Kazakh. Dungan town-dwellers used some Russian words and phrases. Many Dungans spoke Kirgiz, Kazakh and Uygur very well but Russian was less common. Some Dungans won local fame for skilful playing of Central Asian musical instruments, singing local songs and even reciting the Kirgiz epic MANAS.

In Semirech'ye the Dungans learned to play musical instruments brought from Russia, like the accordion and balalaika; they sang Tatar songs and some young men learned to dance Russian dances. All these contacts developed in spite of the fact that the "Tsarist satraps of Semirech'ye feared that the Dungans would assimilate the leading Russian culture, for they considered it dangerous that the Dungans should also adopt, together with the Russian way of life, Russian democratic ideas. The rapprochement between the Russians and the other peoples of Semirech'ye and the Dungans took place contrary to their wishes." (P.95)

On the following page the author refutes his own statement just quoted: "At the beginning of the 20th century, in the period of Russian peasant colonization in Semirech'ye, when the Tsarist authorities appropriated Kirgiz and Kazakh lands for colonization, the attitude of the local peoples towards the activities of the Tsarist authorities. . became hostile. . . This attitude extended to the Russian peasants who had settled on those lands. . . The local peoples were unable to distinguish who were their enemies and who genuine friends. . . The peoples of the oblast were culturally backward so that they could hardly be expected to have a clear political outlook and particularly to adopt the correct attitude towards the culture of the great Russian people. . . All this hindered the rapprochement of Semirech'ye peoples with the great Russian people." (P.96) Sushanlo accuses the Orthodox and Muslim clergy of stimulating mutual hostility. Yet in spite of these unfavourable conditions, "the peoples of Semirech'ye associated with one another, learned from one another and laid granite foundations under the friendship of peoples which in our own days has become one of the great corner-stones of the might and invincibility of our multi-national socialist country." (P.97)

After the Revolution the Dungans, together with the other Central Asian peoples, by-passed capitalism and began the transition to Socialism. Dungan kolkhozes were set up, and the women emancipated. Education expanded. In 1928 the Dungans received a new alphabet based on the Latin one, which stimulated the growth of printing. Between 1952-3 the Cyrillic alphabet was imposed on the Dungans, and Sushanlo claims that it "has enabled Dungan philologists to draw-up a well-balanced orthography and grammar of the Dungan language" (p.101). Dungan Soviet literature is represented by Yasyr Shivaz who "shows the Soviet man at work - the worker, creator of new life and a new

culture" (p.102).

This book provides much interesting information about the way of life of an industrious people about whom very little is generally known. Sushanlo, who is a Dungan himself, is probably well qualified to describe it. In some respects, however, the book is unsatisfactory:

1. In his article on the migration of part of the Dungan population from north-western China into Semirech'ye in 1877-82 (TRUDY INSTITUTA YAZYKA I LITERATURY, AN/Kirg. SSR, Vypusk VIII, Frunze, 1957) he says that over 10,000 Dungans settled on the territory of present Kirgizia and Kazakhstan (p.136). This figure contradicts the figures he quotes in the present book, although he derives them from an official source, the OBZOR SEMIRECHENSKOY OBLASTI, for various years in the 1880s. Thus on page 31 he says that towards the end of 1883 (k 1884 g.) there were 8,809 Dungans in Semirech'ye; in 1884 there were 3,307 of them living in towns and 5,502 in the country - or 8,809 altogether. In addition, about 3,000 of them settled in the Syr-Dar'ya and Fergana oblasts, so the total figure was 11,809, which is closer to the 10,000 mentioned in the article than to the total figure given in the book - 15,000 (p.29). Subsequently their number increased to 18,021 in 1905 (p.57). When dealing with the Soviet period he does not explain why by 1939 they had shrunk to about 15,000 (OCHERKI OBSHCHEY ETNOGRAFII, AZIATSKAYA CHAST' SSSR. Ed. S.P. Tolstov and others. Moscow, 1960, p.272). According to the 1959 census their number now stands at 21,000.

2. The question of land distribution is not clear: on page 30 he says that the immigrants of 1877-8 were treated in this respect like Russian settlers. In 1885 distribution of land started (otvod nadelov nachali v 1885 godu) and by the end of 1889 all rural male Dungans received only 4-5 desyatins each instead of the 10 which the rules of land distribution of 1882 provided for; some were given as little as 2-3 desyatins. (Pp.37-38) He does not say whether and why the 1877-8 settlers seem to have been privileged in this respect.

PART II

THE DUNGANS AFTER THE REVOLUTION

The early Soviet period - Formation of Dungan kolkhozes - Economic progress - Living conditions.

Kh. Yusurov's article "Preobrazovaniye Sel'skogo Khozyaystva u Sovetskikh Dungan" (IZVESTIYA AN/KIRG. SSR, Seriya Obshchestvennykh Nauk, Vol.II, Vyp.2, 1960) outlines the development of Dungan agriculture in the Soviet period. Although limited only to the country dwellers, it throws much light on the changes in Dungan life since the Revolution.

The early Soviet period

In 1921-2 the land and water reform was carried out and in 1927-9 the reform of the system of land exploitation (reforma po zemleustroystvu) took place in Semirech'ye. Land confiscated from the bays was divided among the peasantry and the Dungans also had a share in this redistribution. Those of Frunze were given allotments on the left bank of the Chu where a new Dungan village, Milyanfan, was set up. Landless Dungans were granted land in various districts where new Dungan settlements sprang up subsequently: Krasnyy Milyantan and Khunchi in the Kant rayon, Savay in the Kara-Su rayon and the Dawn of the East artel in the suburbs of Alma-Ata.

On 26 March 1928 the Government of Kirgizia decided to set up cooperatives among the national minorities. They were to be of two sorts: kolkhozes and industrial artels. A similar decree was issued in Kazakhstan. (P.68) Consumers' and production cooperatives were set up in Dungan villages and in some towns: Alma-Ata, Frunze, Tokmak. The consumers' cooperatives grew quickly and encouraged the development of the production cooperatives. In 1922-3 food producing and manufacturing artels sprang up in the towns while in the countryside TOZ (associations for the joint cultivation of land) and small agricultural artels were organized in 1923-4.

Dungan enterprises producing vinegar, honey, starch, oil and vermicelli as well as canteens and "red" chaykhanas (tea-houses) formed food producing artels. Manufacturing artels covered soap works, joinery, shoemaking, dressmaking and other shops.

The Government considered the production artels very important for the national minorities and helped by giving them credit, allowing them to purchase foodstuffs and arranging the sale of their produce.

The poorer Dungan peasants proceeded to form groups for the joint use of cattle and agricultural implements and TOZ, which were basically a form of production cooperatives. By 1925 such a peasant union of over 1,000 households existed at Karakunuz in the Dzhambul oblast. As the forms of collective farming developed, the TOZ began to amalgamate with the groups for the joint use of cattle and agricultural implements and with small agricultural artels.

The agricultural credit societies helped the unions and artels to obtain money, agricultural machinery etc. For example, the Dungans of Pishpek formed six small agricultural artels which organized the first Dungan agricultural credit society, "The Red East". These societies also took steps to encourage the development of collective farming among the Dungans.

The peasants considerably benefited by these developments. Thus in 1926 a TOZ was set up at Aleksandrovka. Originally it consisted of 27 families of which 13 had no houses. A year later the TOZ had already over 40 farmsteads and at the end of 1929 it was converted into an agricultural artel. (P.71) In this way numerous Dungan TOZ and artels appeared in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan in 1926-9.

Formation of Dungan kolkhozes

The Governments of Kirgizia and Kazakhstan helped the Dungans by giving them credit and supplying them with agricultural machinery, which well-disposed them towards the formation of kolkhozes. The TOZ and artels, set up in the previous years, were now gradually converted into kolkhozes such as the Rice Grower, National Minority, Kyzyl-Shark, Red Milyantan and others.

At the same time big new kolkhozes were created by amalgamating a number of TOZ and small agricultural artels. Such were the International, Dekhkan Rice Grower, Red Dawn etc.

The transformation of the small farming units into large kolkhozes was accompanied by class struggle. For example, at Milyanfan before collectivization there were several TOZ including the Poor Rice Grower. Knowing how superior big kolkhozes were to small ones, the local peasants wished to set up a big kolkhoz, which was opposed by kulaks and "other anti-Soviet elements". Finally the poor peasants "unmasked" the "crimes" of the kulaks and in 1931 the Frunze kolkhoz was set up.

In the spring of 1933 the Poor Rice Grower was amalgamated with it. (P.72)

After the "liquidation of breaches of Lenin's principles of the kolkhoz movement" (ibid.) the formation of kolkhozes went faster and a number of new Dungan kolkhozes sprang up while the older ones admitted new members, mainly serednyaki ("middle" peasants). In 1931-2 large Dungan kolkhozes began to appear and the mechanization of agriculture increased their prosperity. In 1934 the first MTS (machine and tractor station) was set up at Karakunuz. It was originally run by Russians and the training of Dungan technical staff was started. As early as 1932 there was a Dungan tractor driver in the Komintern kolkhoz. [Yusurov seems to imply that agricultural production and well-being steadily increased during the collectivization and "dekulakization" period of 1929-30. It seems, however, unlikely that the Dungans escaped the now generally admitted decline which took place at this time. - Ed.]

At the same time the suppression of "class enemies" went on and at Aleksandrovka over 20 farmers were "dekulakized" and about 30 at Karakunuz. (P.73) The growth of large kolkhozes continued owing to the amalgamation of the smaller ones. Thus in 1935 two groups of two small kolkhozes at Aleksandrovka united, forming two larger ones. The prosperity of the kolkhozes grew and the Dungans did their share in completing, in 1938, the construction of socialist society.

When the war started, numerous kolkhozniks joined the army but the work of the kolkhozes did not suffer, for those who remained worked even harder to produce food for the Army. After the "victory of the Soviet Union over Hitler's Germany and imperialist Japan" (p.74), the kolkhozes expanded further and some of them became "millionaires" (having a seven-figure income). This was encouraged by further amalgamation, like that of the two Karakunuz kolkhozes which united with a neighbouring Kazakh kolkhoz. The new one had 3,209 people of 14 nationalities, the majority of them Dungan. (P.75)

Economic progress

The members of the Dungan TOZ and agricultural artels grew prosperous as the economy of their TOZ and artels expanded in the late 1920s. Each poor peasant farm acquired cattle, seeds, means of transport and farm buildings. Thus the Koshchi artel, when set up in 1929 at Aleksandrovka, consisted originally of 51 poor peasant farms, had only 16 draught horses and almost no communal farm buildings. By the end of 1930 the Koshchi had 97 farms, of which 75 were Dungan, 370 head of cattle including 47 draught horses, 86 agricultural machines and implements and 493 hectares of communal fields. (P.76) Other

Dungan kolkhozes expanded just as rapidly. By that time they had surplus grain which they handed over to the State. Subsequently they developed still further and their prosperity increased. The process was not interrupted by the war - for example, Frunze kolkhoz during the war years considerably extended its arable area, increased the number of cattle and horses and the amount of grain it supplied to the State.

Living conditions

The growing prosperity of the Dungan members of the various economic organizations allowed them to give material help to others. As early as 1924 members of the Koshchi union, manufacturing artels and peasants collected large sums of money for the building of a school in Alma-Ata.

With the foundation of kolkhozes the material conditions of their members improved further. For example, the poor Koshchi kolkhoz, set up in 1929, in 1930 could pay its working members 350-400 rubles each plus grain and other foodstuffs. The people of the Red Dekhkan kolkhoz in 1930 refused to take surplus victuals left after the payment of their wages in kind and decided to hand them over to the State. (Pp. 84-85) In 1934 members of Frunze kolkhoz declined to take all the wheat due to them for they already had so much that there was nowhere to store it. (P.86)

The kolkhozniks could now afford to build themselves houses and buy cattle. Their wages went on increasing: in the Komintern kolkhoz in 1931 they received 0.50 kg. foodstuffs and 0.20 rubles per working-day, and by 1935 the figures were 7.15 and 1.5 respectively. (P.85) In 1935 30 bicycles were sold at Milyanfan and 150 more applications for them submitted. (P.87)

After a set-back during the war, Dungan kolkhozes entered upon another period of expansion and the living standard of their people is constantly growing.

"F E U D A L I S M" I N K A Z A K H S T A N

Some difficulties of Marxist historiography

V.F. Shakhmatov's article "The Basic Characteristics of the Kazakh Patriarchal Feudal State Organization" (IZVESTIYA AN/KAZ. SSR, SERIYA ISTORII, ARKHEOLOGII I ETNOGRAFII, Vypusk 3(11), 1959), is an interesting example of the various ways in which Soviet historiography strives to apply Marxist periodization to all human societies irrespective of their civilization and geographical setting.

Shakhmatov criticizes the majority of Kazakhstan's historians writing on the subject, since they represent the state structure (gosudarstvennost') of pre-Soviet Kazakhstan as "mature feudal" differing but little from that of "feudal agricultural" countries. In this category belong even such well-known scholars as Yushkov and Vyatkin.(1) The former has examined the evolution of the Kazakh state structure according to the system applied to settled peoples. Thus he identified the period of the Khans Kasym (turn of the 15-16th centuries) and Yesim (1598-1628) with "early feudal monarchy", that of Tauke (1680-1718) with "social class representative" or limited monarchy (soslovno-predstavitel'naya monarkhiya), while Kenesary (died 1847) and Aryngazy (died 1833) enjoyed "absolute monarchy". Many authors regard the early Kazakh khanates, those of Kasym and Tevekel' (16th century) as "united and strong" and based on fully developed feudal relationships.

Criticism of Yushkov and Vyatkin has made some historians seek a compromise definition of the Kazakh political organization. One of them is Kul'teleyev* who has produced the formula "feudal as regards its class nature, patriarchal feudal in form and early feudal monarchy so far as the form of government was concerned".(2) Shakhmatov, however, finds this as unacceptable as the definitions of Vyatkin and Yushkov.

The tendency to "identify artificially" the Kazakh state structure with the "mature feudal" typical of feudal agricultural states emerged

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* Kul'teleyev's book UGOLOVNOYE OBYCHNOYE PRAVO KAZAKHOV (Criminal Customary Law of the Kazakhs), Alma-Ata, 1955, was analysed in CAR, 1957, No.2, pp.127-42.

as early as the 1920s. Shakhmatov affirms that "all historians or at any rate the majority of them" are guilty of this error. It is a direct result of their false conjecture that in Kazakhstan feudal lords had the sole possession of land from which sprang the authority of the khans and sultans. Accepting this as a fact, the historians have ransacked the "superstructure of society" for traces of feudal institutions and obtained the results they desired: "Falsifying facts only too often or accepting the dream for the reality, they have attempted to find among the Kazakhs fully developed vassalage and the classes of artisans, middle gentry or boyars whem they saw in the so-called middle class of biis, and 'princely' bodyguards in the tyulengut, or retainers in the khans' and sultans' households. But these attempts to find social groups and institutions which in fact did not exist in the early feudal organization of the nomads, are doomed to failure." (P.68)

Marxist definition of feudalism

According to Shakhmatov, Lenin makes it clear that feudalism is a social system associated with settled life and agriculture. According to him, among its characteristics are the allotment of means of production - land in particular - to the "direct producer", his adscription to the soil and his personal dependence on the landowner.(4) The GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA adds that "the base of relations of production in feudal society are the feudal lord's possession of land and his partial ownership of the serf."(5) This makes it clear that, even by Marxist standards, there was no feudalism in Kazakhstan. Shakhmatov's examination of the Kazakh social structure (gosudarstvennost' surely implies the existence of far more highly developed political organization than existed among the nomads) makes it evident. In spite of the fact that he adequately proves this point, he is too obsessed with Marxist periodization to draw this obvious conclusion from the facts he presents. Thus he differs from the historians he has summarily condemned only in that he has replaced their "developed feudalism" with a milder "patriarchal feudal state structure".

Kazakh society

Having denounced his fellow historians, Shakhmatov proceeds to examine the Kazakh society in order to see whether any feudal institutions were present and in each case the answer is negative.

1. The lord's possession of land: The Kazakhs were nomads and clans rather than regions were the basis of administration. The khans and sultans ruled over clans. The sultans (khan's sons) did

not own land, nor did the khans, and the khans did not give land to their sons, but one or more clans to govern. Some sultans, usually the younger sons, never had subject clans.

As the khan had no land which he could grant to the clans to use, he could not use "economic coercion" to make them accept his sons as their rulers. For example, when in 1743 Khan Abulkhair appointed his son, Sultan Yerali, to govern one of the clans, the people refused to accept him. They did not recognize him as their ruler until the Khan had organized a barymta (vengeance raid)and seized a hundred horses belonging to them.

The land used by the clan invariably belonged to it and not to its sultan. The boundaries of the territories where the clans roamed were very vague and the pastures were often used by the first claimant. In some cases, however, the khans and sultans fixed in advance the routes to be followed by the clans, and the pastures and camping sites to be used. This was done particularly in wartime or when grass was poor, that is to say, when such regulation was essential for the well-being of nomad economy; it must not be confused with the rulers' possession of the lands concerned, especially as they often did not know where their clans were going to roam. Peculiarities of the weather affecting the pastures, epizootic disease, robber raids and war might force the clans to strike camp and move away suddenly. There were even cases of rulers forced by their people to roam where they wanted - thus in the summer of 1759 Khan Nurali plainly stated that "all Kirgiz-Kaysaks, both great and small, do not obey my will. . . they are going to move to those parts where their fathers roamed and they not only summon me but force me to go with them" (pp.70-71). Thus the khan's authority was not territorial and the sultans were not his vassals holding land from him [nor did they own cattle - the nomads' "means of production" - Ed.].

2. Military and police organization. The Kazakh khanates had no standing army and in emergency a general levy of volunteers gathered. Clan levies led by clan batyrs (lit. "heroes", from the Persian bahadur, notables some of whom were clan rulers) formed the general levy commanded by khans and sultans known for their military talents. In the middle of the 18th century the Kazakh armed force was estimated at 50-60,000 strong, the majority equipped with firearms; these were only the best fighters and if they went away "the camps still would not be depopulated". (P.71)

The troops lacked discipline and their commanders unity. Each batyr and sultan acted independently with the result that the levy quickly melted away. Moreover, the volunteers constituting it were not

always willing to follow the commander, in which case they quitted the ranks in the middle of the campaign.

Kazakh khans had no feudal bodyguard constituted by vassals dependent on their superiors, but the khans and major sultans had bands of dependent tyulenguts (retainers). They were members of various clans and belonged to different "social strata" who had for some reason placed themselves and their cattle under the ruler's protection. They always roamed with him, branded their cattle with his mark and served him. The poorest of them did his domestic work and tended his cattle together with their own. Their families were obliged to provide soldiers from among themselves when he required. These tyulengut bands, unlike the clan and general levy, were subject to their khan or sultan alone. When the campaign was over, they returned to their homes. Thus the ruler had no permanent bodyguard and the tyulengut troops cannot be compared with the standing druzhina (bodyguard) of Russian princes, as some historians have done.

The khans suffered from the absence of a standing army and after the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia they hoped the Russians would provide them with troops. Thus Khan Abulkhair declared that he had not sufficient means to maintain order among his people and "it was a shame he had always to be alone; so he asked for 3,000 fighting men that he might govern firmly, for with their assistance he will be able to keep everything in proper order". (P.72)

Old Kazakhstan had no central courts of justice and judicial authorities. "Also there was no written code of law which, as we know, is one of the symptoms [sic] of the development of feudal law" (p.72). Customary law was administered by the bii (judges of Kazakh customary law) or occasionally by the khan or sultan when the matter involved different clans. Penalties imposed were limited mainly to seizing the transgressor's cattle or belongings. If he refused to give up the number of animals determined by the bii, the latter allowed the plaintiff's kinsfolk to carryout barymta against him.

There was no police organization and no prisons, which made it difficult for the ruler to enforce his orders. In 1759 Tevkelev, a Russian agent in Kazakhstan, reported: "In public matters they [Kazakhs] sometimes depend on the khan and elders, but as the people do not fear them and do not recognize officials appointed by them, the people carry out only such of their orders as suit them and even the khans themselves cannot force them for they have no power or means to fine or imprison anybody". (Pp.72-73)

As the khan could not enforce his orders, he could not dispense with the support of the bii's, who organized barymta when he required,

though even they themselves were powerless against offenders supported by powerful clans. Sometimes the khan would send men from the auls roaming with him to carry out barymta, but this was a risky enterprise since a strong clan could in turn treat his own cattle in the same manner.

3. The position of the khan: The khan's authority was not hereditary and it could not, therefore, be used to unite the clans and form a centralized state. He was elected by the bii and elders (starshina) who considered first of all the candidate's military prowess, since the khan was regarded primarily as a military leader. The majority of sultans became khans owing to their martial fame.

The sultans of the family of Chinghiz Khan did not belong to any clan and so they had no connexions with the people which were essential to unite the clans in wartime.

The khans had always tried to make their position hereditary but did not achieve it until the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia. Thus Khan Abulkhair, after he had become subject to Russia, repeatedly asked the Tsarist Government to make his dynasty hereditary.

In dealing with matters other than military, the khan was dependent on the bii and elders who were largely independent of him. Their authority among the people was likewise limited. In 1759 Tevkelev and Rychkov reported, ". . . in all the hordes government is so confused that its present state cannot be identified with any known form: the people do not know any political laws and do not understand their common interest. All recognize freedom and safety alone as the common good. For this reason, as has been said, they do not obey their elders or even their rulers, unless avarice or some other such consideration makes them do so. A man adheres to those elders and batyrs who are horsemen like himself. . . The khans' authority depends on their prudence (razsudok) but nevertheless they cannot make all people see reason and obey, which is particularly difficult when dealing with such self-willed steppe people as the Kirgiz [Kazakhs]. This is why Khan Abulkhair used to speak with great regret about this situation, and his son, the present Khan Nurali, feels even worse about it. When he was meeting us and we reminded him of the forthcoming execution of his promises brought to his notice in the ukases, he answered with so much sorrow that tears appeared in his eyes now and again." (P.74)

In 1734 Kiryllov delivered to the Empress Anna a description of the Kazakh hordes in Kara-Kalpakia which said, "in these hordes it is not so much the khans who rule as the elders. This is why they do not let the khans strengthen their position through their men and riches

and they do not elect literate men to be their khans." (Ibid.)

The khan's authority was so small that there were even cases of common men who felt themselves harmed by the khan and demanded compensation threatening to plunder him should he refuse.

The examples quoted refer to the 18th century when the khans' power further declined after the coming of the Russians, but in fact it had never been strong - Tevkelev wrote about Tauke, whom some historians regard as a strong ruler, "he, Tauke Khan, was a wise man whom the Kirgiz greatly respected, but in spite of this they had no fear of him since he had no power". (P.75)

The power of Ablay (sultan, subsequently khan, 1771-81) has also been exaggerated by the historians, but the interpreter S. Gordeyev who was sent to Ablay in 1761 to ask him in the name of the Russian border authorities to release Russian subjects captured by the Kazakhs, reported that Ablay answered, his subjects would not consent to do so while he himself could not use force to liberate the men for "he fears the Kirgiz [Kazakhs], who are base people". (Ibid.)

4. The khan's council consisted of the bii and elders: Their authority has been exaggerated by some historians trying to identify them as a "new category of feudal lords" in order to "represent the Kazakh state structure as feudal and classify it as a class representative monarchy". (P.76)

Some khans held councils of the bii when they could not resolve an important problem without the bii's advice and support. This, however, must not be identified with permanent councils of seniors or with the Russian duma of boyars.

The Kazakh society had but one estate - that of sultans descending from Chinghiz Khan - and there were no classes of gentry, merchants, artisans etc. "The absence of social divisions is one of the proofs of the undeveloped state of the feudal base and also of the state superstructure." (Ibid.)

5. Taxation: Before a military expedition cattle was collected for the maintenance of the bodyguard. As to zyaket (cattle tax) which is sometimes regarded as an obligatory tax on behalf of the khans and sultans paid for the use of pastures which belonged to them, it must be borne in mind that it did not appear until the first half of the 19th century and was limited to the Bukey and partly to the Lesser Hordes. Kazakh customary law does not mention zyaket as a payment for the use of land, or as an obligatory tax and the khans themselves

admitted that since olden days they had had no right to raise any taxes.

Zyaket was known to the Kazakhs as a religious tax for the maintenance of the mullas, building mosques and fighting the infidel. [Originally meaning 'alms' - Ar. zakat, it was one of the principal obligations of Islam.] It was first introduced in the Bukey Horde by Khan Dzhanger (1827-46) who subsequently usurped it as a source of income to himself. In the Lesser Horde some khans and sultans levied zyaket and it was a voluntary payment. It must be emphasized that in all cases zyaket had nothing in common with the feudal land rent.

6. The Church: "The absence of an alliance between Church and State was typical of the nomad state of Kazakhstan. The power of the khan and sultans was not united with the ecclesiastical power. Islam as a feudal religion was not widespread among the Kazakh people owing to the fact that feudalism was undeveloped there." (P.78)

"Feudal Muslim law" the shariat - also did not spread in Kazakhstan. Only such of its laws as regulated relations with the clergy and religion were observed. Some rulers, however, tried to promote Islam among their people - thus Khan Dzhanger of the Bukey Horde sent 127 mullas to the clans for he hoped they would help him to strengthen his government.

Conclusion

Shakhmatov draws the following conclusion from his facts: "Thus the existing Kazakh khanates may be regarded as states of the early feudal type. Further development of the Kazakh state structure into the classical feudal organism could have taken place only with transition from patriarchal feudal to feudal relations with serfdom, which is the basic characteristic of mature feudalism with its monopoly of land ownership dependent on social class, etc. This, however, could have only happened if nomad economy had been replaced with settled life and agriculture." (P.79)

The author's excuse for using the magic word "feudal" is limited to such characteristics of the Kazakh society which in fact need not be feudal at all: "In Kazakhstan vassalage was limited to clan relationships, the tradition of subjection of the younger to the older and membership of the same sultan's clan and family, i.e. these were basically feudal relations of the earliest stage of feudalism." (P.71)

Notes

(1) "Ob Osnovnykh Momentakh Istorii Kazakhskogo Khanstva (v Dosovetskiy Period)", S.V. Yushkov, IZVESTIYA AN/KAZ., SERIYA ISTORII, EKONOMIKI, FILOSOFII I PRAVA, vyp.4, 1948; OCHERKI PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR, M.P. Vyatkin, Alma-Ata, 1941.

(2) UGOLOVNOYE OBYCHNOYE PRAVO KAZAKHOV, T.M. Kul'teleyev, Alma-Ata, 1955.

(3) Lenin, WORKS, Vol.3, pp.140-1.

(4) Ibid., 2nd edition, Vol.44, 1956, p.608.

(5) 2nd Edition, Vol.44, p.608.

Agricultural research centre for Tselinnyy Kray

The Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Grain Farming at Shortandy, near Tselinograd (Akmolinsk), is to be reorganized by the Ministry of Agriculture USSR. The new organization is to be known as the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Grain Farming and will be subordinate to the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin. Its function will be to improve the cultivation of wheat, corn and other crops in the virgin lands, the development of new high-yield varieties of crops, and mechanization.

P. 4.3.61

Kazakh "university for masters of Communist labour"

In the town of Rudnyy, Kustanay oblast, a university has been founded for "masters of Communist labour". The courses are three times a week for four hours, lectures being repeated in the evenings for the benefit of those who work on day shifts. The teachers work on the "social principle" (i.e. they are not paid), and there are 254 people taking the present course. Compulsory subjects include history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, mathematics, Russian language, and draughtsmanship. Later they will specialize in a wide variety of subjects. PART.ZHIZN' KAZ., 1961, No.2

NOMAD ECONOMY IN AZERBAYDZHAN IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY

D.I. Ismail-Zade's article, summarized below, on the history of nomad economy in Azerbaydzhan in the first half of the 19th century (ISTORICHESKIYE ZAPISKI, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of History, 1960), is valuable as the latest of the few existing works on the subject. The only pre-Revolution work devoted exclusively to it is a long article by I.L. Bakhtadze, "Nomads of the Transcaucasian Region", in the SVOD MATERIALOV PO IZUCHENIYU EKONOMICHESKOGO BYTA GOSUDARSTVENNYKH KREST'YAN ZAKAVKAZKOGO KRAYA (Vol.3, Part 2, Tiflis, 1888), which, however, is limited in scope to the last decades of the 19th century.

The interest of Soviet historiography in the Azerbaydzhani nomads was originally inspired by the "socialist reconstruction of the Azerbaydzhani village" involving the complete stabilization of nomads. In the 1920s statistical and ethnographical research was undertaken which yielded a large amount of material relating to those years. Subsequently the subject was discussed in more general works dealing with feudalism. In 1939 N. Bogdanova published an article on feudal exploitation of the Transcaucasian nomads in the first third of the 19th century (ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, Vol.2, 1939). Ismail-Zade's article is the first since then devoted exclusively to the subject of the Azerbaydzhani nomads.

Nomad areas of Azerbaydzhan

Medieval Azerbaydzhan was repeatedly subjected to invasions by nomads, the most important being those of Turkic tribes in the 11th century and of the Tatar-Mongols in the 13th century. These peoples continued their nomadic way of life amidst the local agricultural population.

The pastures they found in the country were of two types: alpine and steppe, which were not irrigated and therefore unsuitable for agriculture. The highland meadows situated in the lateral ranges of the Greater and Lesser Caucasus served as summer pastures while the steppes provided the winter ones.

The best summer pastures (yeylak) lay in south-western Azerbaydzhan and in Karabakh in the Lesser Caucasus. The latter had abundance of water from springs, rivers and snows. In 1899 there were some 307,135 desyatins (1 desyatin = 2.7 acres) of state pastureland in Karabakh. (P.107)

In the north-western part of Azerbaydzhan there were well-irrigated summer pastures in the basin of the Akstaf and the Tarschay. In 1886-8 these covered 68,926 desyatins. Next to them lay the winter pastures (kishlak) of the Nizhne-Karayaz district, 61,525 desyatins in 1887-9. They adjoined the 60,264 desyatins of winter pasture in the Dzheyranchel'skiy region. (Pp.107-8)

The main winter pastures were found on the Kura-Araks lowland - the Muganskaya, Mil'skaya and Shirvanskaya steppes - where not only Azerbaydzhani but also Georgian and Dagestani cattlebreeders wintered with their flocks and herds. Apart from these, there were smaller pasturelands scattered all over the country.

Azerbaydzhan had 37.8 per cent of all Transcaucasian summer and winter pastures combined, but as much as 67 per cent of the latter. (Ibid.)

The distribution of the nomads followed that of the pastures. Karabakh and Shirvan were the main nomad areas. The bulk of nomad communities (obshchestvo) camped on the banks of the rivers where they could grow some crops.

The majority of the nomads in the Baku guberniya was concentrated in the Shemakha and part of the Dzhevat uyezds. In the Lenkoran' uyezd they were fewer and in the Baku uyezd there were no nomad communities because of the absence of suitable grazing lands, so that the local population had to feed their animals outside the uyezd.

In the Elisavetpol' guberniya Karabakh was an important nomad region. It covered the area of four uyezds of which the Shusha had the largest and Zangezurskiy the smallest number of nomads. In the latter, particularly in its western part, roamed Kurdish nomads who were the second largest nomad group, after the Azerbaydzhani, in the country. Nomads of the Nukha, Areshskiy and Dzhevat uyezd brought their animals to Karabakh; in the two former there were hardly any pastures.

Outside this area the main nomad lands lay in river basins and along canals. This was true particularly of the Mugan steppe where all the camping sites spread along the Araks, Kura, Akusha and Bolgar-Chay rivers. Its central and southern parts were almost un-

inhabited because of the shortage of fresh water and the large number of salt lakes. Only in winter were they visited by nomads from Persia.

In the period under consideration nomad economy in Azerbaydzhan was most widespread in the Shemakha and Shusha uyezds. In 1856 nomads constituted 34.07 per cent of the population of the former and 28.6 of the latter uyezd. In the Lenkoran' uyezd they totalled 11.89 per cent, and in the Bukha 5.75, while in the Baku uyezd there were no nomads at all. (P.110)

The nomads

In 1856 the nomads of the Shemakha guberniya* which included a large part of modern Azerbaydzhan, constituted 21.3 per cent of its population and 33.3 of its country dwellers. There were 99,799 people in the guberniya altogether. In 1854 there were 561 nomad camps and 1,271 settled villages. There were 22,035 nomad households (kochevyye dymy), this being 25.7 per cent of all the guberniya households. Thus the nomads constituted about a quarter of the guberniya population in the middle of the century. (P.98)

The nomads were strongly influenced by the way of life of the settled population. Although cattle breeding continued to be their main occupation, at the turn of the 18th century they began to show an increased interest in agriculture and more land came to be cultivated in the winter pastures. While in the preceding period it was done only sporadically, towards the middle of the 19th century agriculture became an essential part of nomad economy. Now, when men and cattle moved to the summer pastures, some people stayed behind in the winter pastures to tend the crops. The expansion of agriculture in this period is borne out by the fact that the Tsarist authorities began to impose taxes in grain and cash on the nomads.

One of the reasons for the transition of the nomads to semi-settled agriculture was the precariousness of cattle breeding. They frequently lost some or all their cattle through bad weather conditions, pestilence or other disasters, while agriculture gave them a measure of security.

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* Since 1840 Shemakha was the capital of the Caspian oblast, which in 1846 became the Shemakha guberniya. It is not clear why Ismail-Zade refers elsewhere to two guberniyas - the Elizavetpol' and Baku - in Tsarist Azerbaydzhan.

Azerbaydzhan SSR
To Batumi
To Makhach-Kala
To Yerevan
Tbilisi
Belokany
Zakataly
Kakhi
GEORGIAN SSR
DAGESTAN ASSR
Akhty
Sholtar
Khudat
Khachmas
Kusary
Krasnaya Sloboda
Kuba
Divichi
Kyzyl-Burun
Ozharat
Nukha
Vartashen
Konakhkend
Kutkashen
AZERBAYDZHAN SSR
Lagich
Alty-Agach
Kukheti
Akstafa
Kazakh
Tauz
Kura
Samukh
Shamkhor
Safaraliyev
Mingechaur
Ismailly
Shemakha
Nasosnyy
Sumgait
Sumgait-Chay
Sabunchi
Mashtagi
Buzovny
Artem Ostrov
Bashkend
Kirovabad
Khanlar
Kasum-Ismailovo
Yevlakh
Khaldan
Agdash
Geokchay
Lyaki
Akhsu
Marazy
Gyuzdek
Khurdalan
Baladzhary
Surakhany
Shiloy
Kedabek
Dashkesan
Adzhikend
Naftalan
Udzhary
Shaumiyanovsk
Chiragidzor
Barda
Kyurdamir
Pura
BAKU
Madagis
Terter
Zardob
Martuni
Mardakert
Kel'badzhar
NAGORNO-KARABAKH AO
Agdzhabedy
Kubaly
Kazi-Magomed
Duvannyy
Sabirabad
Ali-Bayramly
Alyaty
Agdam
Imishly
Saatly
Dzhermuk
ARMENIAN SSR
Stepanakert
Zhdanovsk
Shusha
Martuni
Karadomly
Karachala
Byandovan
Norashen
Goris
Karyagino
Oz. Ak-Chala
Sal'yany
Pusian
Gadrut
Pushkino
Bank
Shakhbuz
Dzhebrail
Garadiz
Kubatly
Neftechala
NAKHICHEVAN ASSR
Nakhichevan'
Astrakhan-Bazar
Abrakunist
Kafan
Masally
Ozhul'fa
Megri
Yardymly
Kirovsk
Port Il'icha
Ordubad
Lerik
Lenkaran'
Astara
IRAN
J.P. 1958.
State frontiers.
Union Republic frontiers.
Autonomous oblast' frontiers.
Railways.
25 0 25 50 75

The development of agriculture affected their dwellings. Primitive structures from reeds and felt as well as dugouts appeared, to be replaced later by stone cottages. The latter began to predominate in the 1860s-70s and became typical in the last two decades of the century.

At the same time cattle breeding continued to be the nomads' main occupation. It was, however, combined with agriculture, so that such nomadic communities had some features of settled life in their winter pastures where they had their fields and dwellings, and thus they became partly attached to the locality.

Nomad tribes and clans survived into the 19th century in name only. In fact they vanished, as groups of blood relations, in the 16th century. Some features of the clan and tribal structure survived, however, as a result of the peculiarities of nomad economy. The ownership of pasture, care of the animals, the provision of water, etc. made it inevitable that the same grazing lands should pass from one generation to the next. Thus, when the nomads applied to Tsarist authorities for permission to settle permanently, they never forgot to emphasize that they must live on the same grazing lands which had been used by their ancestors.

Within the nomad community each family had its own cattle which therefore was not common property. If for some reason a member of the community lost his animals, he was given a new lot by his fellow-nomads after a specified time. All the cattle, however, grazed together and the pastures were held jointly by the whole community.

The Azerbaydzhani tribal community was descended directly from old tribal and clan communities. In the 19th century the names of the majority of nomad lands preserved tribal or clan names. In the 1850s-60s the nomads tended more and more to settle and the communal pastures gradually split into plots owned by individual families. This process made economic inequality among the nomads more pronounced.

Land tenure and taxation

Between 1803 and 1808 after the "union" of Azerbaydzhan with Russia, the khanates were converted into provinces, the majority of them governed by commanders (komendanty), the old social and economic relations survived until the agrarian reforms of 1846-51. The commanders observed the fermany (orders) and the talagi (charters) issued by the former khans granting to the beks villages and camping sites. The commanders themselves rewarded the beks' services with grants of the so-called "inhabited estates" (naselennyye imeniya) to

be managed or held in fief (tiyul).

Feudal relationships changed as a result of the loss of the control of the government by the Azerbaydzhani khans. Owing to this the former dependence of the beks on the khans grew weaker. Arrangements concerning property survived unchanged, with the exception of the "conditional tenure" (uslovnoye derzhaniye) which began to change into possession with full rights, and without any dues and services.

The tiyul continued to be one of the most widespread forms of land tenure. It was of two kinds: the right to gather all rents and taxes or part of them, or the possession of land (villages, camping sites, pastures) together with the taxable peasants living on it. From the middle of the 18th century onwards the latter type of tiyul predominated.

In the 1820s in the Karabakh province there were 527 rural settlements (sel'skiye nazvaniya), of which 295 or 55.9 per cent were nomad camps; in the Shirvan province they numbered 109, or 40.2 per cent out of the total 271. (P.119) In these provinces not only individual nomad sites but whole mahals (districts) consisting of such sites were granted to beks in tiyul. Thus, for example, one, Captain Mirza-Ali, received from Mekhti-Kuli, khan of Karabakh, the Keberlinskiy mahal consisting almost exclusively of nomad lands. Of the total 295 such sites 117 were granted to beks in tiyul by the above khan and his father, Ibrahim Khan. In the Shirvan province 76 out of 109 such sites were held as tiyul. (P.119)

In the first half of the 19th century grants of hereditary tiyul became widespread, but as Russia consolidated her hold on Azerbaydzhan, the position of their holders considerably deteriorated. Tsarist authorities refused to acknowledge the hereditary right of the beks to rule their peasants since the majority of the former had no documents to confirm their claims.

Another common form of land tenure in the Karabakh and Shirvan provinces was that known as mulk (tenure with full rights). In the former province 126 nomad sites and 27 in the latter were held in mulk. (P.120)

The tiyul holder was obliged to render services or perform some special duty or simply to be loyal to the khan, his suzerain. The mulk holder had no such obligations; he could sell his land or pass it to his heirs which the tiyul holder could not do. The position of the latter was stronger also in another respect: he could prove his legal right to hold nomad lands by the simple fact of long possession (davnost') of it, which could be a better argument than presenting

appropriate documents.

The mulk holding had different forms, two of which were the most common at the beginning of the 19th century. The first was limited to rent paid to the mulk holder by the peasants and nomads inhabiting his lands. Sometimes a khan's charter granted him only a part of the rent in the form of some particular tax which he might collect for his own use. Thus the Shirvan khans granted the beks with mulk holdings 1,006 settled and 388 nomad households with the right to enjoy only part of the profits derived from them. (P.121) The rest of the rent went to the khan's treasury, and after the "incorporation" of the khanates into Russia, to the Tsarist Government. There were also lands whose total rent belonged to the mulk holder.

The second kind of mulk was an estate, in the majority of cases inherited. When the khanates were divided into mahals, the so-called mahal beks were appointed to govern them and the mahals administered by them were very often their family property. This arrangement survived after the "incorporation" and the mulk bek continued to receive all the taxes except the newly imposed one on behalf of the Tsarist Government. His lands were used by the peasants who paid him rent and his grazing lands were held by nomads. As the beks did not use such pastures but limited themselves to gathering rents, in 1852 they were appropriated on behalf of the Tsarist treasury.

Thus at the beginning of the 19th century the most common forms of land tenure were the tiyul and the mulk. In the Karabakh province mulk nomad sites predominated (42.7 per cent) and tiyul sites in the Shirvan province (69.6). (P.123)

Like land tenure, taxation remained practically unchanged almost up to the middle of the century. The only trace of the "incorporation" here was a new tax imposed on the population on behalf of the Russian Government; some taxes, too, were now divided between the khan and the Government.

In the late 1840s important changes took place. The Government gained possession of various types of landholdings: the so-called State lands (divani) and lands confiscated from those khans and beks who were hostile to Russia. Pastures were the first to be thus appropriated.

Until the middle of the century the nomads (ilat) rendered the same dues to their lord as the settled peasants (ra'iyyat). In the first decades after the "incorporation", however, the nomads found it easier than the ra'iyyat to meet their obligations. A large amount of free pasture was still available and since the nomad paid tax per head

of cattle, the free pasture allowed him to increase the size of his flocks and herds. The nomads rendered various dues and taxes. The land and income taxes arose from the system on nomad land tenure; they were mainly payments for the use of pasture and were made in kind.

In the Shirvan khanate the serkar was a local variety of rent for the use of winter pasture. Ismail-bek, the khan of Shirvan, derived from it at least 1,000 sheep and 1,000 rubles in Shirvan currency a year. (P.128) Subsequently, the serkar passed to the Russian Government, which charged 4 kopecks per sheep or goat and 10 kopecks per head of cattle. Its total yield was 11,094, probably per annum. (Ibid.)

Another kind of tax was imposed on nomad households possessing some cultivated land. It was paid in kind.

The second group of dues included the poll tax, taxes on dwellings (podymnyye) and others gathered by big landholders and the Government. One of these involved the provision of beasts of burden for the khan, tribal chiefs and beks. A variant of this was the duty to assist the khan when he led a nomadic life - from early spring until late autumn. Each village or nomad camp where he stopped on his roamings had to maintain 40-70 of his servants, 70-150 horses etc. It was a heavy burden on the population.

The third payment of this type was the otakhkharji (lit. room-rent) or the tax on dwellings rendered to the khan in barley and wheat, or in some cases in cash. The value of this tax paid in 1847 in the Karabakh province was 2,000 chervontsy (1 chervonets = 10 rubles). (P.130)

One of the heavier dues was the monetary tax paid by the khans to the Russian Government for permission to enjoy all their usual income. It was a tax on dwellings estimated according to the material situation of the households concerned; some were exempt from it.

The second group of dues included also some minor payments and services concerning individual provinces only and not valid in the rest of Azerbaydzhan.

The dues of the third group can be collectively described as personal services to the lord and the State. Until the "incorporation" military services belonged here, with the nomads providing the majority of the "feudal" levies of the khans. For example, in Nakhichevan' the Kengerli tribe supplied horsemen who were the main part of the khan's host. After the khanate had been "incorporated" with Russia, the tribe had to keep 200 armed horsemen in readiness in case they

might be wanted for war; 50 of these men guarded the border on the Araks. Every six families of the tribe provided one horseman and equipped him with a horse and weapons. (P.132) The situation was the same in the Karabakh khanate where the khans used the nomads to guard the Persian frontier.

The evrez was a common service in settled districts but the nomads were also liable to it. It meant that the people had to work for a period, usually 2-3 days a year, in the landholder's fields. Thus 15 nomad camps in the Karabakh khanate had to plough some land and sow it with wheat (but not reap it) for Mekhti-Kuli Khan, and subsequently for the Russian Treasury. Another service required of the nomads was tending the khan's cattle.

The fourth group of dues included gifts and offerings made to the khans, beks and officials on whom the peasant was dependent. Both the nomads and settled population were liable to them. They were made in kind and money on feast days, weddings and other occasions as well as for no apparent reason at all.

In the nomad economy of the first half of the century, dues in the form of labour and goods (produktovyye) were more widespread than those paid in money. This was possibly because of the common practice of nomads tending the lords' cattle; in the Shirvan and Karabakh provinces there were many small nomad camps consisting of shepherds, herdsmen etc. which rendered no taxes and dues for this reason. In many camps there were also other people exempt from taxes: orphans, widows and the destitute.

Livestock and production

Sheep greatly predominated among the nomads' animals. Cattle were kept mainly by settled peasants, while horses and camels were the nomads' draught animals.

Compared with cattle, sheep were cheap to maintain and the profit they brought was almost as good as that derived from cattle. Thus the nomad had an income of 100-150 rubles a year per 100 sheep (sale of lambs, wool, cheese etc.).

In the middle of the century the nomadic and semi-nomadic population of Transcaucasia had some five million sheep and some hundreds of thousands of horses and cattle. Thus each household had 30-100 animals. (P.111)

The nomads suffered heavy losses when sheep died of starvation in

winter and when pestilence broke out. The year 1859 was particularly bad in this respect - in the Lenkoran' uyezd alone 13,776 animals fell ill between 26 January-6 July and 8,123 of these died, while in the Shemakha uyezd 907 out of 2,581 affected animals died in the first seven months of the year. (P.112)

The nomads sold not only cattle but also animal products - fat, cheese, wool etc., as well as goods manufactured by their women - carpets, bags, ropes, horse-cloths and other commodities.

About the middle of the century the sale of animal products were considerable and the nomads made an important contribution to the economic life of the country. The total value of animals and animal products sold in 1845 in the Caspian oblast was 532,585 rubles as compared with 796,916 rubles worth of grain. (P.116) The bulk of this trade was done at local markets. The nomads themselves used little milk, cheese and other such products, most of which was sold. Thus, according to Tsarist records, in the early 1830s 17,000 puds (1 pud = 16 kgm.) of fat, 9,000 puds of cheese, and 30,000 puds of wool were produced by the nomads of the Shirvan province and almost all of these were disposed of locally. (P.117) At that time Shirvan supplied with cattle and sheep not only the Baku and Sheki provinces, but also Georgia while large numbers of animals and animal products went to Turkey and Persia.

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Archaeological finds in Tadzhikistan

In the course of work on an irrigation canal near the village of Novabad, Tadzhikistan, recently, large earthenware vessels were found, the largest of them 165 cm. high. According to experts the vessels belong to the 10th and 11th centuries and were used for holding grain and water. Apart from these, earthenware lamps have also been discovered in the vicinity. All the objects are now in the museum of the Tadzhik republic. KT. 4.3.61

The protected snake pit

Three thousand snakes have been discovered in a gorge in the Nuratin Mountains of Uzbekistan. As snake venom is very important to the pharmaceutical industry a reserve is to be set up in the gorge for the "protection" of the snakes. About half a gram of dry venom can be obtained from each snake per year. SU. No.132, 1961

TROTSKYISM IN TURKMENISTAN

An article by Yu.S. Kuznetsov, "The Struggle of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan for Leninist Unity within its Ranks" (IZVESTIYA AN/TURK. SSR, Social Sciences Series, No.3, 1960) deals with a subject very rarely treated in respect of a Central Asian country. Even the detailed official ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR (ed. by A. Karryyev and others, Ashkhabad, 1957) devotes less than a page to it and gives but a very brief account of the episode. Kuznetsov's article, when referring to the Party and the "Trotskyist-Zinov'yev opposition" does not differ from stereotyped propaganda pieces, but gives a rather fuller picture of what orthodox Communists are expected to believe about the impact of Trotskyism in Turkmenistan. Owing to the nature of the subject, however, it must be assumed that some facts are distorted and others suppressed.

Kuznetsov makes use of a variety of sources. The most important are TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 1926-7 and original materials in the republican Party archives. The works of Lenin are also quoted.

At the XIVth Conference (27-29 April 1925) the Party, inspired by Lenin's argument that the Soviet Union had everything necessary to construct a complete socialist society, decided to start building socialism.

"All enemies of Leninism took up arms against this general Party line, the so-called 'new opposition' headed by Zinov'yev and Kamenev being particularly active. Although not allied openly with the Trotskyists so far, the Zinov'yev supporters right from the start shared Trotsky's views and in particular his thesis concerning the impossibility of building socialism in our country because of its backwardness and capitalist encirclement.

"Intrigues of the opposition seeking to transform our mother country into an agricultural appendage of the imperialist states, were unmasked and shattered by the XIVth Congress of the Communist Party (December 1925). The Congress emphasized that the struggle for realizing the Leninist plan for constructing socialism in the USSR was the basis of the general Party line and it passed the historic resolution concerning full development of socialist industrialization in the Soviet State." (Kuznetsov, pp.70-71)

In the summer of 1926 the "Trotskyist-Zinov'yev anti-Party bloc" came into being. It was an "agency of the class enemy within the Communist Party, the mouthpiece of the hostile capitalist encirclement" and it tried to "thwart the construction of socialism and weaken proletarian dictatorship". (P.71)

In July 1926 the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the All-Union Communist Party took steps against the opposition; Zinov'yev and Lashevich were excluded from the Party leadership. Among other branches of the Party, that of Turkmenistan supported the resolutions.

At the end of October 1926 the XVth Party Conference was held. It issued a resolution "Concerning the Opposition Bloc in the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party" in which the Party policy of industrialization was outlined and the "defeatist ideology and capitulatory nature of the platform of the Trotskyist-Zinov'yev bloc" condemned.

After a short period of relative peace the opposition became active once more in the summer of 1927, when "another war threatened the Soviet State" and the "Party and the nation rallied to repulse the war provocators". (P.73) [The "provocator" seems to have been the British Government, which broke off diplomatic and trade relations with the USSR.] Now the Trotskyists began to propagate the "deceitful anti-Party 'platform 83' whose purpose was to mislead the Party masses and destroy the unity of the Communist Party". (Ibid.)

The resolutions of the XVth Party Conference were discussed by the local branches of the Party at the end of November - beginning of December at Poltoratsk (Ashkhabad), Krasnovodsk, Serakhs, Mary and elsewhere. The Party line got full support in Turkmenistan and the Trotskyist-Zinov'yev bloc was condemned. At that time the Turkmen branch had no Trotskyist factions and the situation did not change when some Trotskyists, including I. Chugreyev and Ya. Bogomol'nyy arrived from Russia. At the end of the year, however, the Trotskyists, particularly M. Tumailov and N. Sapozhnikov, began to distribute anti-Party literature and tried to maintain contact with Trotsky and Zinov'yev, and with the opposition group in Tashkent which supplied them with propaganda pamphlets, slogans etc. They tried to recruit supporters and, although Kuznetsov says they had no support among the republican Communists, their efforts were rewarded when Tumailov and Chugreyev obtained leading posts in the Turkmen Central Control Committee of the Party. They exploited their offices to win over to the opposition Communists prosecuted for their misdeeds by the Central Control Committee. (P.74) To the same end they distributed "platform '83'"

[probably a paper] among Ashkhabad Communists, particularly soldiers and industrial workers. The "platform" was also sent to the provinces where the opposition found some support, for example to P. Tikhonov and G. Gizatullin at Bakharden. Trotskyist attempts to organize small groups of their supporters were a failure, one of them, Sapozhnikov, was told by the workers of the Gosizdat (State Publishing House) to stop "agitating" them or they would punish him. Communist workers handed over copies of the "platform" to their Party committees and reported "with indignation" Trotskyist attempts to convert them. The result of all this agitation was that only three "unstable and politically undeveloped" out of the 8,000 republican Party members joined the opposition. (Ibid.)

The ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR mentions another opposition group. "In this debate the bourgeois nationalists were allied with the Trotskyists and Zinov'yev supporters. They disseminated the Trotskyist 'platform 83', slandered the nationalities policy of the Communist Party and tried to incite the Turkmens against the Russians by demanding a 'hundred per cent' Turkmenization (korenizatsiya) of the [Party] hierarchy. Their main purpose was to prepare the way for Turkmenistan's secession from the Soviet Union. But the bourgeois nationalists tried in vain to undermine the fraternal international collaboration of all the nationalities of our mother country, thanks to which the Turkmen SSR had started to overcome successfully its cultural and economic backwardness and to catch up in its development with the leading republics of the Soviet Union." (Vol.II, p.306)

The attempt by the opposition leaders to set up a political party of their own, a "party of capitalist restoration", alienated from them two distinguished adherents: Ye.S. Kazanskiy, commander of an army division, and I.A. Ostretsov, representative of the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Turkmenistan. The latter published in TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 30.6.27 an announcement of his breach with Trotskyism and called upon "all opposition members who honestly and sincerely wish to struggle for Lenin's cause, united within the Party created by him - the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party" - to follow his example.

As Communist immigrants from European Russia showed no marked preference for Trotskyism, the opposition turned to Turkmen Party members. M. Tumailov, one of the authors of "platform 83", drew up a manifesto concerning the national problem, entitled "What will the opposition platform give to Turkmenia?", in which Trotskyist ideas were mixed with nationalist deviations. This document slandered the Central Committee of the Party, demanded that the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party should be abolished, discredited the republican leadership of the Party and tried to create hostility between

the Turkmen and immigrant Communists in order to weaken the Party from inside. Tumailov rejected Lenin's teaching on the nationalities problem and defended "national interests in general", without differentiating clearly between class interests, which made him lapse into "nationalist chauvinism". The Trotskyists distributed this paper among their adherents in the provinces.

The manifesto, however, like "platform 83", was a complete failure and all the republican Party cells as well as the joint session of the VIth plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the Party of Turkmenistan, held on 15-20 September 1927, condemned it.

In the autumn of 1927 the Trotskyists proceeded to establish relations with anti-Soviet elements; at the same time they continued to set up underground organizations and illegal printing presses. In these circumstances the October plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee of the All-Union Communist Party declared that the opposition had started openly to organize an "anti-Leninist Party" with the help of "bourgeois intelligentsia". The plenum decided that an all-Party discussion should be held to examine the situation.

The discussion yielded the desired result. Local Party organizations in Leningrad, Moscow and elsewhere condemned Trotskyism in the very first days of the debate. Seeing their failure, the opposition now turned for support to "classes hostile to the Soviet Government". (Kuznetsov, p.76) But on 10 November the All-Union Central Committee issued orders for the expulsion of Trotskyists from the Party, which "helped the central and provincial branches of the Party to extend the campaign for the Party's unity, to defeat finally the opposition, and to isolate them completely from the Party and the masses". (Ibid.)

In Turkmenistan the discussion took place in the first half of November and the local Party cells were visited by Party leaders sent by the Turkmen Central Committee to elucidate the resolutions of the October plenum. "The discussions were lively and its participants very active. Attendance was good, a large number of people took part in the debates and the Communists actively participated in drawing up resolutions. At the meetings in Ashkhabad, Chardzhou, Kerki, Kizyl-Arvat and Bakharden the Trotskyists made attempts to oppose the Party line. Debates opened with lectures on the resolutions of the October plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Committee, followed by discussions. Representatives of the opposition were the first to speak and often they had to 'go on tour' from one meeting to another and from town to town because of their small number. Ashkhabad Trotskyists N. Sapozhnikov and Ya. Bogomol'nyy, were particularly zealous in defending the views of the opposition. The

former behaved defiantly at the meetings, outrageously slandered the Leninist Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party and insulted people taking part in these meetings. For his rude, demagogic conduct N. Sapozhnikov was promptly expelled from the Party at the meeting held on 12 November 1927." (Ibid.)

The local opposition criticized not only the resolutions of the Central Committee and the agenda of the impending XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, but also the whole home and foreign policy. They accused the Party of opportunism, slandered its chiefs and defended their allies - "international Communist deserters" they also demanded that peasants should be deprived of their hoards of grain, that workers should get an immediate increase in pay, and they condemned the seven-hour working day.

Discussions held in the republican Party cells showed the loyalty of their members to the Party and Government, so that only eleven men voted for the opposition. (Ibid., p.77)

The "Trotskyist-Zinov'yev bloc" was finally shattered at the XVth Congress of the Party (2-19 December 1927) which declared "membership of the Trotskyist opposition and propaganda of its views incompatible with membership of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party". (P.77)

Spider-repellent rugs

There is a shortage of rugs in Central Asia. In order to meet the demand one factory has started to produce rugs from half wool, half synthetic material. But the customers refuse to buy them; they insist that it is only the pile of pure wool rugs that repel tarantullas. IZ. 8.2.61

THE HISTORY OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: SOVIET VIEWS ON FALSIFICATION

The article of which a full translation is produced below appeared in the Social Sciences Series of the Journal of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek SSR*. The Editors of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW feel that this article will be of interest to their readers for the following reasons. In the first place, the instances of "falsification" are all quoted out of their context from works which are certainly not easily accessible in the USSR either in their original form or in translation. This strongly suggests that the article has merely been compiled on the basis of some centrally prepared abstract of foreign publications. Some of the quotations are inaccurately translated: for example, "liberal'noye tsarskoye gosudarstvo" is wrongly given as the translation of the expression "a liberalized Tsarist government" which appeared in CAR, 1956, No.3, p.213. Secondly, it is remarkable that an article which can only be described as a piece of popular propaganda should appear in a learned journal issued by the Academy of Sciences, whose readers would surely be familiar with the details of Uzbekistan's political, cultural and economic progress which Mr. Inoyatov gives at such length. Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, the article is an interesting example of the angry Soviet reaction to mentions of Soviet colonialism made by various Western statesmen last autumn. In their tireless denunciation of Western colonialism Soviet writers seem to have forgotten that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

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* Protiv Falsifikatsii Istorii Sovetskoy Sredney Azii, by Kh.Sh. Inoyatov, SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK. UZB. AN., No.1, 1961.

During the period of the Soviet regime there have been published in the countries of the capitalist camp a large number of books, brochures and articles dealing with the victory of the October Revolution, and the history of the building of socialism in Soviet Central Asia. Many of the authors of these publications - historians, economists, journalists, tourists etc. - try to give an objective account of the history of the victory of socialism and of the present situation in the Central Asian republics of the USSR. Other bourgeois imperialist ideologists, however, ignore historical facts and realities, and in order to please their masters try by every means at their command to bring into disrepute the greatest event of world history - the Great October Socialist Revolution, and to cast aspersions on both the methods used by the first socialist state in the world and the present efficiency of the Soviet regime. Some of them simply falsify historical facts, while others do this under the mask of "scientific objectivity". But they one and all seek to denigrate and distort the real history of our country, to paint the rotten system of capitalism in glowing colours, and by this means to hold up the spread of ideas of socialism and to postpone the inevitable collapse of the capitalist system.

In bourgeois historical literature there are still current the completely outworn ideas which give rise to the assertion that the workers of the national regions of Russia played no part in the October Revolution, that the Soviet regime was "alien to them" and "artificially imposed" by the Russians, and that the peoples of the borderland areas, as it were, supported "their own" bourgeois governments.

The complete bankruptcy and falsity of these fantasies has long ago been refuted (sic) by numerous facts, historical documents, and by the works of Soviet historians. The broad masses of the workers of the local indigenous nationalities played the most active role in the victory of the October Revolution, in the establishment of Soviet power and in the defeat of the united forces of internal and external counter-revolution during the period of the civil war and of foreign military intervention.

During the glorious days of October and the terrible years of the civil war, the peoples of Turkestan together with the other peoples of our country rallied round their own Communist Party and firmly and decisively "voted" for the Soviet regime, for a new, free life, and for socialism.

In the face of generally known facts, the bourgeois mutilators of history concoct absurd fictions about "the Soviet colonization" of Central Asia and about the "lawlessness" of the population of the Central Asian republics, and claim that it is opposed to the Soviet regime. In their pseudo-scientific "works" they try in defiance of the facts to

"prove" the existence of economic and political discriminations among the Central Asian peoples and draw all kinds of comparisons between the colonial policy of Tsarism and the national policy of the Soviet regime. Thus, Kennedy, one of the "experts" on the history of Communism, boldly states that "the charactersitic features of the policy of Russia have remained unchanged. Soviet aims and objectives coincide with those of Tsarism."(1) The author of the article "Leaven of the Pharisees", published in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, in an insolent libel on the Soviet regime, declares that "the liberal Tsarist government would have achieved the same, if not greater success, as the Soviet regime".(2) The same theory is developed by W. Douglas, member of the Supreme Court of the USA, in his dirty, anti-Soviet little article.(3) And throughout his lying book about "modern Turkestan" A. Zeki Velidi Togan tries to convince the reader that the Russians "achieved their domination there. . . by their numerical superiority and by force".(4)

In fantastic and lying slander of the Soviet regime and the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the French bourgeois historian Vincent Monteil yields nothing to Togan. In his book LES MUSULMANS SOVIETIQUES he uses the accounts of various White refugees, traitors to their country, and anti-Soviet foreign tourists, etc., to paint the facts of the Soviet regime in the darkest possible colours. His book is bestrewn with such "expressions" as "Russian colonialism", "a policy of force", "Russian expansion", and "proletarian neo-colonialism". Monteil tries to prove that Central Asia is still "a Russian colony" and that "privileged Russian town dwellers are exploiting the Soviet regime to their own advantage, and are completely excluding the local population from taking any part in active political life".(5)

Another ardent mutilator of history, Walter Kolarz, also tries to attribute to the Soviet regime the carrying out of "active Russian colonization" in Central Asia.(6)

But all these slanderous inventions of our enemies burst like soap bubbles at their first contact with the real facts of Soviet actuality. We do not propose to describe here the state of the economy, culture and the condition of the broad masses of the local population in pre-revolutionary Turkestan. It is well known that before the October Revolution Central Asia and Kazakhstan were typical backward colonies of Tsarist Russia, whose peoples lived in darkness, beggary and injustice, groaning under the intolerable double yoke of the Tsarist colonizers and local tyrants. The economy of colonial Turkestan, diverted as it was to the supply of agricultural raw material to the metropolitan country, developed very slowly and in a distorted and one-sided way. National culture was kept under.

Everything progressive was mercilessly suppressed by the cruel hand of Tsarism and of the local ruling classes.

The victory of the great October Socialist Revolution, the establishment of the Soviet regime and the wise Leninist national policy of the Communist Party opened up a vast scope for the many-sided economic, political and cultural development of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. They received their own, Soviet national statehood. In the republics of the Soviet East the socialist industrialization and collectivization of agriculture were successfully carried out, and as a result colossal successes were achieved in every branch of the national economy. Of this the following facts provide eloquent evidence: At the present time industrial produce is exported from Uzbekistan to 51 countries of the world. A prominent place in the articles of export is occupied by the latest agricultural machinery, compressor plants, equipment for the textile industry etc. The achievements of the republic in irrigation, cotton and silk-growing and in other branches of agriculture are well known to all.

During the Soviet regime a fundamental cultural revolution has been carried out. In pre-revolutionary Turkestan the literate portion of the population did not exceed two per cent, and in the whole region there was not a single higher educational establishment; but today in the republics of Central Asia, as throughout the USSR, the illiteracy of the population has been completely abolished. In Uzbekistan alone 31 higher educational establishments are operating, while in all the republics of Central Asia and in Kazakhstan there are 82 such establishments as well as a large number of scientific research institutions and national academies of sciences. Vast progress has been made in the development of every form of art and literature by the peoples of Central Asia.

All this is well known to the whole world and it is only the despicable falsifiers of history, the rabid enemies of the Soviet people, who can draw any sort of comparison between the predatory colonial policy of Tsarism and the national policy of the Soviet regime, based as it is on complete equality, on brotherly friendship and on the mutual help of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The October Revolution has decisively proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of all peoples and their right to free self-determination and to the development and freedom of their national cultures.

The sovereign rights of all the peoples of the Soviet Union are legally secured in the constitution of the USSR and of the Union republics which were created on the basis of the freely declared will of the people and have voluntarily entered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Possessing equal rights, the Central Asian republics

independently enjoy state power within the limits of their own territory and they themselves decide all questions of their economic, political and cultural life. As is well known the Central Committee of the KPSS and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have recently taken a number of new steps towards a significant extension of the rights of the Union republics and towards the further strengthening of their sovereignty, and this has provided new and clear evidence of the triumph of the Leninist policy of the Communist Party in our country.

Objective foreign observers and investigators also speak of the real freedom and independence of the republics of the Soviet East. In this connexion the reports of the special correspondents of the French newspaper LIBERATION, Albert-Poliard (?) Lanten and Jaques Deroge (?) who visited Central Asia, are of interest. This is what they write about Uzbekistan: "We are in a country which in some ways resembles Algeria. But this is a liberated and independent Algeria, a country whose people have irrigated their own lands, have made them fruitful, and have harnessed the Hungry Steppe, a country which uses atomic energy produced by modern plants, and the power of the natural gas of Bukhara."(7)

The refutation of the slanderous inventions of the bourgeois historians about the "discrimination" exercised against the local indigenous population of the republics of the Soviet East does not present much difficulty. Here are some facts about the national composition of the controlling Party and Soviet organs of the republics of Central Asia and of Kazakhstan. In the Kirgiz SSR, Kirgiz make up 52.8 per cent of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet, 56 per cent in the local soviets, 62.5 per cent of the general establishment of the secretaries of Party obkoms, 71 per cent of the raykoms, 100 per cent of the chairmen of the oblast executive committees, 80 per cent of the chairmen of the rayon executive committees, etc.(8)

In Kazakhstan, about 50 per cent of the raykom and gorkom Party secretaries, and 60 per cent of the leading Soviet workers are Kazakhs.(9)

In the bourgeois press there can often be found slanderous statements about the "assimilation" of the Central Asian peoples and the "destruction" of their culture and traditions etc. Thus, in his book, A. Togan sets up a howl about "millions of non-Russian people being assimilated and becoming Russians in the course of a few years"(10) and claims that this is due to the mixing which goes on in the kindergartens, schools, and in the youth and sporting organizations etc.

This calumnator Togan and other Central Asian "experts" like him are ignorant of the fact that in all the republics of the Soviet East teaching in the schools, tekhnikums and higher educational establishments is carried on in local languages, and that the study of Russian and foreign languages in the national schools, and conversely of national languages in the Russian schools, simply contributes to the development of the culture of the people in question and does not in any way displace native languages or prejudice national sentiments and qualities.

It is well known that before the October Revolution not one of the peoples of Turkestan had its own theatre. There are now theatres in all the republics of Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, for example, out of 28 theatres and concert organizations, 22 perform in the Uzbek language. In Kazakhstan there are 25 theatres with 900 actors, of whom a considerable part are Kazakhs. The remarkable success in the development of various types of theatrical art by the peoples of Central Asia has received wide recognition far beyond the frontiers of our country.

Before the Revolution very few periodicals and newspapers were published in Turkestan, and most of those which did appear were in the Russian language. But today in Uzbekistan alone there are 312 newspapers of which more than 200 are in the Uzbek language. In Kazakhstan there are 268 newspapers in the Kazakh, Russian, Uygur, Chechen, Korean and other languages, and in Turkestan there are 75 newspapers of which the majority are in the Turkmen language.

Foreign falsifiers of history, in their desire to bring into disrepute the great success achieved by the republics of Central Asia in the various branches of national economy and in cultural structure, endeavour to represent certain changes made in the languages of the Central Asian peoples during the Soviet regime as "the compulsory assimilation" of national languages with Russian. For example, in 1956 there appeared in the British magazine CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW an article entitled "Soviet Linguistic Policy in Central Asia", in which the alphabet reforms carried out in the Central Asian republics, are represented as "coercion of the peoples of the Soviet East". The author of the article declares, for example, that the alphabet reforms in Turkey "aim at making the Turkish language as Turkish as possible", but the Soviet reforms, according to the author, "aim at making the languages of Central Asia as Russian as possible".(11)

Such an important measure taken by the Soviet regime as the change over of the scripts used by the peoples of Central Asia from the Arabic to the Latin and later to the Russian alphabet has provided a rich source of all kinds of slanderous inventions by the bourgeois

"historians". Some of them, as for example O. Caroe, claim that this step was taken with the object of isolating "the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from the cultural influence of Turkey";(12) others (for example V. Kolarz(13) and A. Bennigsen(14)), discern here a tendency towards the "russification" and "assimilation" of the peoples of Central Asia. Yet a third group criticize the inclusion of Russian words in the vocabulary of the Central Asian peoples.(15)

But these "students" of the languages of the peoples of Central Asia for some reason forget that the enrichment of a language through another is quite an ordinary phenomenon. All the European languages, for example, have experienced the influence of the Latin language. The close economic, political and cultural ties, and the brotherly friendship of the Russian people with the other peoples of the Soviet Union, and the mutually active part which they play in the building of socialism must inevitably have an effect on the lexical store of the languages of these peoples.

There are in history many examples of linguistic reforms and of the exchange by peoples of an obsolete alphabet for a new one. The replacement of the complicated Arabic alphabet at first by the Latin, and later by the Russian script, which was much more convenient for the Central Asian peoples, had a widespread effect on the cultural structure of the Soviet East and in the acquisition by its peoples of all the achievements of advanced culture and technology. All honest people in the world admit that it is precisely in the Soviet period that the peoples of Central Asia have acquired all the conditions for the successful development of their culture, which has reached unprecedented heights thanks to the wise Leninist national policy of the Communist Party.

The enemies of the Soviet Union also try by every means in their power to cast aspersions on the material condition of the peoples of Central Asia, including that of the children. Thus, V. Monteil, in one chapter of his lying and abominable little book, will have it that "in Tashkent as well as in Samarkand, Russians, Ukrainians and Uzbeks live in beggary, the standard of living is very low, the children, who rarely go to school, are very dirty."(16) One wonders where and when this "man of learning" was able to see dirty, ragged children who only rarely went to school. Everyone knows with what great care and attention our children are surrounded. The Soviet State spares no effort and expense in the thorough education of the little citizens of the Soviet Union, future builders and members of the Communist society. As regards the scope of the general compulsory education of children, it is enough to say that in the Uzbek SSR, according to the records of the Ministry of Education, there are over 1,354,000 pupils of whom 79.4 per cent are from the local indigenous nationalities. In 1914,

by the way, only 17,300 children went to school in Uzbekistan.

The inexcusable lies of the "child loving" falsifiers are also refuted by the eloquent testimony of many foreign tourists who have spent some time in Central Asia. For example, a British journalist, Sam Russell, has written: "When I was making preparations to leave for Uzbekistan, I came across by chance in a book an account based on facts published in one of the numbers of the magazine VESTNIK VOSPITANIYA (Educational Bulletin) for 1908. At the rate of progress at that time 4,600 years would have been necessary to do away with the prevailing illiteracy in Central Asia. In Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand and Stalinabad I saw with my own eyes how the Soviet regime had been able to solve this problem 200 times more quickly. And now it is possible to speak not only of the abolition of illiteracy but of the creation in these formerly backward areas of a new national culture, based on a wide network of schools, higher educational establishments, theatres and academies of sciences."(17)

"The level of public health and education in Central Asia", says an article by Delgado on "The Soviet Central Asian Republics" published in the magazine EASTERN WORLD, "has improved so rapidly during the Soviet regime that it bears comparison not with the neighbouring Asiatic countries, but with the countries of Western Europe."(18)

As regards the statements of Monteil about the "beggarly existence" of the Central Asian peoples, this invention too has no foundation whatever. The Soviet Government displays the greatest care in the development of public welfare. During the Soviet regime the wages of workers and civil servants have considerably increased and this applies also to the workers of Central Asia. Every year large sums are spent on social welfare, on the building of hospitals, sanatoria, homes of rest, convalescent homes, and on the building of dwelling houses, which has now reached colossal proportions.

One of the fundamental indications of the rise in the standard of living is the increase in public demand which bears witness to the increase in the purchasing capacity of the population. In 1955, the turnover of goods was two and a half times greater than in 1940. In Turkmenistan the State and cooperative retail goods turnover, including communal feeding, amounted to 3,288 million rubles as against 64 million rubles in 1928. In Kazakhstan the value of industrial and consumer goods sold to the workers in 1956 amounted to 21,391 million rubles. In Uzbekistan, the retail goods turnover in 1959 exceeded 21 milliards of rubles.(19)

Mention must also be made of the considerable rise in the sale of

amenity goods, which bears witness to the rise in the material well-being of the masses.

Even bourgeois specialists estimating the standard of living of the peoples of Central Asia according to the demand for non-consumer goods per member of the population, admit that in the Uzbek, Tadzhik and Turkmen SSR, the standard of living of the population, is "noticeably higher, approximately by 15 to 20 per cent than could have been expected". It is "much higher than in the neighbouring Asiatic countries and has risen considerably during the three decades following the end of the civil war."(20)

Important evidence of the material well-being of the peoples is to be found in the birth and death rates of the population. In Uzbekistan, for example, the birth rate per thousand of the population is 1.6 per cent higher than in the United States and 2.4 per cent higher than in England, etc., and the death rate 1.5 per cent and two times lower than in those countries.(21)

The bourgeois falsifiers of history try by every means in their power to distort the real position of Soviet women and especially of those in the Central Asian republics. They try to deny or at any rate to gloss over the fact of the active participation of women of the local nationalities in the management of the State and in State economy.(22) Thus, V. Monteil, in speaking of a woman who had become a Minister of Education in the Tadzhik SSR and of a simple spinner in the Margelan silk kombinat who had been elected a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, said that this had been done merely for the sake of effect.(23) But is it only one woman who has become a minister or deputy of the Supreme Soviet? In Uzbekistan alone there are 10 women who are working as ministers and deputy ministers; 16 women are deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and 172 women are deputies of the Supreme Soviets of the Uzbek SSR and Kara-Kalpak ASSR. These facts clearly show the active part played by the formerly unprivileged and downtrodden woman of Turkestan in the administrative life of her country.

More than 1,500 women with higher education occupy leading posts in the industry of Uzbekistan, 25,000 in collective farm production, and more than 2,000 are engineers and technicians. Fourteen Uzbek women are doctors and 400 are "candidates of science".(24) Of the 79,000 people employed in public health in the republic, 61,000 are women, of whom 107 have achieved the distinction of "Honorary Surgeons of the Republic".(25) There are many other facts of this kind. This is the real social and political position of women in the republics of Central Asia and of Kazakhstan.

Life itself refutes all the anti-Soviet inventions of the "learned" lackeys of capital, who aim at misleading the ordinary reader. Their slanders, as we have already pointed out, are unmasked by numerous foreign tourists, members of various delegations etc.

Objective representatives of the foreign world who have been in our country express in their articles and books their admiration for the achievements of the Central Asian peoples. Here we may mention such books as THE SOVIET REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN by Paul Tubert, FROM PARIS TO SAMARKAND by Jean Rogisser, POPPIES OF TASHKENT by the Swedish journalist Arthur Lundkvist, I SHALL REMEMBER YOU, UZBEKISTAN! by the Bulgarian poetess Lilian Stefanova etc. There are also statements made by various social figures and statesmen: The Vice-President of the all-India Council of Peace, Pandit O.N. Thakur, and the President of the Council, Saifuddin Kitchla, Liv Shedt, member of a delegation of the "Norway-USSR" Society, Ib Norlund the Danish sociologist, Phyllis Dobbs, head of a delegation of British women, George Morris, editor of the American newspaper WORKER representing the workers' movement, and many others. All of them confirm that the peoples of Central Asia have during the Soviet regime achieved outstanding successes in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

These grandiose successes have been achieved as a result of the triumph of the October Revolution, of the establishment of the Soviet regime, of the triumph of socialism in our country, and of the wise Leninist national policy of the Communist Party. They bear witness to the vast superiority of the Soviet socialist structure over the capitalist, to the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR brought into being by Great October and forged by the glorious Communist Party, and to the fact that only socialism creates all the conditions for the genuine flourishing of all nations, both great and small.

Enraptured by the vast achievements of the peoples of the Soviet Union, including those of Central Asia, the oppressed peoples of the world see in our country a powerful stronghold of peace, democracy and socialism, and the friend of all the peoples of East and West. It is not in the power of any enemies of Communism, of any Monteils and Togans, to conceal from the peoples of the capitalist countries the truth about the Soviet Union. The bright sun of socialism cannot be shut out by the dirty cap of slander!

Notes

(1) Kennedy, A SHORT HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN ASIA, London, 1957, p.108.

(2) CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, London, 1956, No.3, p.213.

(3) William O. Douglas, "Soviet Colonialism - Product of Terror", LOOK, 1955, No.25, p.36.

(4) A. Zeki Velidi Togan, BÜGÜNKÜ TÜRKELI (TURKESTAN), Istanbul, 1942-7, p.285.

(5) Vincent Monteil, LES MUSULMANS SOVIETIQUES, Paris, 1957, pp. 52-55.

(6) Walter Kolarz, RUSSIA AND HER COLONIES, 3rd edition, London, 1953, pp.5-6, 255.

(7) PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 2 April 1960.

(8) I.R. Razzakov, THE LENINIST NATIONAL POLICY AND THE FRIENDSHIP OF PEOPLES, Frunze, 1959, pp.21, 23.

(9) K. Kiykbayev, THE TRIUMPH OF THE LENINIST NATIONAL POLICY IN KAZAKHSTAN, Alma-Ata, 1957, pp.142, 145.

(10) A. Togan, op.cit., p.589.

(11) CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.2, p.102-3.

(12) Olaf Caroe, SOVIET EMPIRE (THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA AND STALINISM), London, 1953, p.155.

(13) W. Kolarz, op.cit., p.38.

(14) A. Bennigsen, The Muslim Peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviets" (sic), THE ISLAMIC REVIEW, Vol.XLII, No.7, July 1955, p.35.

(15) CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1958, No.3, pp.25-33.

(16) V. Monteil, op.cit., p.59.

(17) Sam Russell, "The Red Road to Samarkand", DRUZHBA NARODOV, 1957, No.11, p.109.

(18) EASTERN WORLD, London, 1958, Vol.XII, No.3, p.15.

(19) PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17 December 1959.

(20) ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR EUROPE, Geneva, November, 1957, Vol.9, No. 3, pp.76, 80.

(21) PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 17 December 1959.

(22) See, for example, V. Monteil, op.cit., pp.105-17.

(23) Ibid., p.109.

(24) THE TRIUMPH OF THE LENINIST NATIONAL POLICY IN UZBEKISTAN, Tashkent, 1957, p.40.

(25) Z. Rakhimbabayeva, "Uzbek Women, Active Builders of Communism", KOMMUNIST, 1958, No.9, p.57.

Polythene base for new lake

The bed and banks of an artificial lake of 717 square yards being constructed in the Golodnaya Step', have been covered with polythene film to eliminate loss of water through seepage.

SU. 1961, No.132

Kazakh housing shortage

Many state farms in Kazakhstan are not fulfilling their housing plans. In 1960 several thousand people left state farms because of unsatisfactory living conditions.

P. 24.1.61

A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF TURKIC LANGUAGES

By

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"Classification of the Turkic languages", wrote Benzing in 1959, "can, for the time being, be sketched only in rough outlines, since no generally accepted system has been established for a more precise analysis". It is true that for many decades past Turkologists have been trying to bring into being a system of classification which would show the relationship between the modern Turkic languages and the broader stocks from which they are derived. It is a difficult task when early records are few in number and, indeed, absent for vital historical periods, and when there has been such frequent and extensive infiltration, conquest and migration of nomadic groups throughout the centuries over the vast area of Asia from the Mediterranean Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

Any new survey by an established authority, therefore, is worthy of the closest attention.

Baskakov's short book* seeks to present a description of the formation and the historical development and relationship of all the Turkic languages. It is divided into three parts. Firstly, the author makes a short survey of previous investigations into the subject. Secondly, he gives a brief history of the Turkic languages, dividing it into six periods: Altaic, Hunnish (3rd Century B.C. to 4th Century A.D.), Old Turkic (5th Century to 10th Century), Middle Turkic (10th Century to 15th Century), Modern Turkic (15th Century to 20th Century) and the Post-Revolutionary Turkic of the USSR. The third and largest section of the book is devoted to the problems of classification.

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* N.A. Baskakov: TYURKSKIYE YAZYKI. Moscow, 1960, 247pp.

Baskakov assumes that the present Turkic languages are derived from a proto-Turkic language and that this was cognate with proto-Mongolian; both these were derived from a joint Turko-Mongolian tongue which, together with Tunguso-Manchurian, stemmed from the "Altaic languages". According to the author - and this is the central point of his thesis - the original Turkic, at the end of the Altaic epoch (i.e. subsequent to the 3rd Century B.C.), divided into two branches: Eastern Hunnish and Western Hunnish. Eastern Hunnish has since the 4th Century A.D. split up to form the modern Tuvan, Karagas, Yakut, Khakass, Kamasin, Shor, Chulym Tatar, Altay, Sarı Uygur and Kirgiz languages, while Western Hunnish has developed into all the other languages. The genetic relationship can be seen most clearly in Baskakov's Appendix 2, which is reproduced in transliteration at the end of the article.

This genetic classification is based on the consideration of phonetics, lexical stock and grammar; and the distinction between the languages of the Eastern Hunnish and the Western Hunnish groups is made as follows:

	Eastern Hunnish languages (p.185)	Western Hunnish languages (p.103)
Phonetics	Secondary long vowels as phonemic units;	-
	z, d, t instead of y;	y instead of z, s, t;
	d/t, b/p, k/k - ğ/g,	phonemic difference
	z/s as variants of the	between voiced and
	same phoneme;	voiceless pairs;
	lack of x, v, x.	presence of x, v, x.
Vocabulary	Mongolian influence.	Arabo-Persian influence.
Grammar	Less developed structure in compound sentences.	Greater development in structure in compound sentences; borrowed conjunctions.
	Extreme development of nominal and verbal forms.	Less development of nominal and verbal forms.

The extent to which the author relies on each member of this threefold basis in the later parts of his book varies from language to language.

While it is possible to maintain that the Turkic languages can be classified into these two broad groups, not everyone would hold that they are precise enough to be valuable - the position of Chuvash notably being doubtful. Baskakov's wisdom in choosing the term "Hunnish" for an ancestral Turkic may be particularly called in question. That the few remnants of Hunnish that are known are of a Turkic type language may not be disputed; but to claim a Hunnish language as the actual progenitor of these languages at the present time when even the reconstruction of existing texts has given rise to different readings, is to be rash rather than bold.*

Another major point of interest lies in Baskakov's placing the original Kirgiz language at a remote distance in time and in a different language group from the ancestor of languages such as Kazakh with which it has so far been generally placed. The relationships given by other workers in the field are as follows:

Kirgiz related to:

Benzing:	Kazakh; Kara-Kalpak; Nogay.
Menges:	Kazakh; Kara-Kalpak; Nogay; non-Iranized Uzbek; (also with Iranized-Uzbek; Neo Uygur).
Samoilovich:	Altay; Kumyk; Karachay-Balkar; Karaim; Tatar; Bashkir; Nogay.
Räsänen:	Kazakh; Kara-Kalpak; Tatar; Bashkir; Karaim.

Baskakov expresses the view (p.209) that the exact boundaries between Old Kirgiz, Old Oguz and Old Uygur are not yet known definitely. It is probably here that his divergency with other Turkologists over the placing of Kirgiz in the classification starts.

In his sections dealing with the details of classification the author, very rightly, gives an account of both living and dead languages, and thus affords a clear picture of historical developments. There are, however, considerable and unexpected differences in the treatment accorded to some of them. In a comprehensive survey of all

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* See, for example, the readings of the same Hunnish verse:
Ramstedt: sŭkä talīqīn bügŭg tutun. Bazin: sŭg tägtı īdqan boquğīğ tutqan. von Gabain: särig tīlītqan buğuğ kötürkän.
(PHILOLOGIAE TURCICAE FUNDAMENTA, p.686.)

Turkic languages one would expect rather more than one page to be devoted to the Turkish of Turkey when no less than seven are devoted to Altay. Baskakov mentions several dialects of Turkey Turkish without giving details of their differences. He mentions the social implications of kaba türkçe, orta türkçe and fasih türkçe; a few lines of description or illustration would have been useful. Such scant treatment of the well documented and probably the most sophisticated of all Turkic languages, spoken by fully one half of all Turkic language speakers, is a major deficiency in the book. There is also no mention of the Turkish of Cyprus and the fact that this, like the modern Turkish of Bulgaria, is a literary language using Latin characters and, in written form, virtually identical with that of Turkey.

Baskakov nowhere indicates the extent of mutual understandability between the Turkic speaking peoples, now regarded as having separate languages, of the USSR and elsewhere. An educated Turk of Turkey, for example, if he were acquainted with the Cyrillic characters, could read Azerbaydzhani fluently, although he might have to pause on occasion at unknown vocabulary or turns of expression. He would have no major difficulty with Turkmen; but he would find Kazakh or Kirgiz incomprehensible without some serious study, and Chuvash would be an even more remote foreign language to him. But it is certain that he would find the spoken languages of Central Asia less difficult than the written languages. It would have been interesting if Baskakov could have given some indication of the extent to which a Kazakh, for example, could communicate to a Turkmen, a Kirgiz and an Uygur, without having recourse to Russian.

In every case where Baskakov gives statistics of the modern languages of the USSR he quotes the 1959 Census; he gives the figures for the nationality, however, not those for the number of speakers regarding the language as their mother tongue. This leads to an error in the case of the Bashkirs in particular. Baskakov's figure of 983,000 (p.162) should be 607,000, since only 62 per cent of the Bashkir people speak their own language.

The bibliography is full, but there are some curious omissions. For example Wurm's not unimportant THE (KARA)-KIRGIZ LANGUAGE (BSOS, 1949) is lacking.

Baskakov's third appendix lists the names of some 250 Turkic peoples and languages and gives cross-references. This is a most valuable feature.

This is a most stimulating book and the author's classification is worthy of serious study. It is unfortunate the book is so short

that full justice cannot be done to the linguistic details. There is much basic work to be done in Turkology before a satisfactory solution to the problems of classification can be found. One wonders, indeed, if, in such a vast study, a single person could ever find time to evaluate properly the whole field. Baskakov's is a brave attempt.

It may be of interest, as an example of the modern Turkic languages of the USSR, to append a short paragraph from Mr. Khrushchev's statement on the occasion of the Sixth Pugwash Conference in Moscow on 27 November 1960. The versions are taken from the Turkic language newspapers of 29 November, namely, KOMMUNIST (Azerbaydzhan), SOVET TURKMENISTAN, KIZIL UZBEKISTON, SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN and SOVETTIK KIRGIZSTAN.

To achieve some sort of comparison each language has been transliterated into Turkey Turkish characters, with additional diacritical signs as follows:

Azerbaydzhani	ə = ə		h = x		k = k									
Turkmen	ň = ң		ä = ə		ç = ç		e = ə		h = x					
Uzbek	k = қ		" = ъ		h = x		' = ь		yo = ё		ü = ў		h = ҳ	
Kazakh	i = і		ň = ң		k = қ		ı = и		h = x		ä = ə		ü = ү	
Kirgiz	ä = ө													

1.	Azerbaydzhani	Sovet dövlәti öz varlığının ilk günündәn
2.	Turkmen	Sovet dövleti özüniň dovam edip gelen ilkinci
3.	Uzbek	Sovet davlati taşkil topgan birinci kündanok
4.	Kazakh	Sovet memleketi özıniň alğaş ret ornagan küninen
5.	Kirgiz	Sovet mamleketi özü jaşay baştagandın birinci

1. sülh uğrunda, tərksilah uğrunda mübarizə aparır. Mə'lum olduğu
kimi,
2. günündən bəri parahatcılık ugrunda, yaragsızlanmak ugrunda çıkış
3. tinçlik uçun, kurolsizlaniş uçun kuraşib kelmokda. Ma"lumki,
4. bastap-ak beybitşilik jolında, karusızdanu jolında kimıl jasap
keledi.
5. kününön tartıp ele tınçtiktı jaktap, kuralsızdanuunu jaktap
araket

1. son illərdə Sovet İttifagı ciddi beynəlhalg nəzarət altında
hamılıgla
2. edyər. Məlim bolşı yalı, Sovet Soyuzı soñkı yılların içinde
pugta
3. Sovet İttifoki keyingi yillarda kattik halkaro kontrol' ostida
4. Sovet Odağının soñğı jıldarı halıkaralık katan bakılau koyu
jolımen
5. kılıp kele jatat. Kiyinki jıldardın içinde Sovetter Soyuzu el
aralık

1. və tamalilə tərksilah olunmag haggında dəfələrlə təklif irəli
2. halkara kontrollıgı astında əhlumumı ve dolı yaragsızlanmak
hakında
3. yoppasiga va batamom kurolsizlaniş tüğrisindagi takliflarni bir
neca
4. jappay jəne tolık karusızdanu turalı üsınıstardı talay ret
engizgeni
5. katuu kontrolduk astında jalpı jana toluk kuralsızdanuu jönündö

1. sürmüşdür. Biz tamamilə və hamılıgla tərksilaha elə indi
başlamağa
2. telim gezek teklipler hödürledi. Eger Günbatar dövletler dolı ve
3. marta ilgari sürdi. Ğarb davlatlari yoppasiga va batamom
4. melim. Eger batıs derjavaları büğan əzir otırsa, biz tolık jəne
5. sunuştardı bir nece jolu jasagandıgı belgilüü. Egerde batıştagı

1. hazırıg, bu şėrtlė ki, Gėrb dövlėtlėri dė buna hazır olsunlar.

2. ėhlumumı yaragsızlanmaga tayyar bolsalar, biz şoṅa hėziriṅ özündė-
de

3. kurolsizlanişga tayȳȳor bülsalar, biz hozirning üzidaȳȯk ȳȯppasiga

4. jappay karusızdanudı tipti kėzirdiṅ özinde-ak bastauğa ėzirmiz.

5. derjavalar dayar boluşsa, toluk jana jalpı kuralsızdanuunu azır

1. ———

2. başlamaga tayyardırıs.

3. va batamom kurolsizlanişni amalga oşira boşlaşga tayȳȯrmiz.

4. ———

5. ele baştoogo da biz dayarbız.

[Translation:

The Soviet Union from the first day of its existence has striven for peace and disarmament. As is well known, the Soviet Union of recent years has repeatedly put forward proposals for general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We are ready even now to begin full and general disarmament if the Western powers are ready for it.]

TABLE SHOWING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKIC LANGUAGES



NOTE: The signs indicate degrees of phonetic relationship as follows:

/ "Interchanging with". Used to indicate the closely associated multiple forms which vary according to the phonetic laws (e.g. vowel harmony, consonant mutation) of the language concerned and which are, for example, found in suffixes.

// "Alternating with", "with the alternative form". Used for alternative forms which are not necessarily phonetically linked.

~ "Associated with", "corresponding to", "cognate with", "linked with". Used to indicate correspondences between two or more languages or dialects, or variants of the same language.

THE PRESS, PUBLISHING AND LIBRARIES IN THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE USSR

The development of the press and of publishing and the creation of an extensive library network together constitute one of the major achievements of the Soviet regime in the Muslim Republics of the USSR.* The Party authorities constantly emphasize that the primary object of all literature is the creation of Communist consciousness and the raising of the cultural and technical level of the Soviet people. The result of this is that by comparison with non-Soviet countries, the entertainment value contained in Soviet newspapers and periodicals is very small, while that in books is confined to the relatively small quantity of imaginative literature. Even the latter class of literature is strongly impregnated with political doctrine. It is interesting to note that while the demand for books, and especially novels, appears greatly to exceed the supply, great efforts seem to be necessary in order to persuade the public to subscribe to and read the daily press. Visitors to the Muslim republics have remarked on the fact that while people appear to spend a large part of their spare time in reading books, it is comparatively uncommon to see anyone reading a newspaper or a periodical.

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* The publishing, printing and distribution of books are discussed in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1954, No.2; No.1 of 1956 contains an article on Central Asian newspapers while a description of Soviet Azerbaydzhan newspapers is to be found in No.1 of 1959.

I. THE PRESS

Issue and distribution

Although the flourishing state of the press and its continuous expansion are frequently dwelt upon, the number of newspapers appearing in the republics seems to fluctuate considerably and the official figures do not always agree. Thus in 1954 there were 70 newspapers in Tadzhikistan (GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd Ed.., Vol.41, p.485), 68 in 1958 (KT. 4.12.58) and 66 a year later (KT. 13.10.59). But the small Encyclopaedia Vol.9, p.51, shows Tadzhikistan as having 76 newspapers in 1958, while PRAVDA of 17.10.59 says that there were 63 newspapers in that year.

In 1959 Turkmenistan had nine republican, eight oblast, four city, 40 rayon and 30 local kolkhoz newspapers as well as 14 periodicals, the great majority of these in Turkmen. (TI. 17.4.59) In Uzbekistan 312 newspapers are published, over 200 being in Uzbek; 13 are republican, 18 oblast, 18 city and 145 rayon. Industrial establishments, research institutions and VUZ publish 48 and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes 69. There are also 118 other periodicals of various kinds. (PV. 5.5.60) Kazakhstan has 325 newspapers and periodicals in Kazakh, Russian, Korean, Uygur and Uzbek. (KP. 19.4.60) In Azerbaydzhan 118 newspapers appear. (BR. 29.10.59)

Apart from the metropolitan Soviet papers, those from the "People's Democracies" are available to subscribers. In Tadzhikistan the Soyuzpechat' (Union Press Agency) accepts subscriptions for 1,428 periodicals; of these over 300 are Eastern German, 25 Chinese, 275 Czechoslovak, 249 Polish, 136 Hungarian and 107 Bulgarian. Periodicals published in those countries in Russian are said to be available to the general public from the Soyuzpechat' stalls. (KT. 29.9.59)

Papers reach the public through the Soyuzpechat' network which is controlled by the Ministry of Communications (svyaz'). Apart from accepting subscriptions, it runs news-stands and organizes sales in public places. In Tadzhikistan this retail trade is done by 121 stalls and 180 communications branches (otdeleniya svyazi). The delivery of newspapers is said to have improved lately so that now 44 out of the 49 towns and rayons of the republic receive republican newspapers on the day of publication. But the publication of some newspapers and periodicals is often delayed. The delivery of papers is particularly bad in

some country districts; the Kulyab rayon is an extreme case where subscribers receive papers 5-6 days old, owing to postmen being overworked. (KT. 30.8.59) In 14 out of 15 oblast centres of Kazakhstan subscribers receive metropolitan Soviet papers one day after publication, except in Alma-Ata where they are delivered on the same day. Republican papers reach their readers on the day of publication in 11 oblast and 29 rayon centres. (KP. 21.11.59)

Tasks of the press

"The Soviet newspaper. . . is a powerful weapon of the Bolshevik Party in its management of the economic, political and intellectual life of our socialist country." (GT.SOV. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd Edn., Vol. 10, p.8.)

Local newspapers are the immediate "organizers of the masses" since they discuss topics connected with the life of the area; but they are said to be good only where the local Party cell closely supervises their range of subjects. If not, their ideological level is poor and they "cannot satisfy the growing spiritual demands of the readers". In Tadzhikistan the Pyandzh raykom and the rayon paper work happily together to the satisfaction of all concerned. On the other hand, LENIN - ZHOLU, the newspaper of the Dzhirgatal' raykom, is "detached from life" and swarms with grammatical and stylistic errors. (KT. 26.8.60) Its Kirgiz namesake of the Osh oblast sets a good example to other papers: it highlights socialist competitions and a column called "Keep your word - carry out your obligations" is a regular feature. Another Osh oblast paper, LENINSKIY PUT' (the Russian for Lenin - Zholu), pays much attention to atheism, prints articles "unmasking" Islam and sectarianism and quotes declarations by people who have abandoned religion.

KOMMUNISTICHESKIY TRUD of the Przheval'sk rayon and a paper of the Tyup rayon have introduced "exchange columns" to exchange practical information on maize growing, which helps socialist competition between their respective rayons. KOLKHOZNAYA ZHIZN' of the Issyk-Kul' rayon has organized a "seminar" for Party cell secretaries on its pages and publishes a permanent feature called "the tribune of the propagandist and agitator". (SK. 26.3.60)

In 1960 Kazakhstan was constrained to give more agricultural and industrial produce to the State and the press busied itself organizing a "national socialist competition". "Many republican, oblast and rayon papers struggle efficiently for the realization of all these tasks, initiate socialist competition and propagate what is new and progressive". Thus the oblast newspapers PAVLODARSKAYA PRAVDA and

KZYL TU published the experiences of a tractor "brigade" in the Presnovka sovkhoz in ways of obtaining a good maize harvest and on the mechanization of harvesting, the result of which was that in 1959 the oblast produced 15,000,000 puds of grain above the quota. PRAVDA YUZHNOGO KAZAKHSTANA and ONTUSTIK KAZAKHSTAN "militantly, passionately, operatively and consecutively" described the struggle of the oblast cotton growers to produce more. Papers of the Semipalatinsk oblast wrote much on the socialist competition among cattle breeders; this material is distinguished by its "purposefulness, militancy and intolerance of shortcomings". PRIIRTYSHSKAYA PRAVDA waged a battle for fodder production and gave wide publicity to the socialist competition between two local shepherds, and between an oblast man and the famous pig-breeding Hero of Socialist Labour, Yaroslav Chizh. "All this shows how much the journalists of our republic can do to discover and widely exploit possibilities of increasing the output of grain and other agricultural produce. . ."

The majority of the republican papers, however, seem to treat their tasks superficially. In this category belong the Kzyl-Orda oblast paper, LENINSKIY PUT', which on 2.2.60 published the statistics for milk production in the oblast but did not explain [for the benefit of milkmaids] how a certain kolkhoz milkmaid obtained as much as 3,130 kg. of milk per year. PRIKASPIYSKAYA KOMMUNA of the Gur'yev oblast publishes nothing about cattle breeding and it has ignored the achievements of a shepherd who in 1959 obtained 164 lambs per 100 sheep and in 1960 "struggled" for 235 lambs. Other papers ignore technical progress although they appear in industrial districts, like TEMIRTAUSKIY RABOCHIY and AKTYUBINSKAYA PRAVDA, and they do not pay much attention to various problems existing there. (KP. 19.4.60)

Subscriptions

Since "the Soviet press plays a great role as the collective propagandist, agitator and organizer," (KT. 19.9.59) it is essential that everybody should read regularly as many papers as possible. The campaign for subscribers for the coming year (podpiska na gazety i zhurnaly) starts in October and ends in December. Plans are prepared and it is decided in advance to how many copies of papers a kolkhoz or rayon must subscribe; in many cases these plans fail miserably in spite of the socialist competition. Thus at the end of the 1959 podpiska (subscription campaign) the Dzhety-Oguz rayon of Kirgizia carried out the plan by 79.2 per cent only, to the indignation of SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA. (SK. 18.12.59) More importance is attached to the campaign in the countryside than in the towns, apparently because in the latter people can get their papers from newsagents and are also more subject to direct propaganda.

The organization of the campaign is highly elaborate. In 1958 in Tadzhikistan there was a socialist competition for the purpose, in which 7,000 "aktivists" took part. The best results were achieved in the Kurgan-Tyube, Stalinabad, Pyandzh and some other rayons. There were 2,099 offices (punkty) accepting subscriptions, 1,412 communications officials (svyazisty) and over 5,500 press "publicity agents" (obshchestvennyye rasprostraniteli pechati), i.e. voluntary workers, participated. Nevertheless, Tadzhikistan lagged behind most other republics in the number of subscribers. (KT. 30.8.59 & 19.9.59)

The success of the subscription campaign, like the ideological standard of newspapers, ultimately depends on the local Party cell. That of the Aydabul' sovkhoz, Kokchetav oblast, reserved the "politically most literate aktivists" for this work; they visited people's homes, arranged discussions there and accepted subscriptions on the spot. (KP. 4.11.59) Other methods of stimulating subscriptions are posters and advertisements, discussions held in factories, kolkhozes and public places, readers' conferences and meetings of journalists with the public.

Where subscription propaganda is brisk, the kolkhozniks respond as desired. Thus by the middle of the campaign period in Tadzhikistan people of the Engels kolkhoz, Garm rayon, had taken out 760 subscriptions amounting to 25,000 rubles (presumably per annum), and those of the Stalin kolkhoz, Moskovskiy rayon, took out subscriptions to the sum of 40,000 rubles. (KT. 11.11.60) In 1959 every family in the Sagirdasht kolkhoz, Kalay-Khumb rayon, and the Lenin-zholu of the Murgab rayon, subscribed to three newspapers and at least one magazine. This was due to the efficient campaign of 1958 when one "agitator" alone induced the Sagirdasht people to subscribe to 1,540 copies of various papers. (KT. 9.10.59) In the Chubartau rayon of Kazakhstan 950 copies were ordered per 1,000 of the population three weeks before the end of the campaign. (KP. 21.11.59)

On the other hand, there are frequent complaints about the campaign being neglected. Thus in the Leningradskiy rayon of Kazakhstan only eight copies of republican newspapers were ordered. (KP. 4.11.59) In some areas even the "agitators" themselves do not realize the great political importance of the campaign. Thus in 1959 in the Iliyskiy rayon, Alma-Ata oblast, there were 1,300 "agitators" who subscribed to only 47 copies of BLOKNOT AGITATORA and 39 copies of AGITATOR, both of these being agitators' professional journals. (KP. 21.11.59) In some parts of Azerbaydzhan, Party publications are just as unpopular: in the Barda rayon only two people subscribe to KOMMUNIST, six to PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN', two to AGITATOR and one to VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS. In big rayons like the Kasum-Ismailovo, Sal'yany and others only one or two copies of AGITATOR and PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' have been ordered, even

though there are many Party "aktivists". (BR. 23.6.59)

The "press propagators" are nevertheless eager to win in the socialist competition, and this leads in some cases to abuse. Thus in Tadzhikistan some aktivists, in spite of their efforts with the kolkhozniks, had to obtain funds from the kolkhoz managements which enabled them to take out subscriptions for the people without the latter's knowledge (zaochno). There were also other "grave breaches of the principle of voluntariness" where subscribers were sent papers they did not order, as "extras" (nagruzka). (KT. 30.8.59 & 19.9.59)

II. BOOKS

Editions

Large-scale publication of books in the Central Asian languages started only in the Soviet period. The Tadzhik State Publishing House (Tadzhikgosizdat) was founded in 1925 at Dyushambe (now Stalinabad) and in 1927 started issuing books and pamphlets. In the first year it brought out 56 books in Tadzhik. During the following 31 years 8,537 books were published, among them some 600 works of fiction by Tadzhik Soviet authors. Between 1928-58 the Tadzhikgosizdat issued 173 Russian classics, 152 "classics of Marxism-Leninism" and 82 Tadzhik translations of Russian Soviet authors. (KT. 10.10.59)

In Kirgizia between 1929-59 the publication of books increased 52 times as regards titles and 57 times as regards the number of copies issued. (SK. 4.11.60) The first Kirgiz book was published in 1926 by the recently founded Kirgiz State Publishing House which in 1959 issued 1,017 books, over half of these in Kirgiz. (SK. 18.12.59) In Kazakhstan 1,814 books were published in 1959, over 16,000,000 copies altogether. (KP. 17.8.60)

Nevertheless complaints are made in all the republics that the number of copies published is so small that it does not satisfy public demand. The print order of books issued by the Kazakh State Publishing House keeps decreasing. Even the average print order of books published in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Kazakh SSR was only 5,000. Books for the "mass reader" are printed in impressions of 3,300 only and the technical in impressions of 5,300. The trading organizations are blamed for this situation: the Kaznigtorg (bookselling agency) and Kazpotrebsoyuz (consumers' cooperative) when ordering books say the order is based on public demand for them, though in fact they have no idea of how many copies could be sold since they do nothing to find out.

The result is that frequently people and libraries try in vain to obtain a book. Thus in 1959 the Kazgosizdat (Kazakh State Publishing House) brought out a pamphlet by M. Iskakov on the old Kazakh calendar, and the trading organizations accepted very reluctantly 3,000 copies, but very soon letters started pouring in asking for another, large impression of the work. In the same year the Kniga-Pochtoy ("Books by Post") department of the Alma-Ata oblast book-selling organization received 39,216 individual orders and only 18,200 of these could be carried out. Thus the present method of fixing the print orders is thoroughly unsatisfactory. (KP. 2.7.60)

In Tadzhikistan the situation is similar. Editions of popular books are too small - for example, only 100,000 copies of Yasenskiy's MAN CHANGES HIS SKIN have been published while 200,000 are required. Not enough Tadzhik classics appear and there is a great shortage of books for the VUZ and tekhnikums and of various vocational literature. (KT. 6.9.60)

There are frequent complaints that many of the books are so shoddy that the customer feels discouraged from buying. Some of them are altogether unreadable, like the edition of Tolstoy's KNYAZ' SEREBRYANNYY brought out by the Kirgiz State Publishing House. A reader bought a copy, only to find that pp.49-80 were missing. He had it exchanged and the next one lacked pp.113-95. Only the third copy was complete. (SK. 1.3.59)

Another serious problem is that of creating specialized literature in the native languages. The Kirgiz State Publishing House has failed so far to organize the translation from the Russian of books on economics, so that even a basic work like the SHORT DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS is not available in Kirgiz. One consequence is that no standard way of rendering Russian terms has been arrived at and the same terms are often translated in different ways with highly confusing results. The demand for technical books in Kirgiz is also growing, but there is no "technically literate" translation of works on, for instance, the structure of tractors, combine harvesters and other agricultural machinery. (SK. 17.3.59 & 9.4.60)

In the more distant parts of the republics a shortage of school books is often felt, for which both publishers and trading organizations are to blame. In Tadzhikistan the Gosuchpedgiz was founded in 1958 to publish books for schools and teachers. By August 1959 it had issued 96 textbooks in Tadzhik and Uzbek and promised fully to equip the republican schools with books for the school year 1960-1. (KT. 28.8.59) Its Kirgiz counterpart, the Kirgizuchpedgiz, was to issue 62 textbooks by July 1960, most of them adapted to the new school syllabus. It also published belles lettres for school use, among

these were Kirgiz translations of books from the "People's Democracies", particularly China. Books on ethics and "Communist" morals are another important branch of its activity. Such are IDLERS PREFER OTHERS TO WORK, LET US TALK ABOUT MODESTY, YOUTH REACHES MANHOOD THROUGH WORK, SPIRITUAL BEAUTY, CULTURED BEHAVIOUR, etc. One of its particular concerns are books and visual aids for the study of Russian by Central Asians. In 1961 a new textbook on Russian literature for the Kirgiz will appear, as well as English, French and German books for the fifth class in Kirgiz schools. Kirgiz books on such subjects as mathematics and physics will be printed at the same time. The Kirgizuchpedgiz tries to make provincial teachers compile textbooks for publication, but the Ministry of Education does not allow them time off from work and gives them no money to come to Frunze where they could work together with other compilers. (SK. 7.7.60)

Distribution

Book sales are growing in all the republics. In 1959 in Tadzhikistan 20,920,000 rubles worth of books were sold - 60.7 per cent more than in 1953. (KT. 6.9.60) In Kirgizia in 1940 books worth 10 rubles 70 kopecks were sold per head of population, and in 1959 almost twice as much. (SK. 4.11.60) In the same year books valued at 11,835,000 rubles were sold in Turkmenistan - 2.7 times more than in 1950. (TI. 24.6.60) In Uzbekistan the Bookselling Union (ob"yedineniye knizhnoy torgovli) sold 20 million books in 1954 and over 32 million worth 113 million rubles in 1959. (PV. 31.8.60)

The reading of books is almost as important politically as that of the press and various selling methods are employed to make people buy them. The best results are obtained through three such methods: self-service in bookshops which, though hailed as a "progressive method", is being introduced very slowly, purchase by instalments introduced in 1959-60, and "book weeks" and "book months". Only some bookshops in larger towns have the purchase by instalments scheme. Thus in Tashkent two shops do it; at least 400 rubles worth of books must be bought, a quarter of the cost payable at once and the balance within one year. (PV. 8.4.60) In Kirgizia 400 rubles is the maximum value. (SK. 6.4.60) In Tadzhikistan there seems to be no limit and a woman is reported to have puchased 1,200 rubles worth of books in one year. (KT. 16.8.60)

The "weeks" and "months" also increase the sales. During the "week of children's books" in 1960 in Stalinabad between 26-30 March, 16,500 rubles worth of books were sold, while 60,000 copies were disposed of throughout the republic. Meetings between children and authors were arranged, bookshops started special children s departments and book bazaars were held in schools and in the streets outside book-

shops. (KT. 27.3.60 & 1.4.60) In Uzbekistan a "book month" is held every year, its highlight being meetings between the public, and authors and publishing officials, and exhibitions of books, while the State Publishing House and the Bookselling Union arrange readers' conferences to discuss their publication plans for the coming year. (PV. 7.8.59)

The book trade uses also a host of other devices: selling books direct in factories, kolkhozes, cinemas, libraries, trains and buses, "exhibition sales", book bazaars, the Kniga-Pochtoy network, readers' conferences and debates, and inviting authors to bookshops where they read passages from their books and tell the people of their work. Many bookshops also employ knigonoshi or itinerant peddlers.

In spite of all these efforts to popularize books, the state of the book trade is unsatisfactory. Apart from troubles connected with print orders, the number of bookshops and stalls is too small in all the republics, particularly in the countryside, though even republican capitals are not well provided. There is not a single bookshop in some of the larger districts of Baku (BR. 1.11.60), while in Alma-Ata there are only eight, or one per 57,000 of the population. (KP. 17.8.60) In the Sovetskiy and Fayzabad rayons of Tadzhikistan almost no books were sold in the first three months of 1960 (KT. 3.8.60) and at the shop of the Beshkent kolkhoz books worth 16,000 rubles are lying in a mouldy heap on the floor, (KT. 22.10.60) while the population of the village of Khaydarkan has to travel 100 kilometres to Fergana to buy books, including school books (SK. 13.5.60). These are extreme though by no means very unusual examples of the book trade in the country.

The two main reasons for this state of affairs are lack of qualified and enthusiastic booksellers and bad distribution of books. In Tadzhikistan only seven out of 290 have special qualifications (KT. 6.9.60) while some managers of village shops which also sell books resent this branch of trade since it does not help to achieve their sales target. (KT. 22.10.60) Of the 300 shop assistants employed by the Kirgizknigotorg (Kirgiz Bookselling Agency) only two per cent have had proper training. (SK. 4.11.60) The manager of the Khalach rayon consumers' cooperative, Turkmenistan, cannot name a single book he has read and yet the local book trade is his responsibility. (TI. 24.6.60) In Uzbekistan the situation seems somewhat better since almost half of the sales staff of the Bookselling Union have had higher and middle school education. (PV. 31.8.60)

It frequently occurs that, while necessary books cannot be obtained, particularly in the country, large numbers of them accumulate in the warehouses. Not a single shop at Shaartuz, Tadzhikistan, sells

books though local warehouses have 200,000 rubles worth of them. They are distributed among rayon shops without regard for local needs and although the population is overwhelmingly Asian, the bulk of books available are in Russian. (KT. 22.10.60) Two hundred English school books have been sent to the Dargan-Ata rayon of Turkmenistan though English is not taught there at all. In the Tashauz oblast there is a shortage of Uzbek and Kazakh textbooks while the latter are continually sent, together with works on cattle breeding, to the oil-producing town of Nebit-Dag where nobody wants them. In the oblast city of Chardzhou 94 books published in the republic in 1959 cannot be obtained though some of them are lying idle in the oblast book warehouse. (TI. 24.6.60) In Kirgizia village shops far away from the rayon centres receive new books very irregularly and there have been "serious errors" in the supply of school books for the year 1960-1. The book shop of the Karakol workers' cooperative has been ordered to keep crockery, groceries and other goods. Thus the book trade in the provinces is practically limited to the rayon towns. (SK. 28.7., 4.11 & 25.11.60)

Although in Uzbekistan the book trade seems to be better organized than elsewhere and in 1959 the republic won the fourth place in the Soviet Union for book sales, the shortcomings discussed above are to some extent mentioned there as well. (PV. 31.8.60) They are common in Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan.

III. LIBRARIES

Types and distribution of libraries

"Cultural requirements of the workers" are served in Kirgizia by over 2,000 libraries, (SK. 16.12.59) in Turkmenistan by over 1,300, (TI. 20.11.59) in Uzbekistan by 2,896, (PV. 20.1.60) and in Kazakhstan by 13,500. (KP. 26.6.60) The libraries belong to the Ministry of Culture, trade unions (profsoyuznyye) and various Government departments (vedomstvennyye). The last category are not accessible to the "mass reader" and they seem to be specialized libraries. In Kirgizia the State libraries, belonging to the Ministry of Culture, are a minority: 599 as against the total of over 2,000. (SK. 26.4.60) In some regions the distribution of libraries is bad. In Kirgizia at Aravan there are five libraries while some of the near-by villages have none; there are eight libraries in the centre of Frunze but not a single one in the northern and southern suburbs. In the Osh and Tyan'-Shan' oblasts, as well as in some rayons outside them, there are many settlements without libraries - there are none in 17 settlements of the Kirovskoye rayon, 18 settlements in the Leninopol' rayon and 16 in the Talas rayon. (SK. 16.12.59 & 13.5.60) In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, it

is stated that there is not a single village without a library. (KP. 26.6.60)

Complaints are made in all the republics that many libraries occupy unsuitable premises, which applies even to such an important place as the Kazakh State Book Chamber where copies of everything published in the country are deposited. It is housed in an overcrowded, dark and damp basement where books decay; there is no room for the new literature arriving all the time and it lies about in heaps, while the director keeps begging the Minister of Culture in vain for more suitable accommodation. (KP. 7.10.59)

Book supplies and librarians

Libraries obtain books from bookshops and "library collectors" (bibkollektory), the latter set up for the express purpose of supplying libraries. It is not always easy, as has been said above, to obtain the desired books from the shops while some of the bibkollektory also work "formalistically" and send books to libraries without regard to local needs. Those of Osh and Frunze have sent 12 copies of a book on vegetable cultivation to the library of Padsha-Ata though the local kolkhoz grows no vegetables at all. (SK. 4.9.60) The library of Andreyevka, North-Kazakhstan oblast, has received from Petropavlovsk some dozens of German books which nobody wants, but no works on new types of agricultural machinery which are urgently needed. (KP. 29.4.60) In the first half of 1960 Pervyye Nyugedy library, Azerbaydzhan, received almost no fiction for adults while many works written in the 10th-16th centuries, together with books about them, were sent there though they are not particularly popular with the kolkhozniks. (BR. 20.7.60) Yet PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 3.10.59 assures its readers that "our mother country has long ago surpassed all capitalist countries as regards book resources and the importance and quality of librarianship". About the quality more will be said below.

Various shortcomings of the library system are blamed upon the great shortage of qualified librarians. One with a special training is a great rarity in the countryside. In the Mary oblast such people constitute only 20 per cent of library personnel, while some of the staff cannot boast even middle school education. In 1954 a tekhnikum for "cultural and educational" workers was opened in Ashkhabad and by the end of 1959 it managed to produce only 200 librarians. Teaching there is bad and students' practical work is so neglected that the tekhnikum authorities do not even bother to send them for practice to the Marx State Library, which has invited them to come. (TI. 25.11.59) In Uzbekistan there are 432 librarians with elementary education only

and the situation is worst in Kara-Kalpakia where only one librarian has had special higher education and only some ten special middle school education. The oblast culture office (upravleniye kul'tury) does not send people to library VUZ and tekhnikums. (PV. 20.1.60) In Kazakhstan only a "negligible part" of the library workers have had special training while many do not have even ordinary middle school education. (KP. 2.7.60) In Kirgizia 63 per cent of the public libraries staff have no special education. (SK. 16.12.59) The training provided by the library department of Baku University and the Krupskaya library tekhnikum has much room for improvement. (BR. 12.12.59)

Making books popular

The Kirgiz Central Committee has declared that "the main task is to convert every library into a real mass centre for the propagation of knowledge and a strong point of the Party organization giving Communist education to the workers. Propaganda regarding the historic resolutions of the XXIst Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, elucidation of the policy and decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, giving active help to the Party and the State in the creation of Communist consciousness and raising the cultural and technical level of the Soviet people should be the main part of the work of all the libraries." (SK. 16.12.59)

As libraries are called upon to play such an important role, it is essential that they should have as many readers as possible, so good librarians go out to "seek the reader". Various methods are used to attract people to libraries. Library workers of Ust'-Kamenogorsk lead and zinc plant at one time recruited readers by visiting private homes to interview the inhabitants and invite them to join; they found out from the disabled and mothers of many children what sort of literature they liked and now the staff bring the books to their homes. The result is that, whereas at the end of 1959 there were 1,777 subscribers, now they are over 3,000. At the plant itself the librarians have installed 20 mobile libraries in the "red corners" and departments and with the help of workshop "aktivists" they select books for those units, arrange "weeks of Soviet poetry", lectures, debates and meetings with authors. (KP. 2.7.60) In the Dzerzhinskiy sovkhoz, Aktyubinsk oblast, all adults attend the local library whose staff also keep in contact with the people by visiting their homes in order to encourage them to read, while over 100 komsomols act as knigonoshi for the library. (KP. 26.6.60) A library in Stalinabad has started 20 "book issue desks" at factories. (KT. 11.11.60) In Kirgizia there are 77 permanent libraries and 30 reading rooms in the pasture areas while at the same time the staff of rayon and village libraries travel

hundreds of kilometres if necessary to supply shepherds with literature. (SK. 26.4.60)

Another way of attracting readers is the gradual introduction of self-service in libraries, acclaimed as a "new, and the most active form of causing books to reach the reader" (TI. 25.11.59) and gravely discussed in the press. All these efforts sharply contrast with the passivity of some village libraries which lend only 2-3 or fewer books per day at a cost to the State of 30-40 rubles per issue, (SK. 4.9.60) and many of them are not worth visiting for they do not get new books and their shelves are stocked with out-of-date vocational literature on subjects which have nothing in common with the economic make-up of the area.

Finally, libraries do very much the same kind of work as the propagandists and "agitators" (see CAR, 1960, No.4). The librarian of the Stalinabad furniture factory has carried out an atheist campaign whose highlights were an exhibition of books and illustrations "What is sectarianism", and a readers' conference "Is there a God?". The rayon library of Pyandzh arranged exhibitions of books and pictures on the life of Lenin, the struggle for the Seven-Year Plan, etc. (KT. 10.9.60 & 15.3.60) Novo-Pavlovka library, Alamedin rayon of Kirgizia, holds "literary evenings" and readers' conferences, "visual agitation" elucidates the resolutions of the XXIst Party Congress and the Seven-Year Plan, and there is an exhibition "Study, toil and live in the Communist manner". Libraries of the Stalinskoye rayon popularize books helping to surpass production quotas. (SK. 4.9.60 & 26.4.60) Libraries prompt workers to produce more for the State by supplying them with appropriate vocational literature and arranging lectures on ways to work better. The Chardzhou oblast library supplies "brigades of Communist labour" with suitable literature and provides lectures like "Let the flame of Communist labour burn brighter". The Mayakovskiy Library in Ashkhabad every Saturday broadcasts lists of books on various subjects like "Creative attitude to work". (TI. 25.11.59 & 4.10.60) The Savay sovkhoz library, Andizhan oblast, arranged 210 debates and "readings aloud" (chitki) and issued 316 "battle cries" in the harvest season. (PV. 28.11.59)

Libraries which limit themselves to their primary function, i.e. the acquisition and issue of books, and which neglect, above all, to teach and encourage their readers to produce more, are denounced as "detached from the practical requirements of Communist creativity". (SK. 16.12.59).

F E U I L L E T O N

PAYING THE PIPER

The following is a translation of an article which appeared in PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 30.10.60 under the title PESNI ZA NALICHNYYE.

The din in the hall grew steadily louder. Across the rows of seats cries of protest assailed the stage like the roar of some storm-tossed ocean.

"Put a sock in it."

"Where's Mamurjan Uzak?"

"Give us our money back."

"Stop the concert."

For the tenth time the musical quartet-doyra, rubab, chang, and gijak came on to the stage. By this time, however, no one was in the mood to listen to them and, self-consciously they backed away towards the curtain.

The head of the rayon House of Culture was trying all he knew to stop the shouts of the audience. He would raise his hand, then lower it helplessly, pointing to the doors at the side as though wishing to explain something. At last, noticing a slight lull in the noise, he managed to blurt out:

"Mamurjan Uzak has disappeared. . . To be more exact, he has been kidnapped. He will not be singing."

And again hundreds of voices rent the air with angry cries.

In actual fact, the head of the House of Culture had been telling the truth. That very evening the People's Singer of Uzbekistan had indeed been kidnapped from Urgut. But how?

That afternoon, one Norkuljan, the director of a kolkhoz, had arrived in the rayon centre of Samarkand oblast from the village of Kamangaran. He immediately went round to see Mamurjan at his hotel.

"I am having a banquet this evening. My daughter is being married. Be my honoured guest", he invited the singer, "sing our songs and entertain us."

"It is impossible, Norkuljan. There is a concert in the House of Culture today. I can't. . ."

"Come on. Don't talk like that. Honest work will not make you old. I will not hurt your feelings, however. Will 3,000 suit you?"

"That's a different thing. Let me think. Three thousand is certainly not much. I will need more. . ."

Right on the appointed time the singer arrived at the banquet in his own "Volga". It is said, that at the wedding, he sang with rare richness and power. There was no irritation in his throat, in spite of the fact that the pilau was well peppered and he had drunk many glasses of vodka in toasting the bride and groom. Although the concert in Urgut had been ruined, Mamurjan's conscience did not worry him. What does conscience matter when he had picked up such a large amount of cash.

Another, who moves around from banquet to banquet in his own light blue "Volga", is Fakhreddin Umar. He is a colleague of Mamurjan Uzak at the Uzbek State Variety and also a brother-in-arms in the extortion of large sums of money. Fakhreddin is considerably younger than Mamurjan but he operates on a far larger scale - he would not sing at any wedding for less than 5,000 rubles. There are even people who pay him 10,000 or more for an evening. Umar has so many clients and is so overburdened with requests, that he even has to make out a time-table for the banquets, for it would certainly be a pity to miss any of them.

But what happens when he has a concert on the same evening? Even then this resourceful businessman finds an answer - well beforehand he will provide himself with a fictitious medical certificate.

Fakhreddin sells his voice and his conscience for money. He sings at one wedding after another and, each time, people, following the long outmoded custom, will slip, one after another, 25, 50, and 100 ruble notes under his skull cap. Fakhreddin smiles. The rustle of this "additional" money soothes him. Towards morning he goes home with a well filled bag. He carefully conceals the money in his large

private house; presents his two wives with expensive gifts; prepares to buy himself another "Volga"; and leads a dissipated, dissolute existence.

He has a great deal of money - so much, in fact, that there is simply nowhere to put it. But Fakhreddin wants more and goes to any lengths. Recently he, himself, arranged a banquet. His guests drove (literally drove) expensive gifts to their dear friend's - about 30 foals and 50 sheep. And when the host entered and began to sing for his guests - idlers like himself - the money rained at his feet, like the leaves from a dying plane tree.

Thus Fakhreddin Umar leads the life of a parasite. But when filling in forms about his personal life he will write, completely without shame: "My father was a peasant and bent his back for the bay. . ." Now Fakhreddin himself is little better than a bay, for he has become a parasite.

The father of Muhammad Mirza - a musician (rubab player) at the Uzbek Variety - was also a hired labourer. In our days the fate of his son turned out to be quite different. He graduated from the Tashkent conservatoire and was awarded the honorary title of Honoured Artist of the Uzbek SSR. Muhammad Mirza receives about 5,000 rubles a month from the State bank. Apparently this is not enough. This Honoured Artist of the republic disgraces his own name and also that of Uzbek art, for not only does he make a practice of singing at banquets but his programme is simply stale trash.

There is yet another example. Karim Mumin, a soloist on Uzbek radio, was holidaying in Kislovodsk, where he received a telegram from some friends inviting him to a banquet. The singer, without a moments hesitation, flew to Tashkent and back. The fare both ways was paid with money to spare.

Other artists of the Uzbek Variety, the philharmonic, the Mukimi Theatre of Musical Drama and Comedy - all active propagandists of music in unison and solo singing - also appear at banquets. Fortunately, among the large and glorious army of Uzbek artists, there are only a few of these opportunists, who strive to grab as much money as possible in order to ensure themselves an easy, dissipated life. But there must not be any parasites in art at all.

"ALMOST LIKE CHEKHOV"

The following story, POCHTI PO CHEKHOVU, by Magerram Ali-Zade (LITERATURNYY AZERBAYDZHAN, No.12, 1960) is a satire on the craze for "modern" names in Azerbaydzhan.

The tendency to curry favour with the authorities by giving children names associated with modern political and economic developments is common in all colonial territories. While India was under British rule such names as Kollektar (Collector), Kaptan (Captain), Subedar (a military rank) and Sahib (honorific universally applied to Europeans) were frequently found. In independent India the practice has been discontinued.

I am very fond of Chekhov. Now and again I would open some volume of his works and read two or three short stories with delight. Last night, for example, I read once more the LOSHADINAYA FAMILIYA ("Horse Name") and, as usual, had a good laugh. Then I was going to read another piece but could not: relatives - Uncle Fathullah and Aunt Matan - arrived from the country. So, of course, we chatted and exchanged news and they told us about a joyful event which took place a week ago: a son was born to Jayranbaja.

"What news! How wonderful! We must send a telegram of congratulation. And what name have they given to the baby? It would be a joke if the telegram were addressed to the boy: 'We congratulate you - let us say - Veli upon your arrival in this wide world. . .'"

"Nonsense! He is not Veli!", exclaimed Uncle Fathullah. "They have given him a nice modern name. . ."

"What?"

"Just wait a moment, let me remember. A beautiful, sonorous name. A boy bearing such a name will probably grow to be a famous man." And Uncle Fathullah moaned and scratched his head, screwed a finger into his brow, but it did not help.

"And how I tried to remember", he wailed, "all I can recall is that it is a very lovely name. It plays a distinguished role in farming. Matan, can you help me?"

But Aunt Matan only shrugged. "How could I remember all those

modern names? When we were young, there were such beautiful names - you utter one and feel as if you have eaten halva. Sweet names, tasty! My father, for example, was called Sheydullah and his brother Farajullah. But now there are no such names - a boy is called Sovkhoz or Kolkhoz. Is that a suitable name for a child?"

"No, our baby is not called Sovkhoz"; Uncle Fathullah sighed; "but something, I feel, similar to Sovkhoz."

"May be MTS [machine tractor station]?" I asked.

"No, not that, but something similar."

"Oh, man", Auntie looked shocked; "you cannot even remember a boy's name. So it is very much like MTS, you say? What do we have at home next door to the MTS? Raykom [rayon Party committee] or what?"

"Could it be true that the baby is in fact called Raykom?" I laughed. But Uncle Fathullah was serious.

"No, it is Nagdali's son who is called Raykom."

"Really? So it is true that there is such a name?"

"But of course. In our village there are four Raykoms, and this year many boys have been named Director."

"What of it!", Auntie interrupted, "one of our kolkhoz women calls her daughter Obligatsiya [bond of State loan], I swear by God it is true. And Sureyya's little son is called Zayem [loan], he is growing to be a nice boy. Sureyya has won two prizes at the State loan (zayem) since he was born, so now many people give that name to their boys. They think that if there is a Zayem at home, they will surely win."

"And old Kerim has named his granddaughter Ferma [farm]."

"Well, one can understand that", Uncle smiled, "Kerim has built himself a nice little house at his farm's expense, what a rogue the old man is! As to the name itself, it sounds nice: Ferma Abdullah kyzy [daughter]."

Here Grannie joined in our conversation, "You keep chattering and one can get no sense from it. Either recall the boy's name quick or send the telegram without it."

"No, it will be dull without the name. It must be recalled."

Uncle Fathullah was so excited that he could not sit still but kept walking up and down the room and scolding himself, "How could an old fool like me forget that name? All the time in the train travelling here I kept repeating it and telling the other passengers about it. But now, let Allah strike me dead, I cannot remember it. All I know is that it is a farming sort of name, something to do with the technical side of it. . . Just wait, it feels as if I were going to recall it in a moment. . ."

By now we all kept walking with him. We looked at him now with sympathy, now with reproach, and now and again we tried to help by prompting him, "Seyalka? Veyalka [sowing machine, winnowing machine]?"

"No, what an idea! Those are girls' names."

"Tractor?"

"Oh, no! Let Allah chastise me!"

"Kombayn [combine], may be?"

"Nothing of the sort!"

"Samosval [dump truck]?"

"Again not. Our nephew is called Samosval - Samosval Huseyn ogly."

"So maybe Silos [silage]?"

"Nothing like that. It is a fine name, cultured, and sounds nice."

"Cultured? So maybe Cultivator?"

"Oh!" - Uncle Fathullah jumped for joy, "I've got it! It is not Cultivator but Incubator! There you are!"

That night I kept laughing for a long time. Dear me, I thought, Chekhov should see you! It is almost like LOSHADINAYA FAMILYA.

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 January-31 March 1961. If an important news item has appeared after 31 March, it has been included where possible. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

Tadzhikistan

At the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Tadzhik Communist Party the First Secretary of the Party, T. Ul'dzhabayev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, N. Dodkhudoyev, and the Second Secretary of the Party, P.S. Obnosov were relieved of their posts and the Plenum elected D. Rasulov First Secretary, I.G. Koval' Second Secretary, and A. Kakharov Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The reason given for these changes was that these leaders have failed to fulfil their duty in achieving the Plan, especially in cotton production, and in order to cover up the shortcomings they presented falsified statistics. This has been the position for years, but instead of reorganizing agriculture by making a much better use of machines and by improving the selection and education of specialists, they have built up a network of fraud thus saving their own position. They were described by the speakers as "unprincipled careerists"; T. Ul'dzhabayev and N. Dodkhudoyev were expelled from the Party.

Iz. 18.4.61

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 6 January 1961, Zh.A. Tashenev has been relieved of his duties as President of the Council of Ministers, Kazakh SSR. KP. 7.1.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 24 January 1961, S. Daulenov has been appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Kazakh SSR. KP. 25.1.61

Tselinnyy Kray

The organizational plenum of the Tselinnyy Kray Party Committee has elected T.I. Solokov First Party Secretary and S.B. Niyazbekov Second Party Secretary. KP. 30.12.60

Territorial changes

Uzbekistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 2 March 1961, the village Chukduk, Tamdyn rayon, Bukhara oblast, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlement. VVS. 14.3.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 27 January 1961, the settlement centred around the Institute of Nuclear Physics AN/Uzb. SSR, Tashkent oblast, has been given the status of town-type settlement and named Ulugbek. VVS. 7.2.61

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 7 January 1961, a new rayon has been formed with the name of Akhangaran. This new rayon is in the Tashkent oblast and its centre is the town Akhangaran. VVS. 20.1.61

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 16 December 1960, the village Nurek, Ordzhonikidzeabad rayon, has been given the status of a town of rayon subordination. VVS.30.12.60

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 25 February 1961 Aral'sk rayon has been renamed Vose rayon, and the administrative centre, the village Aral, has been renamed Vose. VVS. 14.3.61

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 14 January 1961, the village Shcherbakty, Tsyurupin rayon, Pavlodar oblast, has been given the status of town-type settlement. VVS. 26.1.61

Tselinnyy Kray

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 20 March 1961, the town Akmolinsk, centre of the Tselinnyy Kray, has been renamed Tselinograd. P. 21.3.61

COMMUNICATIONS

Azerbaydzhan

A new train ferry-boat service is to be set up between Baku and Krasnovodsk. Large steel boats will carry trains consisting of thirty carriages across the Caspian Sea. This new means of transport is expected to be of major importance for the economic and cultural relations between countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

TI. 1.3.61

Kirgizia

A Frunze-Osh highway is under construction. The new road will link northern Kirgizia with southern Kirgizia and will lead through the Tyan'-Shan'. Up to now there is only a caravan track going from Frunze to Osh or the train route through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan. The new road will be 600 km. The Tyuya-Ashy tunnel built at a height of 3,400 metres will cut across the Kirgiz Alatay. Six large and about 150 smaller bridges are to be built along the road, which will not only link the south and the north of Kirgizia, but will make accessible regions which have been completely cut off, and thus make it possible to exploit the natural resources of the area such as coal, oil and various metal ores.

SOVREM.VOS. 1961, No.1

Kazakhstan

A new railway line is under construction from Karaganda to the mining town Karkaralinsk, Kazakhstan. The new line will be 250 km. long and will become part of the Aktogay-Karaganda line. KP. 12.3.61

The Soviet section of the Lanchow-Aktogay railway line from Aktogay to Druzhba, a distance of over 300 km., was completed at the end of 1960. NT. 1961, No.7

EDUCATION

Friendship University

On the death of Patrice Lumumba, the Friendship University of Moscow has been renamed "Patrice Lumumba Friendship University". This University is open for students from Asia, Africa and Latin America who are under the age of 35 and have had a general secondary education. (See CAR, 1960, No.4, pp.398-9.)

There is a preparatory course of one to three years for those who do not know Russian. The University has six faculties: engineering, agriculture, medicine, physics, mathematics and natural sciences, history and philology, economics and law. Applications for the 1961-2 academic year must be sent in before 30 April 1961, accompanied by a short biography, birth certificate, a certificate of health, certified copies of diplomas or school certificates and two signed photographs. Candidates must state the profession they wish to be trained for and the faculty where they wish to pursue their studies. Entrance examinations for arts students are history, geography and literature, and for science students in mathematics, physics and chemistry. SU. 1961, No.133

IRRIGATION

Turkmenistan

Karakum canal: The Murgab-Tedzhen canal, second stage of the Karakum canal, has been opened. Its total length is 540 km. and it will now be possible to use the waters of the Amu-Dar'ya for irrigation in Turkmenistan.

Construction work on the third stage of the Karakum canal has begun. This new section will be 360 km. long; crossing the Tedzhen oasis it will reach Ashkhabad through the Kopet-Dag gorge. (See CAR, 1959, No.1; 1960, No.2, pp.138-9.) P.13.1.61, Kom.P.3.3.61

Uzbekistan

Irrigation by artesian wells in the central and southern Kyzylkum is rapidly developing. A huge underground lake, about 300 km. long, 120-400 metres below the Kyzylkum desert has been discovered (see CAR, 1960, No.1, pp.45,47). Making use of this water for irrigation, "artesian oases" have been created in the desert; at present there are thirteen. The Aksay oasis covers an area of 130-200 hectares, others, such as the Ayak-Kuduk, Akmazar, Kamysty, Beshkak and Kzylkesen, cover areas varying from seven to 40 hectares. The total area irrigated in this way is at present 674 hectares; according to the plans, by 1965, 10,000 hectares will have been converted to oases in the Kyzylkum. PV. 18.3.61

The Charvak hydroelectric scheme: A new project has been envisaged for the construction of a hydroelectric power-station at Charvak, Tashkent oblast. A dam to be built on the river Chirchik will be 150 km. high and the reservoir thus created will have a capacity of over

one milliard cubic metres. According to present estimates this new hydroelectric station will produce 450-500 million kilowatt-hours each year. The reservoir will provide irrigation for 158,000 hectares of land in the Tashkent oblast alone. Preparatory work is to start in 1961. [This project was described as "under construction", and due to be completed by the end of 1960, in 1956. See PV. 25.4.56, and CAR, 1956, No.3, pp.270-1. - Ed.] PV. 29.1.61

Plans for the development of irrigation in areas near the Amu-Dar'ya include construction of two new dams at Tyuya-Muyun and Takhia-Tash. These will provide irrigation on both banks of the river and for southern Kara-Kalpakia, which in turn will ensure large-scale rice and cotton production. PV. 25.1.61

The construction of the 30 km. Kzyl-Tyubin canal has been completed. This canal will irrigate 22,000 hectares of virgin land in central Fergana. PV. 31.1.61

Kirgizia

A canal under construction in the Chu valley will connect the Chu river with the "small" Alaarchin reservoir, which has a capacity of 39 million cubic metres, thus providing irrigation for 20,000 hectares. Iz. 26.1.61

After the Bazar-Kurgan reservoir, now under construction, is completed, another two large reservoirs are to be built in southern Kirgizia, the Ak-Burgan and Nayman. The latter will provide irrigation for about 6,000 hectares. Kom.P. 31.1.61, Iz. 4.2.61

Kazakhstan

There are plans for building a new hydroelectric power-station on the Syr-Dar'ya, near the city of Kazalinsk. When ready, it will irrigate about 500,000 hectares. P. 10.2.61

LINGUISTICS

At the general conference of the Department of Languages and Literature, Academy of Sciences USSR, held in June 1960, A.K. Borovkov reported on the achievements of Turkology in the Soviet Union. He pointed out first of all the great development in the study of Turkic languages since the Revolution, and not only in the theoretical field but also in solving practical problems such as the creation of new alphabets for various peoples in the Soviet Union. In Borovkov's opinion in order to

enable the further development of Turkology two basic theoretical problems must be solved: one is the comparative historical grammar of Turkic languages and the other is the origin of Altaic languages.

In his comment, E.V. Sevortyan emphasized the one-sidedness of Turkological studies at present, i.e. that not enough attention is paid to theoretical problems. E.I. Ubryatova pointed out that there are very few scholars studying certain languages, such as Chuvash, Tuvin, Khakass etc., while there are about one hundred Turkologists working, for example, on Azeri. VOP.YAZ. 1960, No.6

LITERATURE

The first dictionary of the Tadzhik language in Tadzhik (Tolkovyy Slovar') is under preparation. It will come out in two volumes by 1963, and will contain about forty thousand words, the more important of which will be given both in Cyrillic and in Arabic script. The dictionary will include the classical vocabulary of the Tadzhik-Persian literature. KT. 11.1.61

ORIENTAL STUDIES

Last year a joint team of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences, Tadzhik SSR, and the Institute of the History of Peoples of Asia, Academy of Sciences USSR, led a second expedition to the Pamirs in the course of their research into the history of Ismailism. This time the expedition worked mainly in the Ishkashim region and in the town of Khorog. Among the very valuable manuscripts found was the Umm al-Kitab, an Ismailite tract on the origin of man, which was very famous both in the Pamirs and in Chitral (India); but until now scholars have known of it only through references. Some scholars maintain that this book was written by Nasir Khosrow, famous Persian poet and thinker of the 11th century. Another valuable manuscript the expedition found was the Kitab-i-hidayet al-muminin at-talibin, a history of Ismailism by Fedai Khorasani. This manuscript is much more complete than the one which was edited three years ago by A.A. Semenov. It contains a list of the names of all imams and information on the main events in the lives of famous Ismailites. KT. 2.1.61

Mollaoraz Khodzhamammedov

Mollaoraz Khodzhamammedov, one of the leaders of the Soviet Revolution in Khorezm, died in December 1960. At the time of the Revolution he was the first to ask the help of the Soviet Government against the dictator of Khorezm, Dzhunaid-Khan. After the Revolution Mollaoraz Khodzhamammedov was a member of the Revolutionary Committee of Khorezm and later became a member of the government of the Soviet Popular Republic of Khorezm, as president of the Turkmen Executive Committee and Foreign Minister. He was present in Moscow when the Union of the RSFSR and the KhNSR was signed on 13 September 1920.

TI. 27.12.60

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

NOTES ON THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE NAMDHARI UPRISING OF 1872

By

G.R.G. Hambly

The following comments on the article "The Namdhari Uprising of 1872 in the Punjab", which appeared in CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1961, No.1, have been communicated by Mr. G.R.G. Hambly, who is a close student of the period.

The history of the Sikh Namdhari sect has still to be written. Most references to the Namdharis, or Kukas as the British generally called them, are more concerned with the dramatic story of the Maler Kotla affray, the mass executions of Cowan and Forsyth, and the condemnation of their action by the Government of India, than with the Namdharis themselves, though they are of great intrinsic interest in the history of Sikhism.(1) But to give the movement prominence as an anti-colonial and anti-feudal revolt, as N.M. Gol'dberg and N.I. Semenova have done in "The Namdhari Rising of 1872 in the Punjab", in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.4, 1960 (CAR, 1961, No.1), and as has been done recently in India, is not justified on the basis of present available evidence. At all events, the climax to the movement - the attack on Maler Kotla - was not directed against either the alien British administration or the Sikh aristocracy, but against a rival religious community.

Throughout the 1860s and '70s there was considerable unrest prevailing in Northern and Central India, principally of a religious character.(2) The Government of India was certainly apprehensive

about internal security, but its fears were almost entirely directed towards the supposed resurgence of militant Islam. In this context it is significant that only a handful of British officials attached much importance to the Namdhari movement. If that movement had been believed to have as its object the overthrow of the Government, the Indian Civil Service would have taken the threat more seriously, since the Punjab was both a border province and a major recruiting ground, but the records of the period reveal little concern with the problem. In contrast, the so-called Wahabis were regarded as a danger out of all proportion to their numbers and influence.

In origin, the Namdhari movement was directed towards religious reform. Like the later Singh Sabha movement, in which the Akalis were to become prominent as temple reformers, it was concerned with the purification of the pristine faith of Guru Govind Singh by the removal of later accretions of Sikhism. It is an interesting coincidence that its development was contemporary with the appearance of Wahabi doctrines in North-West India, introduced by Sayyid Ahmad Shah of Rae Bareli, the implacable opponent of the Sikhs on the trans-Indus frontier. What Ahmad Shah sought to achieve for Indian Muslims by a strict return to the precepts of early Arabian Islam, Balak Singh and Ram Singh, the first leaders of the Namdharis, aimed to do for Sikhism. They strove to give a puritanical direction to Sikhism and, as so often happens with puritanism, their failure to capture and rejuvenate the Sikh faith, which has been ascribed to their lack of education,(3) drove them into isolation from the Sikh community and ultimately into sectarianism. It was as sectarians that they endeavoured to avoid unnecessary contact with and contamination by non-Namdharis, and it is to this instinct that their boycott of British Law Courts, Posts and Telegraphs must be ascribed rather than to any Swadeshi aims.(4) The conversion of lower-class Muslims played a considerable part in their range of activities and by 1871, when their numbers were reckoned at between 300,000 and 400,000, the Namdhari community had absorbed many Muslim converts. (5)

Three phases are discernible in the Namdhari movement. The first phase, extending down to the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, is one of consolidation and reform within the fold of Sikhism and under the favourable circumstances of Sikh political hegemony in the Punjab. The second phase, from 1849 to 1872, reflected the changed status of the Sikh community in the Punjab and was characterized by the steady growth of Sikh-Muslim tension rising to outbreaks of communal violence. Prior to the British conquest communal disturbances had been rare between Sikh and Muslim because of the existence of the Khalsa as the visible and powerful instrument of coercion on behalf of the Sikh State, which in normal times reduced the Muslims to the status of under-privileged citizens. This was changed after 1849. The

Sikhs ceased to be a ruling minority and were reduced to equal status with the Muslims. This, in turn, affected the Namdharis in a pointed and direct way because the restrictions on kine-killing were removed, though the sanctity of the cow was a principal tenet of the Namdhari faith. At first there was no sharp break with the past. Although British policy towards indigenous religions was by tradition non-interventionist, unless a particular religious custom was peculiarly noxious or anti-social, the Punjab Board of Administration which was set up in 1849 prohibited the open sale of beef in Lahore and Amritsar, though Muslims were of course permitted to obtain beef so long as they did so in an unostentatious manner. But by the late 'sixties this rule was being openly disregarded and beef was exposed for sale quite close to the Golden Temple in Amritsar.(6) As a result, violent communal emotion was generated, leading to the murder of Muslim butchers in Amritsar and Raikot in 1871 and to the attack on Maler Kotla a year later. The third phase followed inevitably from these events. With the prosecution of the murderers at Amritsar and Raikot and the savage punishments inflicted at Maler Kotla a definite anti-British element appeared in the Namdhari movement. The event which antagonized the sect most deeply was undoubtedly the removal of Ram Singh to Rangoon in 1872 and his detention there until his death in 1885. Despite the fact that there was a substratum of agrarian discontent in the Punjab during this period,(7) there is no evidence that the Namdhari movement was part of it. It is highly significant that the Namdhari outrages of 1870, 1871 and 1872 were perpetrated against Muslims and not against British personnel. The parties concerned were ignorant, hysterical fanatics stimulated by bhang, and if the Namdhari movement in that period had been anti-British some incident directed against the British must have occurred. As it was, Ram Singh warned the authorities that his followers intended to attack Maler Kotla and were beyond his control.

The relative unimportance of the Namdharis after the executions at Maler Kotla and the removal of Ram Singh from the province is illustrated in the correspondence between the new Governor-General, Lord Northbrook, who arrived in India after the Maler Kotla controversy had subsided, and Sir Henry Davies, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Northbrook wished the Namdhari executions to be forgotten as quickly as possible and he opposed any public trial of members of the sect. He thoroughly approved of the Government Resolution condemning Cowan and Forsyth,(8) and he resented the revival of the controversy in the Press by Sir Donald McLeod, a former Lieutenant-Governor of the province, and Lepel Griffin, the Secretary to the Punjab Government. Davies assured him that there was no cause for apprehension about the Punjab, which was no more restless than any other province,(9) and Northbrook was able to tell the Secretary of State that "Kookaism is falling asleep, and nothing should be done to arouse it."(10)

In 1873 Davies reported a revival of Namdhari activity due to "the debut of Buddh Singh, brother of Ram Singh, as high priest. . ." He mentioned rumours that the Namdharis were in touch with the Wahabis (an unlikely occurrence in view of the antagonism of Sikh and Muslim at this time) and had sent emissaries to Swat, but he was disposed to think that the officials in Ludhiana, where the Namdharis were to be found in large numbers, exaggerated.(11) Northbrook urged him to remove such provocation to the Namdharis as the public sale of beef.(12) Soon afterwards Davies was able to assure the Governor-General that the Namdharis were "much depressed" and "contemplating no sort of aggression against Government", and he issued orders that they were to be no longer harried.(13) This met with the Governor-General's approval.(14)

Two years later, in 1875, Northbrook reported to the Secretary of State "a slight revival of Kooka agitation in the Punjab."(15) In 1879 there occurred the curious incident of the despatch of a letter from Buddh Singh to the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan pledging the Namdharis to support a Russian invasion and prophecying the end of British rule.(16) This episode, known at the time to the British authorities, has been given undue prominence. It does not supply a proof that the sect aimed at the overthrow of British rule, but merely reflects the attitude of the Namdhari leader and is a further indication of the prevailing unrest stimulated by Lytton's internal policies and the excitement of the Afghan imbroglio. When I.P. Minayeff, the Russian Indologist who had been consulted over the 1879 letter from Buddh Singh, travelled through the Punjab in 1880, he noted the existence of a few Namdharis at Amritsar and many more in Ludhiana district. He was struck by their loyalty to the exiled Ram Singh, their belief in a Russian invasion, and their conviction that the Afghans would emerge victorious from the war.(17) It is open to question whether the Namdharis were so conspicuous to all travellers in the Punjab or whether Minayeff purposely sought them out and exaggerated their importance for his own reasons. At all events, by 1881 Denzil Ibbetson was prepared to state that the Namdharis could not be loyal to the British Government and plotted its overthrow - an opinion widely expressed about the Wahabis. This view was quoted in the Ludhiana District Gazetteer and repeated in G.C. Narang's TRANSFORMATION IN SIKHISM, but it is difficult to show conclusive evidence that the Namdharis aimed at the revival of the old Khalsa.(18) Recently the Indian editor of the English translation of Minayeff's diaries has described the movement as anti-feudal and anti-imperialist.(19) It seems that ever since 1872 the Maler Kotla incident has given an exaggerated importance to the Namdharis as a dissentient element in British India, and at different times and for different reasons, British, Russian and Indian writers have all been guilty of overestimating its significance.(20)

Notes

(1) An example of this was Edward Thompson's description of the Maler Kotla incident in THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MEDAL, London, 1925.

(2) See G.R.G. Hambly, "Unrest in Northern India during the Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo, 1869-72", ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN JOURNAL, January 1961, Vol.XLVIII, Pt.I.

(3) Teja Singh, SIKHISM, ITS IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS, Calcutta, 1938, pp.80-81.

(4) G.C. Narang, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SIKHISM, Lahore, 3rd edn., 1946, pp.313-15.

(5) Report on Native Feeling in the Punjab, initialled F.B., October 1871, in MAYO PAPERS (WAHABIS), University Library, Cambridge.

(6) Northbrook to Davies, 28 October 1873, C.144.14., Northbrook Collection, India Office Library, London, which is accompanied by an important undated letter to Northbrook from an Indian source.

(7) This agrarian discontent was due to the introduction of fixed assessments and cash payments of Land Revenue, fluctuations in revenue policy, uncertainty of proprietary right, indebtedness and land alienation.

(8) Northbrook to Argyll, 10 May 1872, C.144.9.

(9) Ibid., 17 June 1872, C.144.9.

(10) Ibid., 10 October 1872, C.144.9.

(11) R.H. Davies to Northbrook, 26 & 27 August and 3 September 1873, C.144.14.

(12) Northbrook to R.H. Davies, 28 October 1873, C.144.14.

(13) R.H. Davies to Northbrook, 7 November 1873, C.144.14.

(14) Northbrook to R.H. Davies, 12 November 1873, C.144.14.

(15) Northbrook to Salisbury, 5 February 1875, C.144.12.

(16) See article of P.Ch. Roy, in the PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDIAN HISTORICAL RECORDS COMMISSION, 1958, Vol.XXXIV, Pt.II, pp.84-89.

(17) I.P. Minayeff, TRAVELS IN AND DIARIES OF INDIA AND BURMA, Calcutta, 1958?; diary for April 1880, pp.93-94.

(18) PUNJAB DISTRICT GAZETTEERS, Vol.XV, A, Ludhiana District 1904, Lahore, 1907, pp.29-30 and 84-86, and G.C. Narang: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SIKHISM, pp.313-15.

(19) I.P. Minayeff, op.cit., pp.234-5.

(20) The 19th century Russian artist, V. Vereshchagin, was inspired by the Maler Kotla incident to paint his "Execution of Indians by the British", which is reproduced in the English translation of Minayeff cited above, facing p.123.

THE DUNGANS IN CHINA

Recently Soviet writers have shown much interest in the Dungans, a people who emigrated from Sinkiang to present-day Kirgizia and Kazakhstan in the mid-nineteenth century. M. Sushanlo, in his book DUNGANE SEMIRECH'YA (Frunze, 1959), makes a study of the history of this people and their development within Central Asia, though they number less than 30,000 within the Soviet Union. (See "The Dungans of Semirech'ye" in this issue for an analysis of the major part of the book, concerning the history of the Soviet Dungans.) About a quarter of this book deals with the development and history of the Dungans in China, including their supposed origins and the reasons for the exodus of some of them to Russia following uprisings in Sinkiang in the 1870s. (See "The Migration of the Dungans, 1877-1882", CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1958, No.3, pp.264-71, for an abridged translation of an earlier article by Sushanlo on the Dungans.) An entire recent issue of the journal of the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences was also devoted to the Dungans (see IZVESTIYA AN/Kirg. SSR, Seriya Obshchestvennykh Nauk, Vol.II, Vyp.2, 1960).

Several discrepancies appear between this work and previous Soviet writings on the Dungans, including those of Sushanlo himself. In his earlier article, the author said that the estimates of the present-day Dungan population of China varied greatly, but the accepted estimate was somewhere between eight and nine million. In his new book he again stresses the differences in the estimates, saying that some claim there are five to ten million, and others as many as fifty to sixty million. He quotes a publication called THE HISTORY OF THE DUNGANS, issued by the National Publishing House of the Chinese People's Republic in 1957, citing the official figure as 3,530,498. He also gives a list showing exactly where these Dungans are located. (The map facing p.202 shows this distribution, covering almost every province of China.) He emphasizes that, far from being limited to Sinkiang, they are scattered throughout China: "From this table it is seen that the Dungans live in all parts of China. But the main body is in the north of the country." He says that the majority of the Dungans in the north-west are peasants: "Like all Chinese peasants they have suffered from insufficient land. The land, as the basic means of production, was in the hands of Manchu, Chinese and Dungan feudal lords, officials, merchants and usurers. . . The condition of the Dungan peasants was very hard and in no way differed

from that of the Chinese peasantry in other provinces, and possibly was even worse."

Origin of name

The question of how the name "Dungan" (or "Khuetsu" in Chinese) originated is one that seems to have absorbed Sushanlo, and is of special interest because of the changing Soviet attitude. An article in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA of 1954 discussed some of the theories of the Dungans' origin, and said that the theory in favour was that the Dungan people were Muslims who had migrated to China from Persia, Arabia and Central Asia, as part of a Mongol army composed of subject tribes which aimed at the conquest of China and the destruction of the Sung dynasty. (See CAR, 1954, No.3, p.264.) Sushanlo, in his earlier article, says in a footnote that he believes that the Dungans are Chinese of the north-western provinces of China who adopted Islam at some unknown date (CAR, 1958, No.3, p.264).

In the book under review Sushanlo attacks a theory which he says has been spread by the Dungan clergy:

"The most widespread opinion is that the name 'Dungan' is connected with the history of the origin of the people itself. Such an opinion was disseminated by the Dungan clergy at the time of the arrival of part of the Khuetsu population from the provinces of Shensi and Kansu in Sinkiang (second half of the 18th century), and also during the uprising of this people in the second half of the 19th century in north-west China. The Dungan clergy spread the version that allegedly in the T'ang epoch (618-907), at the request of the Chinese emperor, Muhammad sent his troops into China for the defence of the Chinese dynasty from an invasion by nomads. These troops, at the request of the Chinese emperor, made their home in the country. They, it is said, were the founders of a new nationality 'Dungans', from the Turkic word 'they remained' or 'Turgan'. . . The representatives of the Dungan clergy, in union with Dungan exploiting elements, spread among the local inhabitants of Sinkiang (where they arrived in 1764 with the armies of the Emperor Ch'ien Lung) tales that the ancestors of the Dungans were the troops of the Prophet Muhammad and that consequently this nationality by its origin occupies an exceptional place in the Muslim world and stands above other peoples, since the Dungans are descendants of the Prophet." (Pp.5-6)

The groundlessness of this opinion, says Sushanlo, is obvious, since in China the Dungans both earlier and now have been called "Khuetsu". The well-known explorer of Asia Nikolay Mikhaylovich Przheval'skiy recorded that "such a name (Dungans) is completely

DISTRIBUTION OF THE DUNGANS IN CHINA (1957)

Legend

	Province or City	Population		Province or City	Population
1	Hopei	305,733	15	Heilungkiang	42,307
2	City of Peking	78,862	16	Shensi	54,981
3	City of Tientsin	74,686	17	Kansu	1,086,597
4	Shansi	19,084	18	Tsinghai	257,959
5	Autonomous Rayon of Inner Mongolia	48,251	19	Uygur Autonomous Rayon of Sinkiang	134,275
6	Liaoning	125,346	20	Shantung	246,501
7	Kirin	55,900	21	Kiangsu	65,764
8	City of Shanghai	29,644	22	Kiangsi	1,619
9	Chekiang	1,878	23	Kwangtung	4,789
10	Anhwei	133,679	24	Kwangsi	9,894
11	Fukien	5,094	25	Kweichow	40,964
12	Honan	387,546	26	Szechwan	48,093
13	Hupei	28,745	27	Yunnan	217,091
14	Hunan	33,271		TOTAL	3,530,498*

*Total as given in *Dungane Semirech'ya*. The actual total of these figures is 3,538,553.

SCALE 1 : 14,000,000 OR 221 MILES TO 1 INCH

MLS. 100 0 100 200 300 400 500

International boundaries

Administrative area boundaries

Provincial boundaries

unknown either to the Chinese or to the Muslims themselves in those localities which were visited by us in the time of our travels". Sushanlo confirms that the name Dungans has been unknown not only to the Khuetsu in China, but also to the majority of those now in Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. "As far as can be surmised, the name first appeared in the second half of the 18th century in Sinkiang province, when the Laokheukheu (Dungans) from inner China began to resettle in the western territory. . . Among these new settlers were the Laokheukheu. . . from the north-west provinces of inner China, especially Shensi and Kansu." After citing other sources to show that they did in fact come from these provinces, Sushanlo says that the name Dungans came from the name of the eastern part of Kansu province: in Chinese "Dun" (east) and "Gan" (Kansu). More follows to show that the name Dungan applies only to the Chinese Muslims of the Ili territory in Sinkiang.

The name came to be applied to those living in Russia, after her annexation of Kazakhstan and northern Kirgizia, when the Russian empire began to border on Sinkiang. "We have dwelt on this question", says Sushanlo, "only to show that the name 'Dungan' is geographical in its origin and is not derived from the Turkic word 'Turgan'."

The influence of the Dungan clergy

In his earlier article Sushanlo refers only in passing to the part played by the Muslim clergy in oppressing the Dungan people: "The feudal aristocracy exploited the workers with the active assistance of the Muslim clergy." The kindling of "national antagonisms" in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang he blames on the Manchu provincial authorities. In the present book, however, he shifts the main blame for this to the clergy. He says that according to the Russian envoy to Peking, in a report to the Russian Foreign Ministry of 14 April 1872, the Chinese General Tso Tsung-tang had informed the Emperor that "the Muslim elders in collaboration with the officials began to exploit the population more, and this was the cause of the uprising." In fact, while economic oppression increased, the Manchu Government's policy of national oppression was intensified, and the clergy played their part. "This was reflected in the kindling of national discord among peoples living in the provinces of the country . . . The antagonism between the workers of the Dungans and Chinese, Mongol and Tibetan peoples was artificially fanned by the Dungan Muslim clergy. While the Dungan clergy aroused religious fanaticism through their organizations, the Dungan feudalists - landowners, merchants and usurers, tried with the aid of religious propaganda, to defend themselves from the dissatisfaction of the Dungan peasantry and to direct the popular movement in the direction necessary for the exploiting classes."

The reason why Sushanlo now attacks the influence of the Muslim clergy among the Dungans more strongly than in his previous work may be found in the recent increase in official hostility towards Islam in Kirgizia. This is clearly shown in a book published in Frunze in 1958, also by the Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, entitled NEKOTORYYE PEREZHITKI PROSHLOGO V SOZNANII LYUDEY V SREDNEY AZII I ROL' SOTSIALISTICHESKOY KUL'TURY V BOR'BE S NIMI (Some Survivals of the Past in the Consciousness of the People of Central Asia and the Role of Socialist Culture in Struggling Against Them). For a review of this book see the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XLVIII, Part II.

Russia and the Dungans

Sushanlo's account of the resettlement of the Ili Dungans in Russia in this book, is far shorter and less detailed than in his article of 1957 (CAR, 1958, No.3, pp.264-71). He says that the temporary occupation of the Ili territory by Russian forces in July 1871 had a "positive significance": "In the first place it put an end to the internecine struggle in the area, and in the second place it warded off the danger of the seizing of the Ili valley by Yaqub Bek." (Sushanlo says that Yaqub Bek, the ruler of Kashgaria, aspired to the domination of Eastern Turkestan, and was supported in these pretensions by the British.) The population of this area, Sushanlo says, gave a great welcome to the Russians, considering them as "their liberators from the tyranny which had reigned in the territory".

In the present book Sushanlo is more emphatic about the significance of the population's desire to leave with the Russians, when the latter in accordance with the St.Petersburg agreement of 1881 withdrew from the territory after 10 years of occupation. "This was an event unparallelled in history, when the population of a whole area declared its desire to resettle in Russia, abandoning its family homes and the fields which, by the sweat of its brows, it had worked for many generations, simply to avoid remaining under the Manchu yoke. The cause of the Ili Dungans' transfer to Semirech'ye was that the Dungans did not want to live any longer under subjection to Bogdykhan, who had cruelly oppressed their brothers in the north-west of the empire after the suppression of the Dungan uprising." However, Sushanlo admits that the Russian authorities' motives in accepting the Dungans were not altruistic: "The Russian local administration saw in the Ili Dungans and the Uygurs a cheap labour force. This was an important consideration in the Russian Government's willingness to take on itself the expense of the resettling and establishment in Semirech'ye of the Ili Dungans and Uygurs." (P.21)

An underlying theme in the rest of Sushanlo's book is the benefits which the Dungans as a national minority enjoy in the Soviet Union. There is here an implied contrast between their unhappy lot in China and their happy development in the Soviet Union; but the comparison of course is with the old China, no comparison being made with the Dungans now living there.

"MODERN AFGHANISTAN": A NEW SOVIET HANDBOOK

A comprehensive and up-to-date Soviet handbook on Afghanistan, SOVREMENNYY AFGANISTAN (Publishing House of Eastern Literature, Moscow) was published in 1960. It is at least as substantial and detailed a work as the handbook on Persia, SOVREMENNYY IRAN, which appeared in 1957 (see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1958, No.3, pp.357-8). Apart from the importance of the factual material which it assembles, it is of particular significance in that it examines, and in many cases criticizes, aspects of Afghanistan's social, economic and political life which have hitherto been largely ignored by Soviet writers.

Scope of the work

The handbook is divided into four parts - Land and Population, Economy, Historical Outline, and Culture. The names of 26 different writers appear in the list of authors of the different chapters; others are mentioned among the editors of the four divisions of the book; and the editorial team of eight members is headed by N.A. Dvoryankov.

The first chapter, "Physical-Geographical Outline", by Yu.K. Yefremov, describes land relief, mountains, geological history, climate and hydrography.

The chapter "Population", by A.A. Polyak, gives figures and data relating to population, percentage of nomads, density of population in different areas, natural increase of population, proportion of women to men, proportion of urban to rural population, and brief descriptions of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. Details are given of some 25 "nationalities" (narodnost'), including a chart giving their locations according to provinces and areas. Other sections deal with the social composition of the population, "communal clan survivals", the customary law of Afghan tribes, inheritance, family relationships, housing and dress.

The chapter on "State Structure", by I. Aleksandrov and R.T. Akhramovich, gives information on the constitutional functions of the central authorities (the King, Council of Ministers, ministries,

officials of central State institutions, National Council, Assembly of the Nobility and the Great Jirga). The same is done for the organs of local administration, the city boards and the legal system. Of the latter, it is stated that before 1919 legal procedure was in the hands of the Muslim clergy, and that although the State has taken over more responsibility in this area, reform is still not complete. One of the main criticisms of the authors is that there is no single legal system in Afghanistan.

"Languages of Afghanistan", by N.A. Dvoryankov and L.N. Dorofeyev, fill 40 pages. The authors point out that although Pushtu and Persian are the languages of four-fifths of the population, over 30 languages in all are spoken in Afghanistan. The principal languages of the Iranian, Indian and Turkic groups are listed, and the main characteristics of Pushtu and Kabuli Persian are described, with explanations and charts of phonetics, grammar, syntax, structure and morphology.

The chapter "Religion", by Ye.A. Belyayev, is a fairly factual account of the beliefs, customs and obligations of Muslims. The condemnation of religion, while implied throughout, is less obtrusive than in the usual Soviet accounts of Islam. Belyayev refers to the wide influence of the clergy, their prominent role in religion and in censorship of the press, and to their holding of leading or influential positions in the State and administrative apparatus. He suggests that the money used for maintaining the clergy and the mosques might be better used in essential areas of the economy.

"Agriculture", by A.A. Polyak, emphasizes that over 90 per cent of the population of Afghanistan is engaged in agriculture, and that Afghanistan's exports depend almost entirely on it. But, he points out, the level of agricultural production is low; "its development is held back by the prevalence in the Afghan countryside of semi-feudal relations and the existence of deep survivals of communal clan structure".

"Industry and Handicrafts", also by Polyak, is largely an account of industrial expansion since the Second World War.

"Transport and Communications", by G.P. Yezhov, describes recent efforts to improve communications, and makes special mention of Soviet aid in this connexion.

"Foreign Trade", by Yu.M. Golovin, is a very thorough study of the development of Afghanistan's trade relations with foreign countries.

"Finances", by G.P. Rybalko, points out that Afghanistan's

monetary circulation was systematized and centralized more recently than that of other countries; paper money only began to circulate in 1935. The author examines in detail questions of the rate of exchange, the credit system and the State finances in general, including the main heads of the Afghan budget.

"Historical Outline", which is in fact the third of the four main divisions of the handbook, is written by M.A. Babakhodzhayev and V.A. Romodin, under the editorial direction of R.T. Akhramovich. A recent history of Afghanistan, also edited by Akhramovich, has already been reviewed in CAR (1960, No.2, pp.170-201). The present study follows the same pattern. Of the numerous distortions of fact and palpable untruths which it contains, one of the most glaring is the statement that in the Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 Britain sent 340,000 troops against Afghanistan. In fact (see THE THIRD AFGHAN WAR, 1919, OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, Calcutta, 1926) approximately 75,000 cavalry, infantry and pioneers were engaged; with artillery and ancillary troops the total was not more than 100,000.

"Education", by T.I. Kukhtina, points out that before the 20th century all education in Afghanistan was conducted in schools attached to the mosques, under the control of the Muslim clergy, while the great majority of the population were illiterate. Educational advance began in the 1920s, following independence, but only affected the propertied classes; professional and higher education did not start until the 1930s; by 1948 the literacy rate was still only 8 per cent; and between 1941 and 1945 only 15 new schools were opened. Serious measures to improve education were undertaken in the 1950s, and aid was accepted from UNESCO and from Western governments, including the USA, "as a result, since 1950 American influence in national education has noticeably increased." Kukhtina gives a detailed account of teachers' salaries, the examination system, elementary education (with a table showing the numbers of town and village schools in the various provinces), and information on technical education, religious schools and higher education, with an account of the faculties of Kabul University. She makes the general comment: "The low living standard of the population, the insufficiency of trained teaching and research personnel, the absence of a unified system of instruction and of well worked out scholastic curricula, the shortage of school buildings, equipment, textbooks and teaching appliances - all this hinders the successful solution of the problem of national education."

"Historiography", by R.T. Akhramovich, reviews the research and writings of Afghan historians. Akhramovich says that "national bourgeois social thought" began in Afghanistan early in the present century; he claims that the Russian Revolution of 1905-7 had much influence on its development. In the first period after independence, he says,


AFGHANISTAN
50 0 50 100 150 200
International boundaries.
Province boundaries.
Sands.
QARAQUM SANDS
TURKMEN SSR
UZBEK SSR
TADZHIK SSR
Merv (Mary)
Tedzhen
Amu Darya
Termez
Kurghan-Tiube
S. Kuliab
Lake Shiva
Shahr-i-Buzurg
Faizabad
Khazret-i-Imam Sahib
Ishkamish
Jurm
Zebak
Aqcha
Andkhui
Balkh
Mazar-i-Sharif
Qunduz
Taliqan
Khanabad
Tash Qurghan
Shibarghan
Sar-i-Pul
Murchaghar
Baghlan
Pul-i-Khumri
Fereng
Takhta-Bazar
Maruchak
Maimana
Kala-Qala
Bala-Murghab
Kushka
Qara-Tepe
Gulran
Doshi
Banu
Chitral
Indus
Jabal-us-Siraj
Charikar
Qala-i-Nau
Herat
Karrukh
Hari Rud
Daulat Yar
Qala Safarak
Panjao
Bamiyan
Qala Qazi
Istalif
Paghman
KABUL
Jalalabad
Bala Bagh
Arghandi
Dar-ul-Aman
Kundur
Qala Hissar
Kariz Mulla
Telak
Farsi
Farrah Rud
Dai Kundi
Shaikhabad
Ali Khail
PESHAWAR
RAWALPINDI
Taiwara
Ghazni
Gardez
Sabzawar
Ujaristan
Sang-i-Masha
Purchaman
Zirni
Khwaja Ra'uf
Helmand
Chahar Deh
Muqur
Mushkan
Farrah
Nauzad
Musa Qala
Dilaram
Lake Ab-i-Istada
Bara Khail
Marjan
Ghorak
Qalat-i-Ghilzai
Arghandab
Khash
Chakhansur
Qandahar
Qala-i-Jadid
DASHT-I-MARGO DESERT
REGISTAN DESERT
Chahar Burjak
Rudbar
Helmand
PROVINCE
MAIMANA
HERAT
FARRAH
KABUL
GHAZNI
SOUTHERN
QANDAHAR
EASTERN
NURISTAN
BADAKHSHAN
J.P.

Afghan historians concentrated on the activities of Afghan monarchs; "the extreme subjectivism of the authors is dominant in their evaluation of events." However, some historians are credited with being more "objective" - that is, they evaluate the success or failure of reforms "not only by the personal qualities of the ruler, but also by the attitude of the various layers of Afghan society to these reforms". The dominant national bourgeois ideology in Afghanistan, says Akhramovich, is anti-colonialist; it may in some respects oppose progressive social ideas, and it may show certain characteristics of chauvinism, but it is above all concerned to expose the colonialist theories of bourgeois Western historiography. Akhramovich gives an account of the work and output of the Historical Society of Afghanistan, and of Afghan publications on ancient and modern history, on the independence movement and on the Pushtunistan question. The chapter shows the interest which is taken by Soviet scholars in the writing of Afghan history by Afghan historians (see CAR, 1960, No.1, p.64).

"Philology", by G.P. Girs, is an account of the development of philological and literary studies in Afghanistan. It reviews the growth and activities of Afghan philological and literary societies, and in particular of the Afghan Academy, and lists works by Afghan scholars on linguistic and literary subjects.

"The Press", also by Girs, consists of a short but informative history of the development of the press in Afghanistan, an examination of its relations with the Government, and an account of the press today and the operations of the Bakhtar News Agency. Girs describes in some detail the operation of press censorship, pointing out that material is not censored prior to issue but that legal action is taken for violation of the Press Law of 1951. The activities of the Government's Press Department are described; Girs says that "in fact it fulfils the functions of a ministry of propaganda". The daily press, he says, reflects the opinion of official circles and is "in essence semi-official".

Other shorter chapters deal with libraries (M.Kh. Saringulyan), museums (M.R. Arunova and A.A. Dzhafarova), radio (I.A. Sheptunov), literature (G.P. Girs and L.N. Dorofeyeva), historical monuments (M.R. Arunova), the fine arts (E.N. Darskiy), theatre (G.P. Girs and N.A. Dvoryankov), cinema (L.I. Miroshnikov), music (V.M. Belyayev), health (A.I. Chernyy) and sport (G.P. Girs).

A 115-page appendix to the book contains the following:

(a) A 13-page section by L.N. Dorofeyeva, giving instructions for the transcription of Afghan names and geographical terms, including the relation between Afghan and Russian terms.

(b) Statistical tables on the Afghan economy, compiled by Yu.M. Golovin, giving much information on land distribution, Afghan exports and imports, and the geographical distribution of Afghan foreign trade, given in millions of dollars.

(c) A table of Afghan measurements, by G. Rauf (deceased).

(d) An explanation of the Afghan calendar, by V.P. Tsybul'skiy.

(e) A chart of distances between the cities of Afghanistan.

(f) A 15-page tabular list of all newspapers and magazines appearing in Afghanistan since the 1920s, including a brief description of each one, compiled by G.F. Girs.

(g) Ten pages of tables on the administrative divisions of Afghanistan, by M.K. Kurkin.

(h) A 16-page chronology of Afghan history, compiled by R.T. Akhramovich, M.A. Babakhodzhayev, V.K. Kuz'min and V.A. Romodin.

(i) Fifteen pages of bibliography, divided by chapters, and given in the language of origin, in its own script.

(j) Four indexes of names, terminology, institutions, organizations, enterprises, periodicals, and geographic and ethnic names used in the book, compiled by Kukhtina.

(k) Three maps, by A.D. Davydov, G.P. Yezhov, Yu.K. Yefremov and Kukhtina, showing the political divisions, orographic features and administrative and territorial divisions of Afghanistan.

As has been noted above, the handbook directs attention to aspects of Afghanistan which have hitherto been glossed over or ignored by Soviet writers. Sections and passages which exemplify this are given below in abridged translations.

Feudalism and the Constitution (pp.54-55)

The present Constitution of Afghanistan was proclaimed in 1931. It consists of 110 Articles composed of the following sections: general regulations, rights of the Crown, general rights of Afghan subjects, the National Council, Assembly of the Nobility, local

consultative assemblies, duties and rights of ministers, rights of officials, courts, Supreme Court, finances, administration of the provinces, army, various decrees.

The adoption of the Constitution was an important step in the forming of a constitutional monarchy in Afghanistan. Its articles were formulated in accordance with the interests of the landowners and national big bourgeoisie. The Constitution confirmed those social and economic changes which had occurred in Afghanistan since independence.

Affirmation of the sovereignty of the State is one of the basic provisions of the Constitution. It also reflects the passing away of the remains of the feudal splintering of Afghanistan. Thus it is established that all areas of the country comprise a single whole under the authority of the King (Art.2). The Constitution proclaims the inviolability of private property, already guaranteed in 1923 by legislation introduced by the Emir Amanullah (Art.15,17); the equality of all Afghan subjects before State authority (Art.3) and the law (Art.13); obligatory primary education (Art.20).

At the same time, the predominance in Afghanistan of semi-feudal conditions of production ensured the survival of feudal institutions in the superstructure of the State. The religious and legal provisions of the shariat (Muslim Canon Law) continue to play an important part in Afghan legislation. In the Constitution it is emphasized that the rights of Afghan subjects are assured both by law and by the shariat. The Constitution contains no mention of the possible creation of any parties or political organizations.

Class structure (pp.41-42)

The main classes of Afghan society are, on the one hand, the landowners (and tribal khans), forming a privileged leadership, and, on the other hand, the peasantry (including the ordinary nomads). In the hands of the landowners and tribal khans are concentrated the most important means of production - land and the irrigation systems, and cattle. In Afghanistan feudal forms of exploitation of the peasantry prevail everywhere.

In the areas requiring irrigation up to 80 per cent of the peasants have little or no land. Effectively deprived of land and water, and often also of the necessary means of production, they are forced to work the land of the landowners as share-croppers. The remaining 20 per cent of the peasants can be classified as middle and well-to-do peasants. In the mountainous areas, where there are still strong survivals of the communal clan structure, a natural and semi-

natural economy often prevails.

With the development of goods and monetary relationships in the Afghan countryside the process of depriving peasants of land strengthened. Having no possibility of obtaining work in the cities, in the majority of cases they remain in the country, which suffers from agrarian overpopulation.

The basis of the economy of the Afghan nomads is livestock, chiefly sheep and goats. The survival of communal clan relations prevents the application of more progressive methods of cattle-breeding.

The industrial bourgeoisie and working-class are the rising and developing classes of Afghan society. In Afghanistan there are nearly 50,000 factory and construction workers. The working-class of the country is few in number, and territorially dispersed.

During the last 20 or 30 years, the national trading bourgeoisie has become much stronger and this has aided the creation of a wide network of shirkats, or companies. In the towns, the petty bourgeoisie - shopkeepers, owners of small handicraft industries, and others - is very numerous. With the growth of light industry and of foreign competition, tradesmen are encountering great difficulty and many of them have been ruined.

In Afghanistan there are many class elements (e.g. the intelligentsia and clergy) which influence public life in varying degrees. Recently, the progressive members of the intelligentsia have shown an increasing tendency to come out in favour of the strengthening of friendship with the socialist countries, and have opposed the attempts of the colonizers to involve Afghanistan in military and aggressive blocs.

The influence of the clergy is very great especially among the rural population, including the nomads.

Tribalism (pp.42-43)

In spite of the development of capitalist relationships, semi-feudal conditions and survivals of communal clan structure continue to prevail. The latter are especially strong among the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and some settled tribes of eastern Afghanistan and other outlying areas of the country (eastern Gilzai, part of the Mohmands, Atsakzais and, probably the Nurzai). In many of the tribes (Safi, Khostwali, part of the eastern Gilzai) there still exists a family or tribal military organization and a jirga - a council of elders.

The family and tribal groups (ta'ifa) of the Hazaras and Jamshidis have been preserved up to the present. The chiefs of the large ta'ifa who have amassed great wealth, rule not only over their own, but also over neighbouring family and tribal groups which are economically weaker. Among the Hazaras, this usually results in the head of the ta'ifa being representative of the State administration in his area. There are strong survivals of the communal clan structure among the Nuristanis.

Among the overwhelming majority of the tribes patriarchal family relations only cover up various forms of exploitation. Among the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen patriarchal family survivals are also widely exploited by their leaders. On the peasant farms of the Uzbeks, for example, khashar (mutual aid) is often practised, that is to say well-to-do peasants invite neighbours to help harvest their crops; they do not pay them for their work, but merely provide them with food.

Economic under-development (pp.120-2)

After attaining independence (1919) the social and economic development of Afghanistan was speeded up. The Afghan State began actively to intervene in the economic life of the country. The reforms of the 1920s, especially the juridical recognition of private property in land and the replacement of indirect by direct taxation, hastened the development of commodity and monetary relationships in the country, and contributed to the class differentiation and dispossession of the peasantry and to the growth of feudal landownership. The Afghan State took measures for the creation of industrial enterprises, the construction of roads and the development of motor transport. The process of concentration and centralization of the national trade capital led to the ousting of foreign merchants and money-lenders in the 1930s from trade and financial operations. A part of the accumulated national trade capital, mainly under the pressure of the State, was put into industry and transport.

The Second World War unfavourably affected Afghanistan's economic situation. National industry was still so weak that it could not nearly satisfy the demand of the population for consumer goods or process the same quantity of raw materials which it had exported before the war. The disruption of foreign trade links with many countries resulted in a great shortage of industrial goods and a cut in production. A significant rise in the price of goods, especially industrial consumer goods, severely affected the condition of the population.

In the first post-war years the economic position of Afghanistan continued to remain precarious. As a result of inflation, prices of industrial goods and provisions rose. The loss of cattle and bad

harvests caused a sharp fall in agricultural production. The expansion of American imperialism caused great damage to the country's economy; a currency crisis also developed.

After the Second World War the basic social and economic processes developed still further. The landowners acquired more land, while the peasants lost some of theirs; the growth of goods and capitalist relations was speeded up, as well as the accumulation of wealth from trade and the investment of a part of it in industry, and the emergence of the present credit system. Nevertheless, in the chief branch of Afghanistan's economy, agriculture, pre-capitalist forms of exploitation continued to dominate; the prevailing form being métayage.

With the coming to power of Muhammad Daud's Government (1953) the State began to play a still more active role in the country's economy. State organizations and mixed joint-stock companies were created, concentrating in their hands a significant part of Afghan foreign trade; new banks were established. The direction and control of the activity of industrial enterprises passed to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Mining and Industry. The Government raised the fixed prices on export goods, which facilitated the growth of production and an increase in the export of these goods and improved the country's currency situation.

At the present time State and private funds are being used to create new industrial enterprises, irrigation works and highways; a network of airlines is being established, and measures are being taken to increase crop and livestock production, etc. The strengthening of the State's role in the economic life of the country reflects the growing State capitalist tendencies in the Afghan economy.

However, in spite of the successes achieved, Afghanistan remains an underdeveloped agrarian country. In 1953-4 agriculture contributed 72 per cent of the gross national product, while industry and trade represented only 6.4 per cent. The national income per person was approximately 20 American dollars, one of the lowest in the world.

Utilizing the accumulation of national capital, the aid of the countries of the socialist camp, and also attracting foreign capital, the Afghan Government is now finishing a five-year plan (1956/7-1960/1), which, in Afghanistan's conditions, is a big programme for economic development.

Great attention is given to increasing agricultural production, the expansion of energetics, the construction of new industry, the development of transport, prospecting and extracting raw materials, and the training of specialists and technical and administrative personnel.

"Social contradictions": The growth of political sentiment (pp.269-272)

The developing capitalist relations are leaving their mark on all aspects of the country's economic life. The growth of commercial agriculture and cattle-breeding has been the ruination of the peasants. There has been large-scale buying of peasant lands. Semi-feudal relations in the countryside are forcing the peasants to cultivate the landowner's land under progressively worsening share-cropping terms. More and more peasants are going to the towns, but because of the slow expansion of industry and construction there is little work to be had there. At the same time, a small number of the prosperous peasantry is turning into a rural bourgeoisie. Like the landowners, this bourgeoisie of rich peasants are usually share-croppers and, in addition, are widely engaged in usury.

The development of capitalist relations in the countryside has resulted in the formation of a rural proletariat occupied in the production of agricultural raw materials either for export or for the needs of local industry. There are, however, no peasant organizations in Afghanistan, any class stirring among the peasantry being quite spontaneous.

The industrial proletariat is small. Labour conditions are regulated by a law passed in 1946, which applies only to workers occupied either in factories or in their construction. Labour for building is recruited by agents who at the same time act as foremen.

There are no political parties or trade unions. Responsibility for the enforcement of the labour law lies with the Government Department of "Labour and Workers". In 1951, referring to cases of infringement of the labour law, one of the Kabul newspapers complained that the owners of industrial enterprises were not paying enough attention to the laws designed to protect the workers. The working class of Afghanistan takes no part in the political struggle. Where they have expressed themselves they have confined themselves to economic demands.

Big business occupies an important position in the country's economy and thus encroaches on the interests of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. Since the war, there have been some signs that certain sections of the bourgeoisie are dissatisfied with the dominance of the shirkats and with the concentration of political power in the hands of capitalists and landowners. Which precisely these sections are or the extent to which they are organized is not clear. They include some sections of the intelligentsia, and about 1947 a movement called "Active Youth" started, whose declared aim was the abolition of feudal survivals in social life, and also of graft, oppression and other social abuses. The promotion of education and knowledge was thought

to be the best way of achieving these aims. As the movement developed it began to publish its own newspapers, which were the first to be published privately in Afghanistan. These newspapers dealt with the economic backwardness of Afghanistan and the difficult position of the workers, and they reported arbitrary acts by individual representatives of authority. They also criticized the activity of the American monopolists.

The views and aims published in these newspapers in 1951 made it clear that their originators were now advancing from the expression of opinion to active participation in politics. Demands were made that political power should no longer remain the monopoly of the landowners and rich bourgeoisie, and that the economic privileges of big business should be abolished. These demands reflected the wish of the Afghan middle and petty urban bourgeoisie to gain access to political power, and also to improve the conditions of their own economic activity. No change in the structure of society was envisaged, but such expressions of opinion pointed to the development of a social movement in Afghanistan, in which the different social strata of the population were for the first time united.

At about this time there was also increased activity on the part of the deputies of the National Council, which mainly reflected the interests of the urban middle classes. Speeches in the Council criticized various aspects of Afghan affairs.

In 1952, during the preparation and holding of the elections for the 8th session of the National Council, the political struggle became open. In May of that year there was a political demonstration in Kabul for the first time in the country's history. This took the form of a protest on the part of the electorate against the conduct of the elections as controlled by the authorities. The leaders of the demonstration were arrested, and the rank and file participants were subjected to various forms of repression. A ban was placed on opposition newspapers.

Government policy 1946-1959 (pp.272-5)

The policy of the ruling class of landowners and big bourgeoisie was directed towards strengthening their political and economic position in the country. At the same time, in the first few years after the war the Afghan Government, in its efforts to alleviate the growing social contradictions, began to carry out measures which to some degree assisted the economic activity of the middle bourgeoisie, and gave it an opportunity to take part in local administration.

In 1947-8, the companies (shirkats), in which a large proportion of the country's capital was concentrated, were partially deprived of the monopolist rights which they had hitherto enjoyed for the procurement and export of Afghan agricultural raw materials, and for the import of foreign industrial goods. All companies and merchants were declared free to conduct foreign trade under the control of the Ministry of Economy, which issued licences for the import and export of goods. In practice, however, the companies maintained their domination in trade, relying not only on their own wealth, but on the solid support of the State.

In 1947, the Government established elected urban boards in the capitals of the vilayats (provinces), ala-hukumats (districts), loe hukumats (regions) and the larger hukumats (counties). This reform catered for the interests not only of the big traders and industrialists, but also of the middle and small urban bourgeoisie. An important new feature in the regulation dealing with the election of the urban boards was that election must be by secret ballot.

The isolated measures instituted by the Afghan Government, unsupported as they were by any large scale programme of economic reforms, could not solve the many social problems which had come to a head after the war. The activity of trading capital and of money-lending in the Afghan countryside, where feudal forms of exploitation predominate, adversely affected agricultural production. Shortages of foodstuffs repeatedly occurred, and the Government was often forced to buy grain and flour in the USA. According to reports in the Afghan press, unemployment and the steady rise in the cost of living had a serious effect on the condition of the workers.

The development of capitalist relations called for the introduction of wide measures to facilitate capitalist enterprise in both town and country, and to limit to some degree such surviving forms of exploitation as usury and debt bondage. A speedier development of the national industry was necessary in order to weaken the country's dependence on foreign capital, and in addition, to ensure at least partial employment of the labour force which had been released as the result of the class struggle and resulting drift to the towns. The only way to do this was by checking the colonialist ambitions of the imperialist monopolies, and by pursuing a consistent policy which would contribute to the independent development of the country.

This conviction began to be shared by more and more sections of Afghan society, and it was reinforced by important events occurring in the East as a whole, which pointed to the impending collapse of the colonial system. The success achieved in their anti-imperialist struggle by other Asian and African peoples persuaded Afghan patriotic

circles of the possibility of their pursuing an active independent policy not only in international affairs, but also in internal economic development. These circles began to realize how it was that the formation of the socialist camp had enabled economically underdeveloped countries to obtain support in their struggle against colonialism by collaborating on friendly and equal terms with the socialist countries.

Insufficient attention to new forms of economic development and disregard of international conditions which might favour independent measures calculated to relieve acute social problems, limited the social standpoint of the Afghan Government, and aroused the dissatisfaction not only of the masses but also of the national bourgeoisie both in the cities and in the countryside. It was in such circumstances that in September 1953 there were changes in the cabinet. There were however no changes in the class structure of the Afghan State: political power still belongs as before to the landowners and to big business. Nevertheless, the new Government headed by the first cousin of the King, Muhammad Daud, was ready to carry out some reforms which were to aid the development of capitalist relationships and the more rapid growth of productive forces with the support of the State.

The economic programme announced by the Government at the beginning of 1954 provided for "the preservation of capital, the overcoming of inflation, currency control and the expansion of credit". There was nothing essentially new for Afghanistan in these measures; but the concrete steps now taken by the new Government gave evidence of its desire to go further than its predecessors in supporting the development of new forms of economic development. Having proclaimed the policy of so-called "guided economy", the Government of Muhammad Daud proceeded to carry out important reforms of a state-capitalist type.

First of all there was set up what was - under existing conditions - a wide network of financial credit for productive purposes. Before 1954, large accumulations of Afghan capital could be used in principle for State and semi-State loans. With the foundation of new banks (the trading, mortgage and construction, and agricultural producers banks) the possibility of obtaining credit was greatly increased. A new departure in the economic policy of the Afghan ruling circles resulted in an organization of semi-State credits for the rich peasant class in the countryside and for entrepreneurs in urban industrial production. The rate of interest fixed by the new banks and credit co-operatives was significantly lower than that demanded by money-lenders.

Having increased the merchants' credit facilities, the Afghan Government now strengthened its control over foreign trade. The specialized companies created with the aid of State capital had concentrated in their hands a large part of the trade in basic export and

import goods. The Government began to stimulate the export of agricultural raw materials and to encourage the import of industrial equipment and essential goods at the expense of goods of secondary importance.

One of the means of overcoming economic difficulties is considered by the ruling circles of Afghanistan to be the attraction of foreign capital investment. In 1954, a law was passed permitting entrepreneur activity by foreigners. This has resulted in increased activity on the part of American, British, West German, Japanese and other imperial monopolies. In general, however, the Afghan Government has only permitted the formation of mixed companies in which not less than 51 per cent of the shares are owned by national capital. National entrepreneurs in industry enjoy the unfailing support of the State and new enterprises are being increasingly formed in which foreign companies are brought in only as contractors, suppliers of equipment etc.

At the beginning of 1956, the Afghan Government adopted a five-year plan for the development of the country's economy, which concentrates mainly on energy, industry, transport, agriculture, and irrigation. To finance the plan, the Government, while utilizing foreign capital, is also mobilizing internal resources, in the first place by raising taxation, chiefly indirect.

The section on Afghanistan's foreign policy lays particular emphasis on her desire to remain neutral and independent, and on the alleged attempts of the West to involve her in its own military and political grouping in Asia. The section ends with the following paragraph: "The history of Afghanistan's relations with the states of the socialist camp bears witness to the fact that differences in the social structure of states constitutes no obstacle to the peaceful coexistence and friendly co-operation of their peoples."

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries, with the exception of India, appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 January-31 March 1961.

AFGHAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

A Tass report from Kabul (IZ. 2.3.61) quoted Afghan reports that Pakistani aircraft had bombed the villages of Gaziabad and Batmali "in Pushtunistan". Another Tass report from Kabul (P. 22.3.61) reported the Afghan protest to Pakistan which alleged that Pakistani jet aircraft had attacked an Afghan passenger aircraft, en route from Kabul to Delhi, 90 miles west of Lahore.

PRAVDA (24.3.61) reported the reply made by Ali Muhammad, the acting Afghan Premier, to statements by President Ayub Khan in London. President Ayub Khan had stated that Afghanistan was interfering in the internal affairs of the Pushtun areas, and was concentrating troops on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Ali Muhammad declared that Pakistan was trying to deceive public opinion; the Pakistani complaint was quite without foundation, and it was the Pakistanis who had been carrying out raids and occupying Pushtun territory; Afghanistan would support its brother Pushtuns, and considered their struggle a lawful one.

On the following day PRAVDA published an article by O. Skalkin reviewing the Pushtunistan question and restating the Soviet attitude to it. The division of the Pushtun people, said Skalkin, was a legacy of British imperial rule, and the Pakistani authorities were taking measures to perpetuate it. In recent months punitive expeditions into the Pushtun areas had been organized, peaceful villages had been bombed and "mass repressions" instituted. Imperialist circles were showing increased interest in Afghan-Pakistani differences; the Pushtun areas, owing to their nearness to the Soviet Union, had for long attracted the attention of aggressive imperialist circles, and it was from this region that the U-2 aircraft had set off on its flight. The Soviet Union, whose frontiers were so near to this region which was

the object of so dangerous a dispute, "cannot remain indifferent". The Soviet Government desired the just settlement of the Pushtun problem by peaceful means. This was impossible without taking into account the interests of the Pushtun people. As Khrushchev had stated, the Afghan demand for a free plebiscite offered the correct solution; the Pushtun people would then decide whether they wished to remain within the borders of Pakistan, to form a new independent state or to unite with Afghanistan. Good sense was necessary for the solution of this problem and the normalization of Afghan-Pakistani relations, in the interests of both peoples and of all to whom peace and security were dear.

On 3 April PRAVDA published another article, signed "Observer", on the Pushtunistan problem. This said that PRAVDA's earlier article on the subject had been greatly appreciated in Afghanistan, but had caused displeasure in official circles in Karachi. These circles wished to "settle" the Pushtunistan problem by force; regular troops, tanks and aircraft had been used against the Pushtun population, and the number of victims was growing daily; eight divisions armed with modern American equipment had been sent into the Pushtun area. PRAVDA went on to give an analysis of the Pushtunistan problem on the same lines as in its earlier article. These two articles represent a restatement of the basic Soviet view of the problem (see CAR, 1960, No.3, pp.310-15) which affords a limited measure of support to Afghan claims; it is still not openly stated that the disputed area should belong to Afghanistan. A new note, perhaps, is the increased emphasis on the need to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations; and the matter is also viewed in the context of the security of the Soviet frontiers.

SOVIET-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Publicity was given to the 40th anniversary of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 28 February 1921. Articles described the growth of friendly relations between the two countries, reviewed Soviet-Afghan agreements during the past 40 years, and emphasized the extent of Soviet aid and its importance for Afghanistan; most of the articles (e.g. IZ. 28.2.61) claimed that Soviet aid and support was mainly responsible for Afghanistan's gaining her independence from Britain. PRAVDA (1.3.61) published the messages exchanged between Khrushchev and Brezhnev and the Afghan King and Prime Minister on the occasion, and also (29.3.61) a further exchange of greetings on the occasion of the Afghan New Year.

SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

In January and February the Pakistani economic delegation headed by the Minister of National Reconstruction, Zulfiqar Ali Khan Bhutto, continued its talks in Moscow (CAR, 1961, No.1, p.107). On 4 March a Soviet-Pakistani agreement on cooperation in oil prospecting was signed in Karachi. Under this agreement, during 1961-5 Soviet organizations will provide Pakistan with the necessary equipment, and also with such materials as cannot be obtained in Pakistan, and will send to Pakistan specialists for the prospecting operations and also for assistance in training Pakistani specialists and workers. To meet the expenses of the Soviet organizations the Soviet Government has granted the Pakistani Government a long-term credit of 27 million rupees. (IZ. 7.3.61)

NEPAL

Little further mention has been made in the Soviet press of King Mahendra's take-over of the Nepalese Government in December (CAR, 1961, No.1, p.107). Two Muslim republican newspapers (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY and KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 7.1.61) carried a short Tass dispatch from London, reporting without comment that the King had banned the activities of all political parties in the country. The report mentioned that the King promised to continue a policy of neutrality and friendship with all countries. Several articles appeared in connexion with Nepal's National Day on 18 February. IZVESTIYA (19.2.61) reviewed the relations between the Soviet Union and Nepal since they established diplomatic relations in 1956, stressing exchanges of visits between the leaders of the two countries, and Nepal's non-participation in military blocs. No reference was made to the recent political events in the country.

PERSIA

Soviet newspapers presented the most unfavourable picture of the Persian parliamentary elections of January; IZVESTIYA (18.1.61) said that they were merely a repetition of the "election comedy" of the previous year, and Sharif Imami's promise of free and impartial elections was impossible of fulfilment under present conditions. The tone of Soviet comment on Persian affairs improved noticeably after the announcement (15.2.61) that the Persian Premier would visit Moscow with a good-will delegation. IZVESTIYA (13.3.61) gave an account of Sharif Imami's speech to the Majlis in presenting his new government, in which he expressed the hope that as a result of his visit the "misunderstanding" between Persia and the Soviet Union would give place to friendly relations and complete confidence.

The episode of the abortive Soviet-Persian talks of December 1958 -February 1959 for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty was brought to the fore again in the Soviet press in January, in connexion with the account of these talks given by the Shah in his recently published memoirs. An article in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No.1 of 1961, gave a detailed account of the negotiations, in order to rebut allegations made by the Shah concerning the Soviet attitude. (For an account of this article, see MIZAN NEWSLETTER, No.3, March 1961.)

The 40th anniversary of the Soviet-Persian treaty of 26 February 1921 was the subject of a long article in IZVESTIYA (27.2.61) which expressed the hope for better relations between the two countries.

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



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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER: A monthly review of Soviet writing on the Middle East, comprising articles on Soviet opinion about Middle East affairs, relations between the USSR and Middle East countries, and Soviet newspapers' presentation of Middle East developments. In July 1960 the scope of the Newsletter was extended to include Soviet writing on Africa. Subscription rate: £4 per year, post free; single copies: 7s. 6d. post free.

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The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of th
The total area of the six Muslim republics is 1½ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of
area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cen
total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26,676,000 includes
Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Musli
communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the si
republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) p
amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.

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